

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING



THE RECOGNITION OF SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN AS AMIR OF KABUL.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

1. My first proposal, to divide the country into districts, as telegraphed on the 2nd October, met with many difficulties, and finding, on the 7th October, that the exertions of Mr. Anderson and Shahzada Sultan Jan to unite the two factions under their two heads had been very successful, and that the scheme appeared to be the best suited to the requirements of the people, I ratified in durbar the election of Muhammad Nur Khan and Badshah Gul to be the leaders and rulers of the whole community.

2. I impressed upon them that they were not to consider themselves as in any way owners of the country, but as the nominees of the people, as administrators of the public money, and guardians of the public weal; that they were not to interfere in any village matters, which would, as heretofore, be managed by the village elders after the laws and customs of their fathers.

3. They have been advanced the sum of two thousand rupees to commence the enrolment of a levy for the protection of the forts and posts along the line of road, and I have asked permission by telegraph to make this sum five thousand before I leave.

4. A few Enfield rifles, matchlocks, and ammunition captured from the Afghans at Peirwur Kotal will also be made over to them.

5. How long the arrangement may exist it is impossible to say, for the Turis are Afghans, but the chief danger of a rupture is, as Mr. Anderson points out, to be looked for from the secret intrigues of the Amir of Kabul's agents in the Hariob and Khost.

6. I do not say that the Amir himself will authorize such proceedings, but his agents, who long for a residence in Kurram, with all its opportunities for enriching themselves, will leave no stone unturned to embroil the Turis with the British Government, and I think that the Government of India might well address a letter to His Highness, calling upon him to warn his agents to desist from all interference with the Turis. These latter I have cautioned never to give the Amir any excuse for interfering, and pointed out that, to avoid this, they must be extremely careful to grant no shelter or protection to fugitives from the Hariob or Khost.

7. The Chukmunis, who are Sunnis, I do not consider to come within the scope of General Roberts' promises of independence, and their behaviour last year in giving passage to the Munguls to attack our position at Ali Kheyl, although punished afterwards by a fine of Rs. 5,000, would release us from any obligations if we had any. Their Governor, Shere Mahomed, a Khuttuck exile, who has hitherto received a salary of Rs. 250 a month from us, will cease to receive it when we leave, and is, I believe, already making his arrangements with Kabul.

8. Several influential maliks will accompany me to Thal, where I hope that the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat will meet us, and if any further points for discussion or settlement arise, they can be dealt with there.

Enclosure 9 in No. 30.

From H. A. ANDERSON, Esq., Assistant Political Officer, Kurram, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram. (No. 716 O., dated Kurram, 15th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the measures adopted to effect the settlement of the affairs of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India.

The policy of the Government as regards the future of the Kurram valley is set forth in the proclamation telegraphed to you on the 28th August, which was announced to the people of the valley in the durbar held by you on the 7th instant. So far as the administration of the country was concerned, the proclamation announced that the Government of India was not prepared to provide the valley with a Governor. Immediately, however, you informed me that the Government of India had authorized you to submit any practicable scheme for the appointment of a Governor. And subsequent to these instructions the Government of India intimated that it would have no objection to recognizing a Governor elected by the Turis and Bangashis, whether himself an inhabitant of the valley or a stranger.

As you are aware, I have throughout been of opinion that the future welfare of this valley and of its inhabitants would be best secured by the appointment of a Governor

nominated by the Government of India. And I have submitted to you evidence showing that a very large number of the influential men of the valley desired this arrangement. As, however, this course has not been approved by the Government of India, it is unnecessary to discuss it further here.

I propose to explain at some length the reasons which have led me to come to the conclusion that the proposal to leave the choice of an individual Governor to the people of the valley themselves was absolutely impracticable.

The Turi tribe consists of five sections,—

- (1.) The Hamza Kheyl.
- (2.) The Mastu Kheyl.
- (3.) The Dapurzai.
- (4.) The Ghundi Kheyl.
- (5.) The Alizai.

The Bangash of the valley in point of numbers and importance rank with each of these sections, and may for convenience sake be classed with them as a sixth section; while, however, the sectional divisions of the tribe are scrupulously maintained and respected, and their existence cannot be disregarded in any matter concerning the tribe, still it cannot be too strongly insisted, that by far the most potent factor in all matters concerning the tribe as a whole is that of faction. The Turi tribe in this characteristic resembles most of the Pathan tribes of the frontier; and as it was the policy of the Durani rulers to administer by fomenting factious differences, the faction spirit moving the Turis is perhaps keener than elsewhere. I mention this to show that this peculiarity to which I attribute so much working power is not confined to a tribe with whom we have a limited acquaintance, but is also shared by tribes with whom we have long been familiar. I believe that the experience of frontier officers and the records of the offices of frontier districts will confirm what I advance regarding the potency of faction in determining the action of most Pathan tribes. The inhabitants of the Kurram valley are divided into two factions—the Dravandi and the Myan Sayad, popularly characterized as the Sust and Tuig Gundis. The adherents of the former are distinguished as being the disciples of the local Sayads, the adherents of the latter as being disciples of the Shiah Sayads of Torah. It would be out of place here to analyze the effects of this element of discord on the sectional and tribal relations of the people; and I must ask that the assumption be granted that the effects are most potent. But I would point attention to the fact that, in almost every collection of hamlets which constitute a Kurram village, there are representatives of each faction. It may be inferred from this that the village, the section and the tribe are one and all penetrated by the spirit of faction.

It may be gathered from the above description of the state of parties in the Kurram valley that unity in any important matter, such as that of the election of a tribal Governor, was not to be looked for. In accordance with your instructions, however, both personally and through my Native assistant, Shahzada Sultan Jan, I ascertained the wishes of the people as regards this question.

The result of my inquiries showed that the notion of electing an individual resident of the valley as a Governor was not entertained by any one. Such a course was considered as beyond the range of the possible. On the other hand, I found that the names of four persons, not permanent residents of the valley, were in people's mouths. Some people named my Native assistant Shahzada Sultan Jan, and as he is singularly popular in the valley, he might have found some supporters, but he could by no means have secured the votes of a majority. This he acknowledged himself, and at the same time he knew that without assistance from Government he would be unable to undertake the governorship and maintain his position. Further, he had no wish to accept the post and would have refused it if offered to him. My tahsildar here, Akbar Khan, son of Mahomed Amir Khan of the Kohat district, and my Superintendent of Settlement, Mirza Sultan Hasan, were, I believe, at one time anxious to accept the governorship, and so became talked about; but I ascertained that neither commanded general appreciation. The fourth proposal was that the leading Sayad of Torah should be elected Governor. Whatever approval this proposal may have received among the Turis of the Sayad's own faction, it was obvious that it would meet with a corresponding degree of disapproval from the Turis of the opposing faction, and events justified this conclusion. As, therefore, I was compelled to dismiss the proposal that the Turis should elect a man from among themselves to rule their tribe as impracticable, so was I compelled to conclude that the nomination of any of

the strangers named above would be unpopular with the majority of the tribe, and their election would be of no effect.

It will be clearly seen, I trust, from what I have written above, that I endeavoured to give effect to the instructions of the Government of India, sanctioning the election of a Governor by the people of the Kurram valley, but that this course was unsuited to the constitution of the tribe, and could not be adopted under its existing condition. While I was engaged in ascertaining the wishes of the people of this valley, I was informed that the two leading and most influential men of each faction, namely, Sayad Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, were quietly and with united aim consulting with the influential representatives of each tribe with the view of organizing a form of government of a popular nature, in case the Government of India did not deem it advisable to appoint a Governor for the valley. This project was secretly announced to you in a petition, which I submitted to you together with a petition from a very large number of the representatives of the tribe, asking that Government would give them a Governor.

When it was definitely announced that the Government were not prepared to nominate and appoint a Governor in accordance with your instructions, I had it announced throughout the valley that the time was now come for the whole tribe to arrange for its future administration, and every one was invited to come and give expression to his wishes. For three or four days a very large, in fact complete, tribal council was assembled at Kurram, and debated on the policy to be adopted. The results of those debates are contained in the two petitions sealed by the complete body of representatives of every tribe of the valley, forming Annexure No. I. to this Report.

The petitions, it will be noted, are two in number,—one on behalf of each faction—but are identical in wording. They express the unanimous agreement of the people of the valley to carry on their affairs, both internal and external, by means of their general tribal council under the leadership of the heads of their factions, Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan; and they contain the further expressions of the intention of the people to contribute one rupee per jarib of cultivated land to defray the expenses necessarily incurred in maintaining the arrangements proposed to be instituted for the government of the tribe.

As soon as I had ascertained that the tribe was unanimous in preferring this solution of the difficult question of providing for the government of the valley, I communicated the fact to you, and expressed the opinion that the arrangements now proposed should be adopted, and I further recommended that no time should be lost in holding a public durbar for the purpose of finally announcing the orders of Government regarding the future of the valley, and to announce that the arrangements now proposed by the people themselves for their own government were acceptable to Government, and would be recognized by the Government of India. You instructed me accordingly to announce throughout the valley that you would hold a public durbar on the 7th October; and at the same time you directed me to elicit from the representatives of the tribes in more detail the arrangements which they proposed to make for the maintenance of the forts and Government buildings in the valley, and for the distribution among themselves of the duties of internal government and external defence. These details, so far as could be ascertained, are contained in the papers forming Annexure No. II. to this Report.

In the afternoon of the 7th October you opened the durbar, which was attended by representatives from every part of the valley and of every section. After you had explained the orders of Government to the assembled crowd, the Proclamation of Government was read out to them in Persian and in Pushtu. This was followed by the presentation to you by representatives of the two factions of the two petitions containing the proposals of the people for their government.

Those who had attached their seals to these petitions were then questioned as to whether they agreed to the contents; and generally the whole of the assemblage were invited to express their assent or dissent. I think that you were satisfied that, with the exception of Sayad Hanif, an influential Sayad of Kurman, and his nephew Shah Hasan, who were discontented with the preference given to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, the whole assemblage expressed its acquiescence in the scheme of Government contained in the petition. In accordance with this expression of acquiescence you intimated that their proposal was acceptable to Government. A choga and lungi were then delivered to representatives of each faction, who were directed to deliver them to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, respectively, as an intimation that they were accepted by their factions as the leading men, through

whose leadership the affairs of the tribe were to be managed through the tribal Jirgah. The assemblage was then dismissed, and the durbar broke up.

It will, I think, be hardly necessary to adduce argument to show that the scheme of self-administration thus adopted by the tribe of its own free will is the best that could have been adopted under existing circumstances. The fact that the tribe was unanimous in proposing and accepting the arrangement furnishes justification for its being accepted by the Government of India. However, I may express the opinion that, looking at the existing state of the Turi tribe, as described in a previous part of the report, the arrangement is the one of all others possible under the instructions of the Government of India which commends itself to me as being best adapted to secure the welfare of the tribe in the new state of independence into which it will pass on the evacuation of the country by the British troops.

While, however, the general arrangement may meet with approval, exception may be taken to the fact that the details of the scheme of administration are not filled in. The scheme provides generally for matters concerning the tribe as a whole, but it does not provide for matters of local and petty interests, and the other influential men of the valley who may be expected to take part in the public concern are not named nor assigned a place. The answer to this is that, like other Pathan tribes, the Turis have their own customary law, civil and criminal, and their own tribunals, the council of elders and the respected Sayads for the decision of all minor matters. And further, the Turis resemble other Pathans in this respect, that no one can bear to see his neighbour placed higher than himself. Acting on these considerations, I have deemed it unnecessary to attempt to formulate what is already familiar to the people, and unadvisable to particularize where the effect could only be to produce dissension. While, however, I believe that the explanation tendered above will be considered as satisfactory, I feel that you will require a special explanation of the reasons which have prevented me from carrying into effect, according to my original proposal, the portion of the scheme of administration which contemplated a division of the valley into districts for the purposes of internal administration. I was led to believe at one time that it would be possible, to a certain extent, to introduce this division. I hoped that, taking the forts as a basis, it would be possible to assign one to each tribe or locality, and that a certain number of the leading men of the tribe or locality might be specially named and appointed custodians of the fort with certain jurisdiction attaching to the office. I found out, however, on inquiring further into the question, that the latter portion of this plan was impracticable, as there were too many claimants, and that any attempt to select individuals would produce dissensions of the most bitter kind. I found a further objection in the fact that no one of the Turi section inhabits any one district of the valley. A portion of each section holds lands and villages in each district. The sections are broken up and scattered to an extraordinary extent throughout the length and breadth of the country. This being so, it is obvious that any district now constituted as such would of necessity be controlled by representatives of each tribe. To organize an entirely new district administration out of such sectionally heterogeneous materials was impracticable. While, however, I have to confess that I erred on this matter, I think that the scheme for the maintenance of a garrison for each fort, to be furnished by the locality which is approved by the tribe, will, if carried out, prove a source of great strength to the tribe as a whole, and will be considered satisfactory. I have devoted a great deal of trouble to this portion of the scheme. It will be difficult, for the tribesmen suddenly made independent, to realize the value of combining for the purpose of maintaining the forts. They have been accustomed, while under the Durani Government, to attack and burn the Government forts at each change of ruler. They have no taste of service away from their homes, and they look upon their villages as their natural forts. While, therefore, on paper, the maintenance of the forts is provided for, and the influential men of the valley appreciate their value, I am bound to state my opinion that they will have great difficulties to face in carrying out their present proposals. I consider, however, that the matter is extremely important for the welfare of the people, and have given all assistance in my power towards the enlisting of tribal levies. The hands of the leading maliks, however, would be materially strengthened by a present of money to accelerate their enlistment. All the sections are prepared to furnish the complement allotted to them; but it will be difficult to retain the services of the men supplied without some remuneration. In time, no doubt, if all goes well, and the tribesmen contribute to the general fund, it will be possible to enlist regular garrisons. The difficulty is to start the special arrangements before the general scheme of Government has been set to work.

I need not give at length here the strength of the garrison proposed for the forts, nor the other details contained in Annexure No. II. to this Report. The arrangements proposed, if carried out in their entirety, are excellent. Before concluding this report, I would desire to offer a few remarks on the probable results of the arrangements for the future independent government of the valley which I have described.

The success of any arrangements for the self-government of a Pathan tribe, such as the Turis are, suddenly made independent, cannot be predicted absolutely. The tendency of a tribe, under such circumstances, is to break loose from the control of those who would, under ordinary circumstances, exercise restraint on its members. Old animosities and feuds between individuals and between tribes have to be settled, and not without blood-shedding, to be followed by retaliation. Persons who, under the former *régime*, acquired influence and popularity, provoke aggression, and strangers who acquired land under the protection of foreign rulers invite attack. There is a general tendency of the strong to be aggressive, so that the weak are compelled to form new alliances and enlist under new factions. In fact, a general social ferment has to be expected, and a general straining of old social safeguards has to be anticipated.

To a large extent, the Turi tribe may be expected to exhibit these symptoms. There are ancient feuds, such as that between the villages of Malana and Zeran, between the Maddi Khel Norad, sub-section of the Hamza Khel, and the Sunni Bangash of Haji Khel, and there are a hundred and one well known family feuds of tribal note which will surely burst out now. There are also foreign settlers in the land who, unless they pay heavily for support, will be expelled. But the Turis live in the midst of an almost unbroken circle of hostile tribes, whose hostility is heightened by differences of religious belief. For tribal safety, union is absolutely necessary; and it may be hoped that the danger from without will serve to extinguish minor differences within, and will tend to encourage a state of order. The arrangements now to be adopted furnish few novelties, and the tribe should find no insuperable difficulty in setting them to work. The scheme of administration is of their own choice, and is well adapted for the existing conditions of the tribe and the characters of the people. Further, though one or two of the influential men may from time to time have shown signs of a leaning to the Kabul Government, the body of the people, the "Kishars," who have grown rich and powerful during our occupation, while the former respectabilities and influential men have been standing still, are heart and soul determined to maintain the state of independency and self-government now set on foot.

As far as the tribe is concerned, and so far as we conceive its relation with the tribes encircling it, there is some hope that the arrangement now set on foot will work well and will last some time. The great dangers to which the independent welfare of the tribe is now exposed are two, first, insidious interferences from Kabul, and secondly, the treachery of the leading men of the valley. Both these dangers must be faced, for they are certain. Ever since the Amir's deputies have occupied the Hariob, they have spared no effort to embroil the Turis with us, and have sedulously promoted the Amir's interests throughout the valley, though without great success. The Turi maliks drew stipends under the Kabul Governor, and were flattered and honoured when necessary at the expense of the common people. Under the new arrangement they are placed on an equality, and will regret the fleshpots of the Durani. The Turis, however, are a strong, self-dependent, vigorous race, well prepared to face future pent from their numerous enemies, as they know that the Government of India has guaranteed them against encroachments of the Kabul Government. For the time being this assurance seems to have bound them together. When the British forces evacuate the valley, some internal disturbances and bloodshed may be expected, and I cannot confidently give the assurance that the settlement now made will stand in its integrity.

Much will depend on the maintenance of the cordiality now professed to exist between Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, and much will depend on the manner in which they discharge their trust to the tribe. If only they will honestly work in concert for the interests of the tribe, if they will work through the other head and influential men of the sections, and not attempt to act independently of them, the valley should soon enjoy tranquillity. Whether or not at a later stage external intrigue and internal treachery may not disturb the present agreement, it is difficult to say. It is quite possible that this will happen, but if it should happen under existing arrangements, the tribe will have to accept the blame, for the Government of India

has treated it with kindness and consideration. The tribe desires independence at present, and has agreed to a form of self government of its own choice. It has received all possible assistance towards setting the desired form of government on foot. It alone must be held responsible if its own approved institution fails through the incapacity of those subject to it bear the self-imposed burden.



Annexure No. I.

TRANSLATION of the Petitions presented on behalf of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley at the public durbar held on the 7th October 1880, by Major-General JOHN WATSON, C.B., V.C.

INASMUCH as strong enmity and hatred exists between us and the Duranis owing to their tyranny, so that if our flesh and bones and their flesh and bones were boiled together in one pot, the water would not unite ; therefore we have always desired to be freed from the oppression of the Duranis and enjoy repose.

By the kindness of Government we have been delivered from this tyranny, and have recently lived in peace and comfort. As regards the future we have previously made two petitions to the Government: First, we asked that we should be freed from the Durani's rule; and, secondly, we asked that the Government would give us a sanad. We still desire that a Governor be granted to us by the Government; but as there appears to be delay in granting us a Governor, therefore, because we are two factions, one Drewandi, of which the head is Sayad Badshah Gul, and the other Myan, of which the head is Mahomed Nur Khan, therefore, we two factions agreeing together have this confident hope and desire that we shall, with greater unanimity than any other frontier tribes can show, by means of general tribal jirga under the leadership of Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan by paying as revenue one rupee per jarib, defray the expenses of these two leading men, the malikana of maliks, and other necessary expenses of administration, and shall provide for the maintenance of internal order and the means of internal defence to the common advantage and peace.

For these reasons, in accordance with the desire of our hearts, approving the arrangements of a tribal jirga as given above, we petition accepting all responsibility, that Government will approve our request and will acknowledge the two men we have chosen as our leaders. Whatever kindness is shown to them will be shown to the tribe.

Annexure No. II.

ARRANGEMENTS contemplated by the Turi and Bangash Tribes of the Kurram Valley for Tribal Defence and for the Maintenance of Garrisons in the Forts of the Valley.

I.—EACH of the six tribes will furnish 100 men, in all 600 men, to be employed for service. For each body of 100 men a Sadbashi will be appointed on Rs. 30 per mensem, and 10 Dabashi to receive Rs. 12 per mensem. Each private will receive Rs. 6 per mensem. Each tribe will be responsible for supplying its own complement.

II.—*The Shalozan Fort and Cantonment.*—Only the Kara Kheyl or southern fort will be maintained in it, composed as follows :—

10 men of the Kara Kheyl, subsection of the Gundi Kheyl.
30 men of the Bangash of Shalozan.

40

The land now occupied by the cantonments will be cultivated, as the land is well watered and valuable.

III.—Habib Killa shall be knocked down, as it cannot be occupied. The three Turi tribes of the Peiwar, Dapurzai, Ghundi Kheyl, and Alizai will provide a complement

of 30 men to garrison the road towers on the Peiwar road. Each tribe will supply 10 men.

IV.—A garrison of 10 men will be provided for Kharlasi, as it is exposed to the attack of enemies. The garrison will be supplied from the people of Kharlasi.

V.—*The Kurram Forts and Cantonments.*—The lines and northern fort will be knocked down after two months have elapsed, and the land will be cultivated by the landowners. The southern fort, the dāk bungalow, and the baradari of Wali Mahomed Khan will be occupied. A garrison of 300 men, 100 Mastu Kheyl, 100 Dapurzi, 100 Bangash, will be maintained.

VI.—*The Vangyan Fort.*—This fort belongs to Wali Mahomed Khan. If the Ghundi Kheyl, who are the proprietors of the land, buy it from him, they shall hold the fort. If it remains unsold, the people of Bangyan will hold it.

VI.—*Ibrahimzai Fort.*—The people of the Ibrahimzai village will leave it and occupy the fort.

VIII.—*Balesh Kheyl.*—The new fort will be occupied by a garrison of 200 men of the neighbourhood to protect the neighbouring villages against the Massozais. The old fort will be occupied, if possible, by the neighbouring villages.

IX.—The Shinak Gor will be occupied by the villages of Shinak.

X.—The Alizai fort will similarly be occupied by the five Alizai villages.

XI.—To maintain these levies and these garrisons a portion of the revenue paid by the people will be set aside. Muafidars will enjoy their former privilege of exemption, and the bhalsa lands will pay revenue at the ordinary rate of one rupee per jarib.

Enclosure 10 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th October 1880.

From General WATSON, B. Kheyl, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KURRAM evacuated this morning. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., commanding Kurram Field Force. (No. 3526 E/P., dated 3rd November 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 14th October 1880, with enclosure, reporting the fiscal arrangements made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

2. In reply, I am to say that your proceedings in connection with the settlement are approved by the Government of India.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have accepted Wali's proposal, and promised liberal provision.

No. 32.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 46.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 19th November 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 208, dated the 14th of September last, reporting the decision at which you have

arrived in regard to the maintenance of the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass and the Kurram valley, which have been held since the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. As regards the Khyber, your Excellency in Council has decided to recognize the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the pass, and to make such arrangements with their representatives as shall ensure that the road is kept open and free from interference. When these arrangements are concluded, the garrisons now in the pass will be withdrawn, but its occupation by Afghan regular troops, without the consent of the British Government, will not be permitted.

3. Similarly, it has been determined that the British forces shall leave the Kurram district so soon as certain questions connected with the future political position of the Turi tribe, occupying the Lower Valley from the eastern slopes of the Peiwar Kotal, have been arranged. You have already intimated to the Amir of Kabul that, while the independence of that tribe will be maintained against any interference, in accordance with positive assurances given to it by representatives of the Indian Government, you are ready to allow the Jajis, who inhabit the country beyond the Kotal, to pass under his jurisdiction; and you have authorized Major-General Watson, your Chief Political Officer in Kurram, to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis in respect to their future self-government, in view to some practicable settlement which may be satisfactory to a substantial majority of the tribe, and compatible with the early withdrawal of the troops.

4. The arrangements above summarized have been determined on by your Excellency in Council after receiving the opinions of the political and military officers who, during recent operations, have gained personal experience of the localities in question. As regards the Kurram district, your policy has necessarily been influenced by consideration of "the repeated assurances received by the Turi tribe from your officers that they " will not be replaced without their consent under the power of the Barakzai dynasty " at Kabul." Similar promises had been given to the Jaji tribe, inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal; but, as explained in the 9th paragraph of your Despatch, you have not thought yourselves at present under any obligation to guarantee the independence of that tribe, which appears content to revert to its former state of subordination to Kabul.

5. Accepting and adopting the reasons you have assigned, Her Majesty's Government assent to your proceedings, as reported in your present Despatch, and leave the details of the arrangements with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency in Council. They will, however, be glad to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the territories of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 33.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

SEE my telegram 17th November. Following, dated 29th, from St. John,—
 " Viceroy's letter delivered to Sirdar Shere Ali this afternoon. He cheerfully
 " acquiesces in decision, chooses Karachi as place of residence, and will leave as soon
 " as arrangements for his journey can be made."

No. 34.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING, dated 30th, received from Colonel St. John.—" 30th November. Sirdar
 " Shere Ali Khan this morning read the Viceroy's letter in public, and announced his
 " approaching departure to India, fixing date at 12 days hence."

No. 35.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 48.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 3rd December 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 225, dated the 19th October, reporting the delivery to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, after his recognition as Amir of Kabul, of a written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position; and I propose now, in pursuance of the intention intimated in my Despatch of the 30th of September last, to offer such observations as appear to be called for, on the negotiations of which the incident now reported may be regarded as the conclusion.

2. When in the spring of this year the early evacuation of Kabul by the British forces was resolved upon, and it became advisable to find some Native authority competent to assume the administration of Northern Afghanistan, the claims and qualifications of Sirdar Abdul Rahman necessarily forced themselves upon the attention of the Government. The arrival of the Sirdar in Balkh, and the establishment of his authority in that province, were events which could not be disregarded. As one of the senior grandsons of Dost Mahomed, and a chief who had shown capacity in the troubled times which followed the succession of the late Amir Shere Ali, he was believed to have a strong party amongst the Afghans, and a variety of considerations pointed to the establishment of friendly relations with him, as likely to be advantageous to British interests.

3. The communications with the Sirdar which were authorized by your Excellency's predecessor in Council had not, at the date when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office, led to any definite result; but the Native gentlemen who had been sent to his camp in order to ascertain his views and intentions had been received with courtesy, and there appeared to be a fair prospect of arriving eventually at a satisfactory understanding with him.

4. Such being the case, Her Majesty's Government had no desire to deviate from the policy which had received the approval of their predecessors; and they deemed it only necessary to impress upon your Excellency in Council* that, assuming a satisfactory result of the negotiations with the Sirdar, it was desirable that his authority should be established with as little assistance as possible from Her Majesty's agents or troops, and that he should be left after his accession to power to rely upon his own resources. Whilst, however, Her Majesty's Government were unable to undertake liabilities on behalf of a future Afghan Government, the character of which would necessarily, for some time to come, be uncertain, they authorized the renewal to Abdul Rahman Khan of those assurances of support against unprovoked external attack which had been given in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to Shere Ali, as well as an intimation that his reception of a British Resident would not be required.

5. Although during the progress of the negotiations with the Sirdar he gave cause on more than one occasion for mistrust of his sincerity, your Excellency in Council exercised a wise discretion in placing a liberal interpretation on his acts, and in hesitating to accept the unfavourable view of his intentions which his conduct at one time was calculated to inspire. I have already intimated to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of your proceedings in this respect, and I may therefore pass to a review of the instructions furnished on the 20th of July last to Sir D. Stewart, under which the Sirdar was finally recognized as Amir of Kabul.

6. These instructions, while clearly expressing the views of the Government of India on the various questions which might be expected to be raised by the Sirdar, duly provided against the contingency of failure to arrive at an understanding with him. You reminded Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin that the Government of India had from the first decided that the assumption of power at Kabul by Abdul Rahman was not to be made a matter of negotiation or bargain with the Sirdar, and that their arrangements for withdrawal from Northern Afghanistan were to be completed without reference to the result of the correspondence with him. In the event of the Sirdar manifesting good faith and a friendly spirit, you authorized his recognition under the title of Amir of Kabul, and the subsequent extension to him of full countenance and political support, but not of co-operation of British troops in the establishment of

his authority. Whilst you were willing to provide him with some artillery, and with sufficient money to meet his immediate wants, he was to be made to understand not only that the Government of India could not engage to furnish him with any regular subsidy or continuous supply of either money or arms, but that after he had taken possession of the capital he was to rely for holding it on his own resources. The necessity before evacuating Kabul of ensuring, as far as practicable, the protection from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct, of the tribes and individuals who had assisted the British cause, was duly impressed upon Sir D. Stewart, and you instructed him to address a fitting admonition on this subject to the Sirdar.

7. Whilst adhering to the line of policy which had from the beginning of the correspondence excluded any question of a treaty, you furnished Sir D. Stewart with a formal statement embodying the views of the Government of India as to the future position of the Sirdar, which might be delivered to him, if necessary. This document, which I now learn has been presented, assures the Sirdar of the desire of the British Government not to interfere in the internal government of the territories in his possession, nor to require an English Resident to be stationed anywhere within them. It further provides for ordinary friendly intercourse between the two Governments by the residence at Kabul, under agreement, of a Mahomedan Agent of the British Government. It defines plainly what must be the position of the ruler of Kabul in relation to foreign powers other than the British Government, declaring that since that Government admits of no right of interference by such powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of that country, it is obvious that the Amir can have no political relations with any foreign power, except with the British Government. It promises him, finally, assistance to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government to be necessary in repelling unprovoked aggression on his dominions, on the understanding that His Highness follows unreservedly the advice of that Government in regard to his external relations.

8. These instructions, and the subsequent proceedings of your Excellency in Council, meet with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. Although, as was natural, the expectations of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan on many points proved to be larger than your Government was prepared to satisfy, he has obtained all the present assistance that he could reasonably have hoped for. The consideration of so serious a question as that of entering into treaty relations with the Sirdar, cannot with prudence be taken up, until he has to some extent consolidated his administration in Northern Afghanistan, and manifested, more plainly than has yet been possible, his real disposition towards the British Government. Meanwhile, it is satisfactory to find that the Amir in his conversations with Mr. Lepel Griffin did not urge with any discourteous insistence wishes which could not at present be gratified, and that before the British forces withdrew from Kabul he expressed his obligation to the British Government for the favour it had shown to him. It having been determined that no treaty should be contracted with Abdul Rahman, no positive engagement could be taken from him for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted the British authorities during recent events. But Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that the Amir has shown every disposition to treat well those in this category who have remained behind at Kabul, and that your Excellency's Government have been able to offer, within Indian limits, an asylum and a proper provision to others who deemed themselves too much compromised so to remain with safety.

9. Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to take an exaggerated view of the advantage to British interests of the recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, nor to anticipate in too sanguine a spirit the course which events may take in Northern Afghanistan. But they consider that there are reasonable grounds for expecting satisfactory results from the policy which has been pursued. Peace has, at any rate, been restored at Kabul, and the greater portion of the British army operating beyond your North-Western frontier has been enabled to return to India. It is not to be expected that the Amir should establish undisputed authority over the country without difficulty, delay, and perhaps disturbance. But Her Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the ability of Abdul Rahman, and the countenance which has been accorded to him by the Government of India, may, in course of time, ensure his success as a ruler, and enable him to maintain and strengthen, as time goes on, peaceful and amicable relations between the two Governments. Her Majesty's Government cannot but think that the deputation to Kabul of a Native representative

of your Government would be conducive to this end, and they will be glad to hear that you have been able to carry out this measure at an early date.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 36.

To HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 53.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 17th December 1880.

I HAVE received and considered the letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 233, of the 16th ultimo, reporting the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of Kuram for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from that valley.

2. My despatch of the 19th ultimo will have already conveyed to Your Excellency in Council the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the preliminary measures initiated by you in this matter. It is only necessary, therefore, on the present occasion, to record their approval of your further proceedings as now reported.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

His Excellency the Most Honourable
the Governor General of India in Council.

No. 37.

From PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, Calcutta, 29th December 1880, to
SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIRDAR SHERE ALI KHAN has arrived at Kurrachee.

Suitable arrangements, with which he expresses himself quite satisfied, have been made.

LONDON :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

10. Assuming that Herat, and possibly a part of Seistan, will be bestowed conditionally upon Persia, and reserving for separate examination the questions that may arise as to the status of certain semi-independent tribes, we would propose to subordinate the remainder of Afghanistan, directly or indirectly, to distinct Native Governments at Kabul and Kandahar. There can, we conceive, be no doubt of the expediency of separating Kandahar from Kabul. The Duranis of South Afghanistan, who form the predominant class, have no leanings towards the Kabul Government, which has always represented, to the mass of the Kandahar people, an alien and oppressive rule. We propose, therefore, to establish the province of Kandahar as an independent and separate State, under an hereditary ruler selected from the representative of the old ruling families. Having regard to the advance of Persia to Herat, and the responsibilities devolving on us, in relation to that province, as well as to the maintenance of our due influence in Western Afghanistan, we consider that it will be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near Kandahar. But we contemplate no interference in the internal administration of the province. The ultimate boundaries of the province, and the precise terms of the treaty or agreement under which it is made over to the Native ruler, are questions on which we are not yet in a position to place our views before Her Majesty's Government; but they will receive our earliest attention when the broader questions of policy have been decided.

11. The districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram were assigned to us by the Amir Yakub Khan, under the Treaty of Gundamak, and are now being administered by our officers. We have had under consideration the question of restoring Pishin to Kandahar under its new constitution, and of transferring Sibi to the Khan of Khelat, in recognition of his loyal services during the late and present military operations. It appears to us, however, that there are objections to placing under a Native ruler populations that have once been under our own administration. Furthermore, Sibi and Pishin are both on the line of the proposed Sind-Kandahar Railway, which will run for a considerable part of its course through these districts; and, while the fact of its running through territory administered by us will undoubtedly facilitate the construction and working of this line, it seems also right and desirable that we should reap such profit and advantage as accrues from the development of the districts traversed by a railway constructed at our cost. There are also political advantages in interposing a belt of territory under British administration between the Afghan and Biluch provinces. For these and other reasons, therefore, we do not recommend any present change in the status of the assigned districts.

12. Of the future of Kabul it is difficult to speak at this moment, when military operations are still in progress around its capital. We are decidedly of opinion that this province must remain under military occupation until all resistance has ceased, and until its turbulent population has been thoroughly convinced of our military power, and of the futility of contesting it. Until this has been effected, any attempt at a political settlement would be delusive and dangerous. General Roberts has, however, already, by his large captures of guns, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds, done much to weaken that military power which the Amir Sher Ali had so carefully fostered; and we trust that it will be thoroughly broken by the result of the present operations. When this task has been fully accomplished, and not till then, it will be possible to undertake the political settlement of the country. In this part of the country the disorganization is more complete, and the elements of disorder are stronger and more intractable than elsewhere; and it is impossible at present to forecast with any precision the period within which our occupation of the capital and our direct authority over the surrounding districts are likely to be withdrawn. Our aim, however, is to minimize that occupation and control, and ultimately to make over the internal administration to a Native ruler in subordinate alliance with ourselves, supported and controlled by a strong British cantonment established at some suitable point. Where, however, that cantonment should be, and what should be our permanent line of communication with Kabul, we are not yet in a position to state. The determination of such questions requires more accurate knowledge than we yet possess of the country generally, and a more detailed examination than has yet been made of the several routes and their capabilities for roads or railways.

13. We are unable at present to make distinct proposals regarding the Oxus provinces of Afghanistan. Our information about the events and state of feeling in that country is at present most scanty; it is divided from Kabul by a strong natural boundary, and our interests, whether strategical or political, in these districts are.

comparatively, of minor and less pressing importance. So long, therefore, as Russia observes the engagements which place all Afghan-Turkestan beyond the sphere of her political action, we should deprecate interference with these provinces, which might remain nominally subject to the Kabul Governor, though enjoying practical independence. But on this side, our policy must largely depend upon the action of Russia; and upon the truth, or otherwise, of the rumours which ascribe to that Power the intention of moving forces to the Oxus, next spring, with ulterior designs against Afghanistan. We consider our withdrawal from Kabul to be impossible if the Oxus provinces are entered, or seriously threatened, by a foreign Power; and indeed any political interference from beyond the Oxus would unavoidably embarrass our plans for the evacuation of Kabul. We earnestly trust, however, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to secure us against any such contingency, which might not only necessitate the continued occupation of Kabul, but might possibly compel us to uphold, by force of arms, our supremacy up to the banks of the Oxus.

14. Such are, in general outline, the arrangements we should regard as most suitable for the resettlement of our permanent relations with the Afghan States, whenever the requisite material conditions for the stability of such arrangements have been effectually secured. We consider that the outlines thus sketched may, with safety and advantage, be firmly filled in, as time proceeds and opportunity occurs. And, although the task immediately before us is the removal or destruction throughout Northern Afghanistan of all existing means of armed menace or resistance to our authority, we are of opinion that, when this task has been completed, the political arrangements above indicated will be more conducive than direct annexation, or permanent military occupation, to the attainment of that object which we have already described as the untroubled peace, and improved defensive power, of the Indian Empire, so far as these depend upon the military strength of its north-western frontier, and the undisputed character of its relations with the States beyond.

15. It is, at present, impossible to foresee the precise duration of our military operations in Northern Afghanistan; and we consider that our troops should in any case visit Ghazni and the Hindu-Kush boundaries of the Kabul province before permanently withdrawing from the country. But, subject only to the demarcation of boundaries which cannot yet be undertaken, we recognize no serious impediment to the early application to Kandahar and Herat of the principles discussed in paras. 7 and 8 of our present letter.

'We have, &c.,	
(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from the SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th January 1880, to VICEROY.
(Extract.)

OUR intention to protect Shere Ali in the Governorship of Kandahar may be communicated to him.

No. 5.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 11th February 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

RUMOUR from Turkestan that Abdul Rahman has crossed the Amu and occupied Ghor, that Sultan Murad Khan has joined him, and that troops sent by Gholam Hyder to oppose him have gone over to him.

No. 6.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

ST. JOHN has brought here friendly letter from Sirdar Sher Ali. St. John returns to Kandahar immediately to assume separate political charge on Stewart's departure for Ghuznee. It seems advisable he should take reply from Viceroy to Sher Ali, communicating informally to Sirdar the substance of arrangements proposed regarding Kandahar, mentioning also railway, light subsidy towards cost of troops, and British control of external relations. Sirdar now has verbal assurances only. No objection on his part anticipated.

No. 7.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 4th March 1880, to VICEROY.

YOURS, yesterday. Your proposals as to Sher Ali approved.

No. 8.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 14th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

NECESSARY to find, without delay, some Native authority to which we can restore Northern Afghanistan, without risk of immediate anarchy, on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and, if possible, earlier. No prospect of finding in country any man strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him throne of Afghanistan, as sole means of saving country from anarchy.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 15th March 1880, to VICEROY. (Extract.)

YOURS, yesterday. Assuming that Abdur Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that he would be contented with Northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to support him at Kabul.

No. 10.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Griffin reaches Kabul on 20th, and will lose no time in endeavouring to ascertain precise whereabouts of Abdur Rahman, but I have now received authentic intelligence that the Sirdar is in Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived there from Badakshan, where he defeated the Mir Shahzada Hassan, who has fled to Mustoj.

No. 11.

No. 81 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 31st March 1880.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 4th March, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers

regarding the recognition of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th February 1880.

From SIR D. STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

FORMAL orders from Commander-in-Chief for advance to Ghazni under my personal command received. Hope to be in position to move by 20th March. I beg to reiterate request for instructions ratifying continuance of political relations here. Sirdar is as yet uninformed of my projected departure, and will naturally be anxious about future arrangements. The transition should be therefore so managed as to be as little abrupt as possible. I consider that he should be informed at an early date of proposed movement and political arrangements. If these are to be left to me, I will at once submit details for approbation, but would first ask name of the officer appointed to command Bombay troops, which I understand are to remain under my general control even after I leave Kandahar. Also Euan Smith having arrived, is St. John at liberty to leave?

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, No. 593 E.P., dated 12th February 1880. (Extract.)

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

YOURS 11th. Please submit detailed proposals for political arrangements at Kandahar, including terms of future relations with Sirdar, assistance he may need, and territory to be placed under his government. St. John should remain for the present transition. Name of officer to command troops will follow.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 68 G., dated Kandahar, 16th February 1880.

From Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN compliance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 12th instant, I have the honour to submit proposals, detailed as much as possible under the circumstances, for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

The subject naturally divides itself under two heads—the extent and nature of the authority to be enjoyed by Sirdar Shir Ali Khan, and of the control to be exercised over his rule by the representative of the Government of India; secondly, the machinery for carrying out that control.

2. The minimum boundaries of the State over which the independent authority of the Sirdar is to be acknowledged have already been practically fixed, and include the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi with possibly that part of Afghan Seistan watered only by the Helmund; the district of Kelat-i-Ghilzai separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, separated about nine years ago; and the district of Farah originally belonging to Herat, but which has formed a separate province since the capture of that city by the Amir of Kabul in 1863.

3. Our limited knowledge of the topography of these countries renders it impossible to define with sufficient accuracy the boundaries of the State formed by the aggregation of these provinces and districts, but a cutting herewith enclosed from the latest

map issued by the Survey Department shows its extent and approximate limits. In general terms they would include the whole basin of the Helmund as low down as Rudbar, with the exception of the upper valleys of those of its tributaries which rise in the independent and Hazara and Pathan countries, and of the valley of the Tarnak beyond the Kelat-i-Ghilzai district. North of the Helmund the new State would include the lower part of the valleys of the Har-rub and Farah-rub, and to the south so much of the desert round the dependent principality of Kharan as intervenes between Persian and Biluch territory. This is at present quite indefinable. Azad Khan of Kharan in correspondence which is now in my hands declares his independence of, and contempt for, the Khan of Kelat, and acknowledges himself a vassal of Kandahar, which vassalage has, I believe, been recognized by Her Majesty's Government. If this be the case, the southern frontier of Afghanistan is very incorrectly shown in the Surveyor-General's map attached. But the question of the sovereignty over the desert south of the Helmund is a matter of very minor importance as regards Kandahar. The only object of the Khan of Kharan in declaring himself a subject of Afghanistan was to free himself from dependence on his two immediate neighbours, Persia and Kelat. Whether Kharan remains with or is separated from Kandahar will, I believe, be a matter of indifference to Sirdar Shir Ali Khan.

4. Supposing Kharan and the adjacent desert to remain attached to Kandahar, the State thus formed would be shown in the map by an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated or indeed cultivable. The number of inhabitants I am inclined to place somewhere between half a million and a million, three-fourths of them being Duranis, according to their own account, the only true Afghans.

5. The revenue for the next year (1880-81) has been estimated by Major St. John at 20½ lakhs, a total which will be largely increased by settled government, and still more by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar.

6. The above is a brief definition of the State over which the tide of affairs has unexpectedly called Sirdar Shir Ali Khan to rule.

7. As regards the measure of authority to be allowed to him, I have no hesitation in recommending that this should be as ample as possible. The only limitations I would recommend being placed on his authority are that foreign relations should be wholly conducted through the representative of Her Majesty's Government, with the possible exception of any Native State which may be formed at Kabul; that his military force should be limited in numbers and at the disposal of the Government of India for the defence of Kandahar against external enemies; and that commercial relations must be the subject of mutual agreement at stated intervals.

8. In all other matters, the Sirdar for whom I would suggest *Wali* as a suitable title, should be entirely free from control; but, for the support of the British force it would be necessary to keep in his country or on its borders, he should contribute a certain fixed amount of coin or grain, preferably the latter.

9. For telegraph and railway construction and maintenance it would be impossible to insist on any contribution now, but this question like that of commerce may be specially excepted from any treaty as subjects for future agreement.

10. The question of the location of a force above the Passes is not one for full discussion in this letter, but I am of opinion that it will be advisable to continue the location of the main cantonment in or about Kandahar instead of shifting it to Pishin. But I think that the Sirdar will never feel himself independent, or be looked on as independent by his people, with British soldiers in his citadel, or within a stone's throw of his gates; and I therefore consider that the British garrison should, as soon as circumstances permit, be established at some distance from the capital, and that the position of the troops should be *mutatis mutandis* that of the garrison of Secunderabad in the Deccan.

11. I am not yet prepared to give a decided opinion as to the best site for a cantonment. More detailed surveys of the country are required, and the settlement of the railway question and other points must be awaited. But the locality fixed on should, I think, be not less than five or more than twenty miles from the city.

12. As regards political control, I think that the safest plan will be to follow the ordinary precedent by keeping the political and military authority in separate hands,

except on those special occasions when important military operations are in actual progress. From certain points of view it would no doubt be convenient to entrust both duties to the same individual, and officers are, no doubt, to be found equally competent for both. But in practice it might, I feel sure, be productive of gross evils if our political relations with the country were to fall into the management of any officer who might chance to fall into the military command.

13. This part of the question is one that requires most careful consideration. The maintenance of satisfactory relations with the ruler of Kandahar and the attitude of the Afghan authorities towards the British officers entrusted with the conduct of affairs in Southern Afghanistan will, in a very great measure, depend on the personal qualifications of the officer who may be appointed by Government to hold chief political authority in that quarter. In my opinion the strongest Political officer in Government service should be selected for this important duty; he should be made Resident and Agent, Governor-General, in Southern Afghanistan; his authority should extend to Biluchistan, and the general conduct of the affairs of that Agency should be placed entirely under his control, the appointment of Agent, Governor-General, in Biluchistan being thus no longer rendered necessary. These measures would, in my opinion, be productive of great advantages to the public interests, but it is of the last importance that the officer selected for this duty should be thoroughly well qualified to deal with the Afghan authorities, whether as regards his knowledge of the Persian language, his political experience or his capabilities for obtaining and retaining the friendship, confidence, and respect of those with whom he has to deal.

14. The measures proposed above must of course be considered as furnishing merely a general outline of the course that, in my opinion, should be followed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to Southern Afghanistan and the Kandahar Sirdar; and the details of such measures will have to be very carefully considered, if once the general basis be approved. Colonel St. John, who leaves for Calcutta this day, is in full possession of the ideas and wishes of Sirdar Shir Ali Khan as to the future of this part of the country, and having my full confidence is also well acquainted with my own views on the subject. These views I have commissioned him to submit fully for the consideration of the Government of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR SHERE ALI to the address of His EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, 5th Rabi-ul-Awal 1297 H., corresponding with the 16th February 1880.

After compliments. As at this auspicious time my illustrious and kind friend, Colonel St. John, is about to go and wait upon your Excellency, I thought it expedient to bring my sincerity to the notice of your Excellency through this letter. I hope that after Colonel St. John has seen your Excellency he will mention before your Excellency all that I have represented to him regarding my goodwill and firm devotion (to the British Government).

As General Sir D. Stewart has been very kind to appoint me, on behalf of the British Government, to the Governorship of Kandahar and its dependencies, I beg to offer my grateful thanks to the Government of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, and to your Excellency for this great kindness. It is incumbent on me to thank also General Sir D. Stewart, Colonel St. John, and their subordinate officers, before your Excellency, for their kindness and help, especially for those of the last-named officer and his subordinates which have secured peace and tranquillity to the people of the province, who feel themselves grateful for the kindnesses of the British Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

To His Highness SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

Fort William, 13th March 1880.

It has given me much pleasure to read the expressions of friendship contained in your Highness' letter, and I have to assure you that your Highness' honourable and

straightforward conduct is fully appreciated, and will always be remembered by the British Government. It is a source of congratulation both for England and for the Durani nation that one of the descendants of Payindah Khan has continued in the straight part of rectitude, and has not wandered into the waterless desert of dishonour and faithlessness.

For good service and faithful conduct reward is justly due, and it is also incumbent on those to whom God has given high birth and capacity for government that they should not shrink from the duty imposed on them. Therefore I have great pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to recognize your Highness as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. For the consolidation of your power, and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's Empire, it is necessary that a force of Her Imperial troops remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It will therefore be right and proper that a certain portion of the grain revenue of the State, to be fixed hereafter by mutual agreement, should be allotted yearly towards the provision of supplies for these troops. It is also expedient that a special officer of rank shall be deputed to reside in the cantonment as a medium of friendly communication, and to conduct the relations of the British Government with the States upon the frontiers of your Highness' territory. Upon this understanding the government will remain entirely in the hands of your Highness under the protection of the great Government of England.

At a future time it may be necessary to draw up a formal record of the terms upon which your Highness has entered into possession of your country, but this must be postponed until the affairs of other parts of Afghanistan shall have been settled, when the respective interests of British India and Kandahar will have become more fully known.

Your Highness is doubtless aware that Her Majesty's Government has constructed a railway to Sibi to be continued to Kandahar. No greater benefit could be bestowed on the country, since by the commercial advantages and general facilities of friendly intercourse that will thus be secured, the prosperity of the Durani people, and their close connection with the great and powerful British Government, will, if it please God, become firmly established.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

(Signed) LYTTON,
Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

No. 1093 E.P., dated Fort William, 23rd March 1880.

From H. M. DURAND, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter No. 68 G., dated 16th February 1880, submitting proposals for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

2. In reply, I am to forward, for your information, copy of a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the address of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, dated 13th March 1880, that Her Majesty the Queen Empress has been pleased to recognise the Sirdar as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. The original of this letter has been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel O. St. John, C.S.I., for delivery to the Sirdar.

3. I am to add that the several measures proposed in your letter under reply will be considered in detail hereafter.

No. 12.

No. 90 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th April 1880.

WE have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, which will serve to show the present situation of affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The policy we are endeavouring to carry out is summed up in the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch. In pursuance of this policy, we have, as already reported, recognized Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar. The letter to the Sirdar, a copy of which was submitted with our Despatch of the 31st March, has not yet been formally presented to him, but Colonel St. John, to whose care it was entrusted, reports the Sirdar has been informed of its purport, and Her Majesty's Government is now pledged to support him as ruler of the province. He has expressed his readiness to accept the position, and has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required to consolidate or extend his rule in the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. The separation of Kandahar from Kabul is therefore an accomplished fact, and the independence of Sher Ali Khan has been solemnly guaranteed.

3. In Kabul no final arrangement has yet been made. The disturbed state of the country and the difficulty of finding among the principal Barakzai Sirdars a man of any capacity or influence has obliged us to defer the recognition of a Chief. But after careful consideration we have arrived at the conclusion that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, whose presence in Afghan Turkestan is now beyond doubt, would, if willing to accept the province of Kabul without Herat or Kandahar, be more likely than any other member of the family to prove a successful ruler; and we are now endeavouring to enter into communication with him.

4. As regards Herat, it is unnecessary for us to enter into any detailed examination of the state of affairs. It will be seen from Colonel St. John's telegram of the 6th April, a copy of which is enclosed, that Sirdar Ayub Khan is apparently trying to secure our acknowledgment of his title. No communication will be made to him unless he puts forward a clear expression of his wishes.

5. The nature of the future Government of Herat does not, in our opinion, press for settlement. But we consider that the means of influencing Herat from Kandahar will be secured to us by the railway, which will, we hope, be completed early next year as far as Kandahar.

6. In the meantime General Stewart has been directed to march to Ghazni, with the object of breaking any opposition he may find there, and opening direct communication with Sir F. Roberts. This measure was, in our opinion, necessary to overawe opposition and convince the populations concerned that we are in a position to dictate on our own terms the settlement of the questions we are dealing with. We do not, however, desire that Sir D. Stewart's force should remain for long in Ghazni, and arrangements will be made to enable him to leave the place as soon as all opposition is at an end.

7. The movements of our troops in Afghanistan have been guided by the principle that we do not advance to any point of which we are not prepared to retain military occupation as long as our presence there may be demanded by the political situation; and this principle is not departed from in the proposed march to Ghazni. For this march is not an advance, but merely a lateral movement along the direct line connecting General Stewart at Kandahar with General Roberts at Kabul; and the evacuation of Ghazni will not involve any retreat, as the Bengal troops, of which General Stewart's division is composed, can, when at Ghazni, either march to Kabul and thence re-enter India by the Khyber, or return to India, direct by the Kuram

route, as may be found most expedient on their arrival at Ghazni, by which time the political situation will be further developed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

MINUTE by the VICEROY, dated 30th March 1880.

ANNEXED is a copy of a telegram from General Sir D. Stewart, dated 29th instant in reply to one sent to him by the Military Department.

I am at a loss to understand why Sir D. Stewart has not received the programme for field operations now being commenced.

It is essential that he should be at once fully informed of the entire plan of operations, and of the political objects desired by the Government of India.

The latter may be thus summed up. The Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps are being taken for this purpose.

Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection. But it is not desirable to spread our troops over a large tract of country, or to send small columns to any place where they would encounter opposition, and increase the hostile feeling against us. All that is necessary from the political point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul. This he can do either by the direct route, or by Kushi, as he may think to be most expedient, under such conditions as may exist when he is at Ghazni.

It is not desirable that Sir D. Stewart's troops should remain for long at Ghazni; and it is, therefore, necessary that all military dispositions should be made with a view to enabling him to leave Ghazni as soon as he has put down any open opposition that he may find there.

It is very desirable that the conduct of operations in Afghanistan should, as soon as possible, be brought under one head. Sir D. Stewart should, therefore, assume the supreme command as soon as he is in direct communication with Kabul. In the meantime he should be daily kept informed, both by the Foreign Department and the Military Department, of all news received from Kabul, or from any part of the Khyber or Kuram lines of communication, so that he may be constantly and fully made aware of the exact state of the situation at all points.

This Minute, together with the annexure, should be at once communicated *in extenso* by clear the line telegraph to the Commander-in-Chief; and his Excellency should be requested to state at once by telegraph to Secretary to Government, Military Department, what instructions should, under these conditions, be sent to Generals Sir F. Roberts and Sir D. Stewart.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th March 1880, from General Sir D. M. STEWART, Kandahar, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

I AM not in possession of the orders of Government; nor have I received the programme for field operations now being commenced, but I would point out that I am carrying forward from hence supplies for two months, and that I shall not require to draw more European supplies from India by Kabul or Kuram until the end of May. If it is intended that the division under my command move forward beyond Ghazni towards Kuram, supplies should be collected at some place in Kuram, where the troops under my command may pass the remainder of the hot weather. By the information which I have received, no opposition is likely to be encountered at Ghazni, which may not be easily overcome by the troops with which I am advancing. The movement of a column from Kabul to meet the division under

my command will, in my opinion, increase the strain upon the country which the demands of this division for native supplies must entail. The collections of tribesmen under Muhammad Jan and Muskh-i-Alam have already drawn largely upon the supplies which are procurable in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and the uncertainty which prevails throughout the country has doubtless prevented large arrears from being cultivated this spring. It is only with difficulty that sufficient transport has been obtained to allow of the division under my command being moved with full equipment, and I am calculating on replacing casualties amongst baggage animals by purchases made at Ghazni. I submit for consideration that it is very desirable that no movement of troops belonging to Kabul or Kuram command should be made in advance of Kushi. I have this morning received a telegram from Sir F. Roberts that he only proposes to supply for my division at Ghazni, tea, sugar, and possibly rum, and that for all other supplies I must depend upon the country. I hope it will be understood that I do not require any supplies to be advanced from Kabul to meet me; and that, if orders are given for my division to remain at Ghazni, I would at once establish communication with Kabul or Kurum, as may be desired, sending my own transport to bring forward necessary supplies. I make this statement, not with a view of disturbing any approved plan of operations, but in order that there may be no misconception regarding the difficulty of feeding a large force at Ghazni during the present season.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th April 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

SIRDAR ABDUL SALAM, who came from Herat in December last as Envoy from Ayub and returned in January, has sent his confidential servant to me with a letter reporting arrival of Persian Commissioner. He offers to be medium of communication with Ayub in our interests, and asks for confidential agent to be sent to him at Herat, or letter declaring that the English Government wish to have friendship and services of Ayub. He hints that Ayub is hesitating between Persia and England, but inclines to latter. Messenger reports that Persian Commissioner left two days before he did, while letter speaks of him as still there. He says Ayub is practically in hands of Kabuli troops, who for two months would not let him leave his house. Object of letter appears to be acknowledgment of Ayub's title to Herat, overtures to Persia having finally failed. I presume letter may be answered in accordance with previous communications, namely, that Ayub can do as he likes; that we want nothing from him; and that if he wants anything from us he should express his wishes.

No. 12A.

No. 5, S. P. C., dated Kabul, 15th April 1880.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding at Kabul. (Extract.)

A durbar was held at 4 o'clock on Tuesday the 13th instant, which was attended by all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and Maliks of Kabul and its neighbourhood, many of the Hazaras, and of the trading classes; a large number of British officers in Kabul were also present. The proceedings were opened by a short speech from Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, a copy of which is herewith forwarded, and were concluded by an address in which I endeavoured to explain both to the Sirdars and people generally, and to the delegates from Maidan, what were the general intentions of the Government, and specially with reference to the representations which had been put forward: a copy of the paper of requests of the Ghazni party with the address has been already forwarded to you. That portion of the Government programme to which I did not allude in the speech was the separation of Herat from Northern Afghanistan, for the reason that I had understood from the Government of India that no final arrangements had been made with regard to Herat, and that its future disposal was consequently still uncertain. Such being the case, and as there was no special

necessity for declaring the policy of Government on this point, I considered it would be more convenient to the Government were any distinct declaration of its intention to separate Western Afghanistan from Kabul deferred.

The effect of the Durbar has been reported from many quarters to have been good, although a large number of representatives are undoubtedly much disappointed that the return of Ameer Yakub Khan has been categorically refused to them. Still all are satisfied that some definite reply has been given.

The allusion in the speech to the Government being the friend, and not the enemy, of Islam; to the large Muhammadan population which lived in perfect liberty under the British rule in India; and to the fact that the Government has several times interposed, at great cost in money and men, to preserve the integrity of the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey, has been welcomed and largely discussed in the mosques and elsewhere.

PAPERS REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE.

Translation of a document brought before the Chief Political Officer on the
11th April 1880.

We, the undersigned, as representatives of the tribes of Afghanistan, send the following representations to the British Government:—

I. Friendship between the people of Afghanistan and the great British Government should be re-established, as of former years, inasmuch as in this way the interests and welfare of both parties would, God willing, be secured.

II. Our King and Ruler should be released and restored to his former power; and we, the tribesmen, guarantee that, by the blessing of God, he will maintain a lasting and sincere friendship towards the British Government, and that both parties will have identical interests.

III. The British Agent, whoever he may be, should be of the Muhammadan religion, while all British troops should be withdrawn from our country.

IV. The kingdom of Afghanistan should be restored in its entirety to its King and Ruler. In this way it will be able to cope with its foreign enemies.

V. The British Government should furnish such assistance to the King and Ruler of Afghanistan as it may think best for the interests of both parties.

VI. Immediate assistance should be given to the Ameer, seeing that the country has been desolated and nothing of value is left, as the British authorities are themselves thoroughly aware.

We hope that the great British Government will grant these the expressed wishes of the tribes of Afghanistan, as they consult the interests of both parties. All of us have come to the British authorities to ask that we and our sovereign may be forgiven; our wishes are set forth in the paragraphs above.

Dated Friday, 29th Rabi-ul-Sani 1297 (9th April 1880).

Names sealed and signed.

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Muhammad Alim. | 8. Abdul Ghafur. |
| 2. Muhammad Jan. | 9. Shah Muhammad. |
| 3. Muhammad Sarwar. | 10. Muhammad Afzal. |
| 4. Ghulam Haidar. | 11. Sultan Muhammad. |
| 5. Muhammad Hasan. | 12. Lal Muhammad. |
| 6. Abdul Karim. | 13. Ghulam Haidar. |
| 7. Muhammad Tahir. | |

Suliman Khels,	15 in number.
Andaris,	8 „ „
Zurmat Ahmadzais,	17 „ „
Wardaks,	17 „ „
Logaris and Khanwaris,	15 „ „
Ahmadzais,	46 „ „
Tajiks,	5 „ „
Tajiks of Ghazni,	9 „ „
Maidan people,	14 „ „
Mangals and Totakhels,	43 „ „

Speech delivered by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., &c.,
in Durbar, at Kabul, on the 13th April 1880.

Sirdars and Maliks,—I am very glad to receive you here to-day in durbar, especially those who, through the good offices of my friend, the Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, have been induced to come to Kabul, and make their wishes known to me. I trust that this durbar is the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to enter into such arrangements with the people of Afghanistan as will ensure an honourable peace, and a lasting friendship between them and the British. Some of you, I understand, hesitated to accompany the Mustaufi, fearing that your treatment and reception by us might not be such as he had promised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need never have any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word of a British Officer. The British do not say one thing and do another. You who have come in have been honourably treated, and after this durbar is over you are all at liberty to depart. I trust that when you leave Kabul you will carry away with you a more friendly feeling towards us than some of you have hitherto entertained, and that those of your party who are still holding aloof will be wise enough to follow the good example you have set them, and will accept our invitation and come to Kabul.

Mr. Griffin, the Chief Political Officer in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, with whom you have already become acquainted, will now, on the part of the Government of India, answer the requests you have made.

Speech by the Chief Political Officer.

Sirdars, Khans, and Maliks of Kabul,—It has been my wish for some time past to meet you all in durbar and explain to you collectively and publicly, as I have already done privately, the intention of the British Government with regard to the settlement of Afghanistan. This is a favourable opportunity when replies have to be given to the requests of certain Chiefs and Maliks of the neighbourhood of Ghazni, who have been long hostile, but who have, at last, listened to the advice of Mustaufi Habibulla, whom General Sir F. Roberts had sent to reassure them, and have deputed many of their number to place their requests respectfully before the Government. It is to be regretted that the more important of the leaders have not come in person; when the Government promised a safe-conduct there was no reason, for even those who had been most opposed to it, to fear for their lives or liberty. The British Government bears no ill-will to those who have fought fairly against it, and those of the representatives who have come to Kabul are free to leave when they wish, and during their stay will be treated as friends and guests. But those Chiefs who have remained behind at Maidan must not think that their signatures on the paper of requests will be considered as equivalent to their presence; the more so as we know the reason that some of them have not come is that they have secretly abandoned the cause they profess to support, and have made promises to others. When you return to Maidan, ask General Ghulam Haidar and Muhammad Jan when they are going to desert you.

Maliks of Ghazni, Maidan, and Loghar, and Chiefs of the Ghilzai, Wardak, and other tribes in their neighbourhood, I have met you more than once in private interviews, and have discussed with you in a friendly way your requests, and I now only wish to say publicly, and for the information of the Sirdars and people of the city and neighbourhood of Kabul, whom it concerns as closely as it does you, what I have already said to you.

You have first asked that the former friendship between the Government of the Queen-Empress of Hindustan should be restored, that Ameer Yakub Khan should be released and reinstated, and that the British armies should retire from Afghanistan.

In reply, I would first remind you that the breach in mutual friendship was made by Ameer Shere Ali Khan. The British Government not only always desired, and still desires, friendship with Afghanistan, but will not appoint any one as Ameer who does not profess friendship, nor will allow him to continue Ameer unless he plainly shows himself the friend of the friends of the British Government and the enemy of its enemies.

For this reason the Viceroy has decided that Muhammad Yakub Khan shall not return to Afghanistan. You know whether he observed the promises that he made to the British Government. You know that he rewarded those who had opposed us in the first campaign; while those who had assisted us he turned out of their lands and appointments. You have told me privately that if Yakub be not allowed to

return, you are willing to accept as Ameer any one whom the Government may choose to select. This expression of the wish of a large number of respectable Maliks will be, at the proper time, laid before His Excellency the Viceroy, together with that of others who may wish to support the candidature of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Hashim Khan, Sirdar Musa Khan, Sirdar Ayub Khan, or any other member of the ruling family who may be approved by a large number of the people. The Government has no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and will occupy no more of it than may be necessary for the safety of its own frontiers. But the province of Kandahar will not remain united with Kabul, but will be placed under the independent rule of a Barakzai prince. For the administration of those provinces that remain attached to Kabul, the Government is anxious to appoint an Ameer who shall be strong to govern his people and steadfast in his friendship to the British. And if only these qualifications be secured, the Government is willing and anxious to recognize the wish of the Afghan people and the tribal Chiefs, and to nominate the Ameer of their choice. But no decision can be given at present. You, who have assembled here, represent but a small part of the people, and it is necessary to ascertain the views and wishes of many others, Chiefs and Sirdars, who are absent from Kabul. But your votes in favour of Yakub Khan's immediate family will be remembered and considered if, until the decision of the Government be given, you absolutely abstain from all hostile action. Otherwise, you must not expect that the Government will consider him likely to be a friendly Ameer whose friends are its persistent enemies.

The armies of the Queen-Empress will withdraw from Afghanistan when the Government considers that the proper time has come. As they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they will not withdraw at your request. When the country is again peaceful, and when a friendly Ameer has been selected, the Government has no wish to remain in Afghanistan. The army came to Kabul to inflict punishment for the murder of its Envoy in time of peace, which some of you have called a regretted accident, but which the British Government considers an atrocious crime, and it will remain until some satisfactory settlement can be made. You have been told that an army from Kandahar is now marching on Ghazni, while another from Bombay has taken its place at Kandahar. A third army is in Kuram, a fourth at Kabul, and a fifth at Jellalabad, the Khaibar and Peshawar.

The General has ordered a strong force to march from Kabul to-morrow towards Maidan to co-operate with the Kandahar army. If you are wise you will do everything to assist this force, which is not sent against you, nor will it molest you if only the conduct of the people is friendly. If, on the contrary, you listen to leaders who only deceive you for their own advantage, and commit and excite hostility against the Government, then punishment will quickly and certainly follow. The Khagiani tribes, three weeks ago, attacked a British post near Gundamak at night. They have since had to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000, and five of their towers have been blown up. The Hizarak people have been committing outrages on the road, and carrying off men and cattle. A large force has been sent by the General into Hizarak, and a fine of Rs. 15,000 has been imposed. The Government is quite willing to be friends with you, and to treat you as friends, but it is also resolved to be obeyed so long as its armies are in the country, and to punish severely any open opposition. You have a proverb that force and money are the only powers in Afghanistan. It is for you to choose which you wish. The Government intends to keep the sword for its enemies, and the money for its friends, and, if you are wise, you will count yourselves as our friends. Those people deceive you who preach jihad, and say that the English are the enemies of Islam. In India fifty millions of Muhammadans enjoy, under the Government of the Queen, greater liberty and happiness and security than in any country in the world; and it is the British Government which has many times, by great expenditure of men and treasure, guarded and preserved the Empire of the Sultan of Turkey against his enemies. The Government is the friend and protector of Islam, and not its destroyer.

As to your other requests for the appointment of a Muhammadan Agent at Kabul, and the grant of assistance in money and material to the new Ameer, I can only say that these requests have been made by you in ignorance, for they are matters which will be decided by the Government of India with the Chief whom they agree to appoint as Ameer. It is not fitting for small persons to discuss them. Of this only be assured, that he whom the Viceroy of India may select will be supported by the Government in every possible way so long as he shows friendly intentions towards it.

No. 13.

No. 93 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 27th April 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Official Journal of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force for the week ending the 21st March 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSTON.
 „ A. R. THOMPSON.
 „ A. FRASER.

Enclosure in No. 13.

MEMORANDUM, No. 132, dated Kandahar, 25th March 1880.

From Major C. B. EUAN SMITH, C.S.I., Political Officer, Kandahar Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to enclose copy of Official Journal from 15th to 21st instant, inclusive.

Official Journal, Head-quarters, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, Political Department. (Extract.)

Monday, 15th March.—In the afternoon the General received the principal Mullas and Kowanins of the city and surrounding villages in Durbar. They were twenty-nine in number, and had come in consequence of Sir Donald Stewart's late letter to the Sirdar, to inform him that they had all taken an oath on the Koran, to the effect that they would at once deliver up to justice any individual whom they might hear of that was an ill-wisher to the British Government, and intending to do mischief to the troops here in garrison. After the General had heard their statement, he informed them that he wished to say a few words to them, representing as they did the better educated and more sensible classes, and having, as he was aware, a considerable influence either for good or evil on their compatriots. He then briefly recapitulated the circumstances under which, and the reasons for which, the English had first entered Afghanistan, had a second time re-occupied it, and subsequently raised Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to govern in Kandahar. He informed them plainly that as long as Sirdar Sher Ali pursued the same loyal course towards the British Government that he had hitherto followed, he would be supported fully by the English. He pointed out that, in placing Sirdar Sher Ali Khan in power, a Chief of one of the best known families in Afghanistan, and in bestowing on him, as the Government had done, money, arms, guns and ammunition, the Government of India had afforded the most signal proof of their desire and intention to leave Afghanistan to be governed by the Afghans themselves, to abstain from any unnecessary interference whatever in the internal affairs of the country, and to render independent at the earliest possible date the Sirdar on whom the government of the Kandahar province had been bestowed, and who would certainly be assisted in rendering his rule stable and independent. There was no chance of Kandahar again falling under the authority of a supreme ruler in Kabul. Kandahar would for the future stand by itself, and the moment the Sirdar

should inform Sir Donald Stewart that he considered his power sufficiently consolidated to take charge of the city, the General would be quite prepared to make it over to him.

Sir Donald Stewart said that he considered it necessary to make these remarks, as he believed that there was an erroneous impression abroad as to the future of the Kandahar State. The regular official notification of the decision and intentions of the Government would of course be made in the usual manner to the Sirdar at the fitting time, but the people might rest assured that the policy of Government was that now explained to them.

He then proceeded to inform the Mullas that these remarks were necessary to elucidate what he intended to say to them with regard to the late fanatical and cowardly attacks on the lives of defenceless officers and men of the Kandahar Field Force. The audience were well aware that such attacks were contrary to the laws of all religions. There was no justification for them whatever in the Muhammadan religion, but, nevertheless, it could not be doubted that the miserable men who lost their lives in this shameful way were instigated and encouraged in their attempts by the direct action of the Mullas, who made use of their influence in this disgraceful manner. Sir Donald Stewart pointed out the futility of these attempts, which, moreover, served no purpose; in no instance had the fanatics been successful in taking life, and in every case they had lost their own. The attempts were therefore foolish as well as criminal. He was aware that some of these attempts were due to the instigation of enemies of the Sirdar, who hoped that occurrences of this nature might embarrass the friendly relations at present existing between the Sirdar and the British Government. The people might rest assured that such would not be the case. He, Sir Donald Stewart, had accurate knowledge of what went on in the city, and in the assemblies, at which sedition was often talked and preached, but, knowing how much of this sedition was due to the desire of self-display, he had up to the present refrained from taking notice of it. He warned the Mullas, however, that his patience would not always be so great. They were perfectly well aware of the advantages which had accrued to the inhabitants of Kandahar from the English occupation, and no one knew better than themselves how much they owed in the way of security to life and property, and absolute immunity from oppression, to the consideration and forbearance with which they had been treated. In return for this, however, the lives of defenceless and unsuspecting soldiers were continually being attempted by men who were incited thereto by fanatical teaching. Once for all, Sir Donald Stewart informed the Mullas and Kowans that he was determined that, if these attempts were persisted in, he would mark his sense of their character by measures that would be exceedingly unpleasant to the whole community, and that would ensure the severe punishment of all who were in any way connected with the wretched individuals who were made the tools of designing men not less guilty than themselves.

The entire assemblage listened to the remarks of General Stewart with profound attention. At the close, one of them acted as spokesman, and most emphatically denounced the fanatical ghazi attempts that had occurred, declaring they were acts contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet, and which were due to the teachings of ignorant men, who could not be classed as Mullas, or expounders of religion. On behalf of those present, the speaker represented the deep sense of gratitude and acknowledgment felt by all for the policy which had been pursued towards the people of Kandahar by General Stewart, contrasting the quiet reigning here with the anarchy and fighting in the north; and he concluded by once more assuring Sir Donald Stewart that they would to the utmost of their power aid in the apprehension of all ill-wishers of the British Government, while they would one and all give security for the good behaviour of the talibs attending their respective mosques.

The General then dismissed the assemblage, informing them of his own approaching departure, and stating that the policy inaugurated by him under the orders of Government would certainly be continued by his successor as long as the people behaved with loyalty to the Sirdar and the Government.

No. 14.

No. 104 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 4th May 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of telegrams from and to the Chief Political Officer at Kabul, regarding the correspondence between the British authorities at Kabul and Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

2. We also enclose copy of a letter* to Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer at Kabul, transmitting the views of the Government of India on the situation of affairs in Kabul, and conveying instructions for his guidance in his communications with the Sirdar.

* No. 1491 E.P., dated 27th April 1880.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	LYTTON.
„	F. P. HAYNES.
„	JOHN STRACHEY.
„	E. B. JOHNSON.
„	A. R. THOMPSON.
„	A. FRASER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 22nd April 1880, from MR. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN
SECRETARY, Simla.

THE messenger, Sarwar Khan, whom I sent to Kunduz, returned last night. His lengthy statement will be sent by post. The letter of Sirdar Abdul Rahman in reply to mine is as follows—literal translation :—

Whereas at this happy time I have received the kind letter of the British officers, who called me to mind, wrote in a spirit of justice and friendship, to inquire what I wish in Afghanistan. My honoured friends, the servants of the great British Government, know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the kingdom of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of return to my native land. When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribe, I proposed to re-enter Afghanistan, but as it was not fated then, I turned to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since after he had left you he listened to the advice of every interested person and raised fools to power until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, were so managed that it was bright like day. In consequence of that Afghanistan was disgraced before all States and ruined; now therefore that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: as long as your empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace, and that these two States should find us true and faithful; that we should have rest and peace between them, for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce. And we hope of your friendship that assistance and sympathy with the people of Afghanistan, you will permanently establish them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my wish. For the rest, it is yours to decide.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd April 1880, from Mr. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. (Extract.)

MUMAMMAD Sarwar Khan, our agent, left Kabul on 2nd and reached Kunduz on 10th; warmly received by Sirdar Abdul Rahman; gave letter and message.* Sirdar said he was delighted at message; desired nothing more than to be servant of Government. He has written to his friends not to oppose the English and ruin themselves; better days were in store for Afghanistan. After five days agent was given Sirdar's reply in presence of four confidential officers, and verbal message as follows:—

It is quite true that for three generations the English have systematically befriended Afghanistan, and that they have never done me any injury. I am anxious to know the nature of the friendship they now desire. Instead of sending agents I would much prefer, if invited, going to Charikar myself, accompanied by some 500 sowars, and there discuss matters with the English officers in person. If this is approved of, the two or three men, Wali Muhammad Khan and Hashim, now in power, should be set aside and opportunity afforded me to show what I can do in the interests of peace. For 12 years I have been a guest of the Russians, have received many favours from them. I should not like to have conditions imposed upon me which should discredit me with them, or make me appear ungrateful. If the English desire to place me in power they should arrange for the removal of my enemies and make me secure before withdrawing from the country. I shall ever try to be the friend of both powers, and desire nothing more than to be considered the friend of the English, and to secure for my country the royal immunity from foreign interference as is enjoyed by Persia. Sirdar said that he did not write first, because he had no reliable messenger; he shall continue at Kunduz till he receives reply; would come to Charikar in 20 days from messenger leaving Kabul. Sirdar, in answer to agent, said Russia had refused him permission to try his fortune in Afghanistan, and removed him to Tashkend. When telegraphic news reached of Yakub's deportation, General Kaufmann was at Orenberg. General's Secretary sent for him, told him that news, and gave him liberty to go to Turkestan. Sirdar took time to reflect three days after secretary urged him to go. He consented to receive loan of 5,000 Bokhara tillas, and present of 200 breech-loaders and ammunition. Sirdar has eaten Russian salt, and does not wish to quarrel with Russia, but if made Amir will live at peace. Left Tashkend with 100 followers, viâ Oratipa, Hissar, Kolab, crossing Oxus at Rustac. Sirdar has at Kunduz four infantry, two cavalry regiments, two batteries. Since he left, his family have been moved from Kokand to Tashkend, and his full allowances granted them.

General Roberts and I think and recommend as follows:—It is clear that Sirdar was sent by Russia, or that he does not want to quarrel with them. Nevertheless, he does not appear less eligible than when selected by Government, but more so. He is doubtless anxious to come to terms with English. An interview with him is essential.

* The letter was as follows:—

TO SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

After compliments. — It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan."

To Sarwar Khan, the bearer, full and explicit verbal instructions were given. He was directed to inform the Sirdar that the British Government having occupied Kabul, the capital of the Afghan Government, and he, a distinguished member of the late ruling family, having entered Turkistan and occupied places there by force of arms, it was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and if actuated by friendly or hostile feelings towards the British Government. That the Sirdar's long residence in Russia, and his notoriously close relations with that Power, might render him, to a certain extent, an object of suspicion, were it not that he had no quarrel with the British, who entertained no hostile feelings towards him. That the British Government were able to benefit him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and that, if he followed the dictates of wisdom and self-interest, he would at once open a friendly correspondence with the British officers in Kabul. That his opportunity had now come; and that the British Government were disposed to treat him with every consideration, and to consider most favourably any representations that he might have to urge. That on receipt of the letter, he would, if he consulted his own interests, send a reply to the letter by the hand of a respectable and trusted agent, and, later, repair himself to Kabul, where he would be honourably received. The British Government had no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established at Kabul; and consequently the present communication was made solely in his own interests, and not in those of the British Government.

It might be at Mootya, or Charikar, as proposed, but probably unnecessary. We would send two or three men of position, one being native official of government, to Sirdar, definitely offering him Amirship with the conditions regarding Kandahar, friendship, frontier, and foreign relations. If he accepts our proposal, to come to Kabul under safe conduct, and discuss all details. He will almost certainly come. The alternative of meeting at Charikar can be reserved, as possibly he will refuse to come to Kabul, or accept conditions without discussion.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, No. 1460 E.P., dated 25th April 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul.

YOUR telegrams, 22nd, 23rd, transmitting Abdul Rahman's letter with remarks and proposals are received, and instructions issue to you on Monday by letter and telegraph. Meanwhile suspend further proceedings and negotiations, informing Abdul Rahman, if necessary, that his letter is under consideration here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

No. 1491 E.P., dated Simla, 27th April 1880, from A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Kabul.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Governor General has received and considered in Council your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by you from Sirdar Abdul Rahman on the 21st instant, together with a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts and yourself.

2. In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this important communication, the Government of India considers it expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto been acting in Northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of affairs in that country.

3. The single object to which, as you are well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited, is the security of the north-west frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently subsidized, and otherwise assisted, the Amirs of Kabul. It has also, more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their kingdom.

4. Regulating on this principle, and limiting to this object, the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security of our frontier as much as possible independent of such conditions.

5. This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Russian alliance proposed by Russia in contemplation of a rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan power; and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him on conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any Afghan prince.

6. When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well defined and plainly avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character.

7. These two objects have been attained—the first, by the capture of Kabul, and the punishment of the crime committed there; the second, by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

8. Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements with the rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them, which was nevertheless a thoroughly friendly one, and no less conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formerly applied. Our advanced frontier positions at Kandahar and Kurram have materially diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India; and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

9. Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and, secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country.

10. The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated the 30th ultimo, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that “the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps” (continued His Excellency) “are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection.” * * * “For this all that is necessary from the political point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.” The military operations thus defined have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni.

11. With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.

12. The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.

13. What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is the desire it expresses for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint protection of the British and Russian empires. This suggestion, which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message, cannot be entertained or discussed.

14. As already stated, the primary object and declared determination of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times, and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent security

of Her Majesty's Indian empire. As such, it has hitherto been firmly maintained by successive Governors General of India under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that "Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence."

15. It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain territories as constituting a neutral zone between their respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally determined by mutual agreement; and in 1876 the Russian Government formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that "while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no practical result."

16. The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these engagements was again distinctly affirmed, on behalf of the Queen's Government, by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you should take occasion to inform Abdul Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian empires are matters which the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with the Sirdar. The Afghan States and tribes are too contiguous with India, whose north-western frontier they surround, for the Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized influence over those tribes and States.

17. The Governor General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded by the Government of India. So long as the rulers of Kabul were amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these principles, and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne. This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to impose on any ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring empire, is entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose such conditions on a prince who has received hospitality and protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that, in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdul Rahman to conditions which "might make him appear ungrateful" to those "whose salt he has eaten," the Governor General in Council recognizes a sentiment altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with the sincerity of his professed good will toward ourselves.

18. These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to the question asked by Abdul Rahman, as to the "nature of our friendship," and its "conditions." The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own. The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by Abdul Rahman that, between the British and Russian empires, his "tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace." We do not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as "entirely beyond the sphere of its action." The injury to Afghan commerce caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We have no concessions to ask or make; and the Sirdar will therefore perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain between him and us.

19. On this point your reply to Abdul Rahman cannot be too explicit. Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan the hostility and treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplors had compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements of a material and permanent character for the better protection of our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill will, of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars, that it is probably well known to Abdul Rahman. But, in order that our present intercourse and future relation with the Sirdar may be perfectly clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires to fill, the Governor General in Council authorizes you, if necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the districts assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul power.

20. As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British Government as the ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of the native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British Government, which has promised him the support of a British garrison, so long as he requires such support. The Governor General in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdul Rahman will readily recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or elsewhere, have proved themselves active and loyal adherents. Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge them. Similarly, if the next Kabul ruler reintroduces into his Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however, cannot occur, if the sentiments of Abdul Rahman are such as he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and administrative arrangements already completed by us for the permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of negotiation or discussion with Abdul Rahman or any other claimant to the throne of Kabul.

21. To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these completed arrangements, the Governor General in Council cannot authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to Abdul Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, with whose present views in regard to this important question the Government of India is not yet acquainted.

22. Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure was determined on by the Government of India long before the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the government of the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by the hostility, and is not therefore conditional on the good will, of any Afghan power.

23. The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal advantage of Abdul Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general interests of the Afghan people. For this reason, it is desirable that you should inform Abdul Rahman of our intention to evacuate Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must, however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have served and aided the British Government during our occupation of those territories.

24. For this purpose, it appears to the Governor General in Council desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the undisturbed establishment of his future government.

25. The Governor General in Council has, however, no desire to press this suggestion should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence at Kabul previous to the withdrawal of our troops, for the purpose of personal conference with the British authorities, might have the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his position in the eyes of his future subjects. The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own judgment and inclination. But Abdul Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present, in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family of Yakub Khan has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the Sirdar's authority, if he is not personally present to assert it.

26. It should on both sides be remembered and understood that it is not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people an unpopular ruler, or to interfere uninvited in the administration of a friendly one. If Abdul Rahman proves able and disposed to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact. Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government of the country from which our forces will, in any case, be withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither need, nor wish, to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes, his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship with the British Government.

27 The present statement of the views and intentions of His Excellency the Governor General in Council respecting Abdul Rahman will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures; and it will now be your duty to convey to Abdul Rahman, without any avoidable delay, the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give full expression to the spirit of candour and good will in which these communications have been received and are reciprocated. But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar and the Government of India.

28. In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul. In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military authority on the spot.

No. 14A.

No. 10 S.P.C., dated Kabul, May 8, 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Afghanistan.

The only other point which remains for decision is the time for evacuating the country. This is governed by two considerations; firstly, how our occupation of Kabul will affect the new Amir; and secondly, whether the supplies available for the army will allow a prolonged occupation.

It will probably, on political grounds, be advisable to withdraw from the capital as soon after the installation of the new Amir as possible. The presence of British troops will not add to the security or popularity of the Chief, when he has once established himself. But whether military exigencies will permit our armies to withdraw to Ali Kheyl, Shalozan, Gandamak, and the slopes of the Sufeid Koh in the Shinwari and Khugiani country, I am unable to say. Their stay or march must in a great measure depend on the supplies procurable in Kabul. My information, which is gathered from many reliable sources, leads me to doubt whether it will be possible to support so large a force as is now in the neighbourhood of Kabul, without importation from India. The Kabul, Logar, Maidan, and Wardak villages are those alone on which we can rely, and even here armed bands of insurgents only too often close the roads

the moment our troops are withdrawn. These valleys although fertile are of but small area; and many of the villages, according to the revenue returns, only produce sufficient grain for their own consumption. The season, moreover, is not a favourable one; and while the outturn will be fair on irrigated lands, those dependent on rainfall will have a poor crop. These valleys have already been drained of their food stocks, and Kohistan, which has not yet been visited by our troops, has still been harried by bands of Ghazis, who have lived at free quarters in the villages. Nor is Kohistan a grain country. Its chief produce is from its vineyards, orchards, and gardens, and it pays its revenue in cash, and not in grain.

The question of supplies, as regulating the date of the evacuation of Kabul, is one which is engaging the attention of the military authorities, but its bearing on the political situation is so close that it could not with propriety be omitted from the present memorandum.

No. 15.

No. 23.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, 21st May 1880.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their most anxious consideration the state of affairs in Afghanistan resulting from the war entered upon in the autumn of 1878, the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879, the murder of the British Envoy at Kabul, and the military operations which were renewed with the object of punishing that outrage.

2. According to the latest information at my disposal, the Kabul, Kandahar, and Kurram forces absorb fully 55,000 men, of whom about 16,000 are Europeans. This is exclusive of about 13,500 men on the Punjab frontier, and is also exclusive of a force of more than 14,000 men in Sind and in the Bengal Presidency, who are held in readiness for service in Afghanistan.

3. It is evident that the employment of such a large portion of the Army of India beyond our frontier, while a further considerable force is held in readiness for service, entails a heavy financial burthen on the resources of India, and that the prolonged employment of our troops under such conditions must, especially in the case of the Native regiments, before long very seriously interfere with their efficiency.

4. Already, I have been informed by your Excellency's predecessor that it is most difficult to obtain recruits in India, a difficulty which arises in the main from the extreme dislike of the Native soldier to prolonged service in Afghanistan, and although costly and inconvenient measures have been adopted in order to stimulate enlistment, I am not yet informed that these measures have been attended with success. The continued stoppage of the usual furlough given to the Native troops serving in Afghanistan and the possible extension of a similar deprivation to those in British India itself, in consequence of the heavy duties entailed on them in the absence of a large part of the army, cannot but have a bad effect, and I conceive that, with a force of some 76 Native regiments on or beyond our frontier, it will be very difficult to devise any scheme for their relief.

5. Although our armies have encountered during the last campaign some severe opposition, yet, owing to the conspicuous gallantry and devotion of Her Majesty's troops, both European and Native, on all occasions, the superiority of our arms has been unquestionably established and maintained. Nevertheless, the result, even from a military point of view, is far from satisfactory.

6. The Army in Afghanistan holds positions at Kabul and in its neighbourhood, at Kandahar, with an outpost at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and in the Kurram valley, besides guarding the lines of communication between these places and our frontier. I trust that these lines of communication are now secure from any serious danger, but, up to a recent date, they have not been exempt from annoyance and some loss of life on all three routes; while beyond the positions actually occupied by our troops we have for the most part established no control. The Government which previously existed has been destroyed, and no authority exists in the country except that of independent

Chiefs over the various tribes. No security can, therefore, be felt that a renewed combination of these tribes against us may not recur at any moment, and that we may not be again compelled to defend positions which we hold.

7. To attempt to occupy the whole country and to reduce it to submission and order would probably require a much larger force even than that which we have now in Afghanistan, and such order as might even then be established would have no prospect of permanence, beyond the period of our occupation. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider what progress has yet been made towards the conclusion of arrangements which offer any hope of re-establishing a settled Government and which may enable us to withdraw from the country.

8. On referring to the correspondence which has passed between the Government of India and my predecessor, I find that in a Despatch, dated 7th January last, No. 3, Lord Lytton's Government explained as fully, I presume, as was then possible the policy which it was at that time desired to adopt. Its main features were—(1) avoidance of territorial annexation or further assumption by the Indian Government of administrative responsibilities in respect of Afghanistan, and (2) acceptance of the "disintegration of the kingdom of the late Amir Shere Ali Khan as a basis for the political reconstitution of the country." In the opinion of Lord Lytton's Government events, on the one hand, had shown the sufficiency of the military frontier secured by the Treaty of Gandamak, and, on the other hand, had demonstrated that the reconstruction of the Afghan kingdom under a single ruler was not practically possible, even were it politically desirable. They accordingly contemplated a provisional occupation of Herat and Seistan by Persia; the establishment of the province of Kandahar as a separate State under an hereditary ruler selected from among the representatives of the old governing families, to be supported by a British garrison at or near the capital; and a similar arrangement in regard to Kabul to which the Oxus provinces might remain, under certain conditions, nominally subject.

9. But while such were the views entertained by the Government of India in January last, it does not appear that, except in the case of Kandahar, any substantial approach to a definitive settlement in accordance with them has been made since that date. The negotiations which were in progress with Persia in reference to Herat and Seistan led to no result, and have been suspended. At Kabul, Sirdar Wali Mahomed has been placed in charge of the city and adjacent districts, but, by general consent, he would be wholly powerless to assert his authority even in the capital without the support of a British garrison, while no other of the Sirdars now on the spot offers better promises of success as an independent ruler, and the result of communications which have been opened with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, at present in Afghan Turkestan, is quite uncertain.

10. Turning to the measures which have been actually adopted in reference to Kandahar, Her Majesty's Government find that the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has been informed in a letter from the late Viceroy, under date the 13th March, which was formally presented to him on the 11th instant, in the presence of a large assemblage, that the Queen has been pleased to recognize him as independent ruler of the province, according to limits to be hereafter defined, but that, for the consolidation of his power and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's empire, it is necessary that a force of British troops should remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It appears also, from the Secret Letter of the Government of your Excellency's predecessor, No. 90, dated the 7th April last, that the Sirdar has expressed his readiness to accept the position proposed to him, and that he has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required.

11. Thus it appears that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.

12. I proceed to consider the question how far it is necessary to acquiesce in the continuance of this position of affairs. The first object which Her Majesty's Government desires to accomplish is the speedy withdrawal of the greater part of the troops now employed in Afghanistan, and the ultimate withdrawal of the whole from positions beyond our own frontier. But they also desire, if it be still possible, to see the

restoration on our north-western frontier of a friendly State capable of maintaining its own independence, and of administering its own affairs without the military support of the British Government. The engagements which have been contracted in the name of the Queen with Sher Ali Khan, or with any other Afghan Chief, must of course be scrupulously respected, and it is essential that, as a preliminary to any change of policy, your Excellency in Council should satisfy yourself of the exact nature of those engagements, and how far they preclude the substitution of some other arrangement if thought desirable.

13. With regard to the measures which have been taken at Kandahar, I find that so recently as the 16th February last Sher Ali expressed his willingness, if not his desire, to retire on a pension from the Indian Government; and, although he has since accepted the proposed arrangements, there is nothing on record to prove that his wishes in this respect are changed. Again, the boundaries of the State are not even approximately defined in Sir D. Stewart's letter of the 16th February, and it does not appear that any communication on the subject has since been made to Sher Ali. The location of the British force to be maintained at Kandahar has not been decided, and upon this point an important difference of opinion exists between Sir D. Stewart and Sher Ali, the General considering that the troops should be at least five miles from the city, whilst the Sirdar wishes that on no account should they be removed to any distance. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy to be paid for the support of the garrison has not been fixed, and Sher Ali has expressed doubts whether he can maintain himself if such subsidy be insisted on.

14. It is possible that a further discussion of the points alluded to in the preceding paragraph may afford an opening for reconsideration of the whole question, if it is thought desirable. The papers, moreover, contain various indications that the Sirdar distrusts his ability to maintain his position at all except by our direct military support. How far the terms of the late Viceroy's letter, and of the assurances subsequently given, constitute a pledge of such support which could not now be withdrawn without breach of faith, is a question upon which it will be for your Excellency in Council to satisfy yourself as soon as possible.

15. With regard to Kabul, the invitation which has been addressed to Abdul Rahman appears to be of a vague character, and no engagements can yet have been entered into with him which practically commit the British Government to his support. In this quarter, therefore, as I have already observed, Her Majesty's Government is free to adopt whatever line of policy may ultimately be deemed best suited to attain the objects which the Government of India have professedly had in view, namely, the restoration of order in Afghanistan, and the peace and security of the British frontier.

16. The withdrawal of the troops cannot, under any circumstances, be immediate, and may probably, upon sanitary grounds alone, require to be postponed until the month of November. The experience of last year has shown the suffering to which an army is liable in traversing the passes at an unfavourable season, and very strong reasons would be required to justify the exposure to heat and epidemic disease of troops who have already been engaged for a lengthened period in service of a trying and difficult character.

17. Her Majesty's Government, moreover, fully recognize that a too hasty withdrawal, either from Kabul or Kandahar, would probably lead to a renewal of disturbances and to prolonged civil war. For the disastrous consequences to the Afghan people the British Government could not be held altogether free from responsibility, while protracted anarchy in Afghanistan would probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions, and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies, which it is essential to avoid. An indispensable preliminary, also, to withdrawal, is the dispersion of any considerable hostile forces in the field which might attack and harass the troops on their march. It would not be consistent with the honour of the British arms, that Her Majesty's forces on their return to India should be exposed to insult, or that the least ground should be afforded either to the Afghans or the people of British India to regard the movement as otherwise than voluntary, and as having been decided on as a consequence of the cessation of all serious opposition. It will further be necessary to take every precaution that the tribes and Chiefs who have assisted us shall not be exposed to injury in consequence of their friendly conduct.

18. Subject, however, to the foregoing considerations, the desire of Her Majesty's Government is, as I have already stated, that Afghan territory should be evacuated

whenever it appears possible to entertain the hope that the prospect of a stable Government has been secured. The interval which must elapse before the withdrawal of our troops can be commenced will enable your Excellency in Council to form a judgment and to report fully to Her Majesty's Government as to the manner in which this object may best be attained.

19. The arguments in favour of the subdivision of the Afghan kingdom appear to be twofold. It is, in the first place, held to be impossible to find any Chief sufficiently strong to rule the whole country, but upon this point the information in my possession does not enable me to form a confident opinion.

20. The second argument is of a different kind. In the opinion of those who have been most in favour of a policy of active interference in Afghanistan, it is on the line of Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat, that it is most necessary that our strategic position should be secured. There are few who apprehend any danger or attach much importance to the line of approach to India which lies through Kabul and the Khyber Pass. It was therefore with the Amir of Afghanistan in his capacity of Ruler of Kandahar and of Southern and Western Afghanistan that it has been thought necessary to attempt to improve our relations; and whatever importance may in future be attached by the Government of India to the political condition of that territory, it is thought that it may be better that we should have to deal with the ruler of it alone, and not necessarily be involved in interference with the internal affairs of Central, Northern, and Eastern Afghanistan. Should the result of the consideration which your Excellency in Council will give to the question induce you to regard as sound the view above set forth, it might, perhaps, be feasible to effect an earlier retirement from Kabul and the neighbouring district than from Western Afghanistan. In such a case, assuming the communications which have been addressed to Abdul Rahman to be responded to by him in a satisfactory manner, the object would be to establish that Sirdar at Kabul with as little direct assistance from Her Majesty's agents or troops as possible, and to give him to understand that he must rely on his own resources.

21. It would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government be undesirable to embarrass him, and to commit ourselves to the possible necessity of further interference, by insisting on his receiving a British Resident. On the other hand a Native envoy would probably be of assistance to him in maintaining his authority, and would supply the Indian Government with all necessary information.

22. But although these arguments may be urged in favour of the establishment of separate kingdoms of Kabul and Kandahar, considerations in my opinion of not less weight point to a different conclusion. It is the strong opinion of experienced men that a permanent peace cannot be established in Afghanistan under such an arrangement. It is argued that, from the character of its population, the fertility of its soil, and its military position, Kandahar is the most important province of the country, that without it no strong and independent kingdom of Afghanistan can exist, and that no ruler of Kabul will acquiesce in its exclusion from his dominions. Sirdar Sher Ali is aware of this, and also that he cannot by himself hold his province against the warlike tribes on his frontier. It must, therefore, be regarded as almost certain that a policy of separation will be found to involve the necessity of affording permanent military support to the ruler of Kandahar, a liability to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the greatest objection.

23. In the event of it appearing compatible with engagements which have been entered into, and desirable from the point of view of policy, to revert to the idea of the reconstruction of the kingdom of Afghanistan as a whole, and should the negotiations with Abdul Rahman fail to lead to any satisfactory result, it may become necessary for your Excellency carefully to reconsider the position of Yakub Khan, and the facts which have been ascertained with regard to his conduct in Kabul in September last. I am aware that your Excellency's predecessor held a strong opinion that his treachery or incapacity had been so conclusively proved that his restoration had become impossible, and I am far from asserting that this may not be the case. I am also aware that the Government of your Excellency's predecessor had formally decided that the abdication of Yakub Khan is to be treated as irrevocable, that this decision has been communicated to the Government at home, and has been approved, and I understand that it has been announced at Kabul that his return would never be permitted.

24. These circumstances undoubtedly constitute grave, and, possibly, insuperable obstacles to the acceptance of Yakub Khan as a candidate for the throne of Afghan-

istan; but he appears to have a strong party in the country, and if it should be found that, as the heir of the late ruler, he would command more support than any other candidate, and that there is no conclusive proof against him of complicity in the murder of Sir L. Cavagnari and his escort, I am of opinion that his claims, or those of his son, Musa Khan, should not be held to be absolutely excluded.

25. It is probable that, in the negotiations between your Excellency's Govern-

* "The Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Amir's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Amir, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to that Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Amir as an independent ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories, but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should their endeavours to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Amir that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. The British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."

ment and the candidate who may be accepted as the ruler of Kabul, your Excellency will be asked how far you are prepared to give assurances of support against external attack, such as were so anxiously desired by the late Amir Shere Ali. Her Majesty's Government are prepared to renew the assurances which were offered in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, as quoted in the margin,* to the effect that, upon certain conditions, he might rely on the support of the British Government against unprovoked aggression; but they are unable in any degree to extend them, or to assume

undefined liabilities in regard to the foreign policy of a Government the character of which must necessarily be at present so uncertain.

26. The future of Herat presents perhaps greater difficulty than any other part of the Afghan question. The arrangement proposed with Persia, as I have already stated, has been suspended, and the negotiations will probably not be renewed. The most desirable solution would undoubtedly be that the city and dependent territory should continue to form part of an united kingdom of Afghanistan. Indeed, the position of Herat constitutes one of the most serious objections to the disintegration of Afghanistan. It would be difficult for the ruler of either Kandahar or Kabul, as detached provinces, to establish his authority over it, and, in the event of an independent Sirdar assuming power at Herat, it would be practically almost impossible for the British Government to exercise any control or influence over his policy.

27. It will be necessary for your Excellency to consider carefully with your military advisers the expediency of maintaining the advanced military positions on the North-West frontier which have been acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. The necessity of retaining the posts in the district of Pishin will be materially affected by the policy which may be decided on with reference to Kandahar, and it is probable that, for the present at all events, the maintenance of them will be desirable; but the value of the positions now held in the Kurram and Khyber districts appears to be open to the greatest doubt. A large force is now locked up in the Kurram valley with little or no military advantage, and the military occupation of the Khyber pass can probably not be permanently maintained except by the employment of a considerable force, at much risk to the health and efficiency of the troops and with little compensating profit. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that your decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

28. I have not attempted in the preceding observations to define for the guidance of your Excellency in Council a fixed policy which would admit of no modification. The position of affairs in Afghanistan is still involved in so much uncertainty and obscurity that Her Majesty's Government can as yet do little more than commit them to the judgment of your Excellency in Council, in the full confidence that your Excellency is generally acquainted with, and concurs in, the policy which they desire to pursue, with a view to the restoration of peace, the relief of the present heavy strain upon the resources of India, and the permanent security of the frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 16.

No. 131 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Diaries of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, for the period from the 8th to 21st May 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. CLARKE.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" J. GIBBS.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MEMORANDUM, No. 204, dated Kandahar, 19th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.B., C.S.I., Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to forward copy of Diary of the Kandahar Residency from the 8th to the 14th May 1880. Extract.—

May 11th.—This morning at 7.30 the Viceroy's letter and gifts were formally presented to the Wali; Lieutenant-General Primrose, commanding the Kandahar force, was kind enough to be present with his staff. Brigadier-General Brooke, the heads of the different departments, and the Officer commanding the citadel, were also present by invitation. The limited space in the Wali's house prevented a larger party being asked. A guard of honour of the 66th Regiment, under Captain McMath, with the band and the regimental colours, were drawn up in the courtyard, and half a battery of artillery in the square in front of the citadel. In the Wali's house we found a numerous assemblage, consisting of his brothers, Sirdars Hussain Khan and Nur Muhammad Khan, his young sons and nephews, the kazi and principal mullas, the leading merchants, a large number of tribal Chiefs and maliks, and others. After tea had been handed round, I addressed the Wali in Persian, as follows:—

"His Excellency the Viceroy has ordered me to deliver to your Highness this letter in answer to that sent to His Excellency by my hand. He has also desired me to request your acceptance of these gifts as a token of the great regard and esteem he has for your Highness."

The Wali expressed his profound gratitude, and asked that Mirza Hasan Ali Khan

At His Highness' request, I said that, although not mentioned in the letter, it was intended that His Highness should have the right of coining money and having the Khutbeh read in his own name.

might read the translation of the letter aloud. The reading of the letter was interrupted and followed by many exclamations of approval, particularly by the mullas. I then asked the Wali's permission to say a few words to those present, and on his begging me to do so, spoke as follows, in

Persian:—

"Ulema, Sirdars, Khans, and others here present, you have seen by the letter which has just been read what great kindness the British Government, which all over the world is the support of Islam, has extended to the people of Kandahar and the Durani nation. You have also seen how peace and prosperity have been brought by us to Kandahar, and how different is its condition now from what it was two

years ago. In order that this condition of peace and prosperity may continue, and that it may not return to its former state of poverty and wretchedness, the Government of England has decided to restore it to its ancient independence under the most worthy and capable descendant of its former Governors, the Sirdars of Kandahar, whose rule only ceased 25 years ago. Under the just Government of Wali Sher Ali Khan, and under the protection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, remain for ever free from foreign oppression, and will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity that will be the envy of the whole of Islam."

The Wali made a short speech in reply, expressive of his own unworthiness and his gratitude to the English Government. The Viceroy's presents were then brought forward and uncovered. The first, consisting of a sword mounted on blue velvet and silver, with a heavy gold embroidered belt, was buckled round the Wali's waist by General Primrose, on which His Highness said that he trusted he might have an opportunity of showing his readiness to draw it in the cause of the British Government. I then placed a diamond-studded repeater watch and gold chain round His Highness' neck; and presented him with the rest of the gifts, consisting of a large silver salver, a silver ewer and basin, a clock, and several pieces of silk and velvet. The guard of honour then presented arms, and a salute of 21 guns was fired by the artillery. His Highness the Wali then received the congratulations of all present; and the kazi and mullas offered a prayer, in Pushtu, expressive of thanks to God, and exhortation to the Wali to govern justly. To this he replied in the same language, exhorting them also to do their duty in keeping the people in the right way. Sweetmeats were then handed round, and we took our leave. Intelligence reached me the next morning that, after leaving the assembly, the Wali retired into his Andarum, where he took off his dress of ceremony, and, after placing a black rag (expressive of humility) on his head, offered up open prayers to God for having elevated him to so exalted a position, vowing at the same time to be faithful to the British Government, which had so honoured him. This produced an outburst of wrath from his niece, daughter of Khushdil Khan, his eldest brother, and from one of Mihrdil Khan's (his father's) widows, who abused him for joining the infidels, and for daring to compare himself with his ancestors. The Wali's favourite wife (a daughter of Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, Tallai) took his part, and there was a violent quarrel.

No. 17.

No. 134 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan, of Kandahar, to the Viceroy, in answer to the Earl of Lytton's letter to him, dated 13th March, which was delivered by Colonel St. John on the 11th May 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. CLARKE.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" J. GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

No. 208, dated Kandahar, 20th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy in answer to that delivered by me to His Highness on the 11th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, dated 9th Jamadi-us-Sani (19th May 1880).

After compliments.—I beg to represent that your Excellency's very kind letter, together with the honours and presents which your Excellency was most graciously pleased to send, has reached me and caused me much pleasure; that on Friday, the 1st Jamadi-us-Sani (11th May 1880), I was invested with the honours which your Excellency had kindly sent me by my kind friend Colonel St. John. Both he and General Primrose have treated me with every mark of honour and respect, and the contents of your Excellency's letter afforded me the greatest joy and delight.

I feel extremely thankful to Her Imperial Majesty the Queen of England and the Empress of India for Her Majesty's unbounded favour in having recognized me (the sincere well-wisher of Her Majesty's Government) as the absolute Governor and the independent ruler (Wali) of the principality of Kandahar and its dependencies. For this favour of Her Majesty's illustrious Government I can make no return, but beg to express my most sincere gratitude to Her Majesty.

God willing, so long as I live, I shall not fail to fulfil, as far as lies in my power, the requirements of sincere friendship and devotion, inasmuch as Her Imperial Majesty has been so kind as not to withhold from me (the worthless one) anything which is likely to add to my strength or to put my affairs in order.

I am exceedingly glad to learn that a British force will remain in Kandahar for the security and protection of the frontier of Her Majesty's dominions, as the presence of troops here will ensure safety to the frontier. But in reality all the hardships of the journey, &c., to which the British troops are exposed, are for the sake of protecting my country and strengthening my position. With regard to the point that a certain quantity of the Government share in the grain produce of the country should be supplied to the British troops for provisions, I beg to state that this whole country, with all its resources, is the property and at the disposal of the British Government. Whether there be any excess of grain beyond my own wants or not, I will not fail to provide the fixed quantity for the imperial troops in the same way as I supplied to them what they required last year, a fact of which General Stewart and Colonel St. John are aware. Please God, I will endeavour to act in future as I have acted in the past. I am also exceedingly pleased to learn that a British officer of rank will be located here for the purpose of conveying the friendly communications and wishes of the British Government. I hope that, by the grace of God and the good will and kindness of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, all the affairs of this country will be properly arranged and will improve greatly, the interests of this State being identical with those of the British Government. With respect to the extension of the railway to Kandahar, to which your Excellency was pleased to allude, I beg to say that the construction of railways in every country has been the cause of its advancement, as the people derive a great many advantages from them. In fact, there would be nothing so beneficial as the construction of a railway to Kandahar, as it will afford every facility for traffic, &c. I am exceedingly pleased to hear of this proposal. Please God, the good wishes and favours of the British Government towards myself and the people of this country will continue for ever. I feel highly indebted and thankful to all the British officers who were here before, as well as to those who are here at present, especially to Colonel St. John, who pays great attention to me, and is a well wisher of his own Government and a very kind friend of mine.

Usual ending.

No. 18.

No. 164 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* this day addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. Stewart, Kabul, conveying to him instructions for concluding the political arrangements preliminary to the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul.

* No. 2431 E. P.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 2431 E. P.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

Foreign Department (Political).

SIR,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

THE latest reports from Kabul of the movements of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan show that he has now arrived in Kohistan, and that he may be expected very shortly to proceed towards Kabul. So far as his wishes and intentions can be judged from his recent actions and letters, there is fair ground for supposing that he has fully apprehended the nature and objects of the invitation sent to him in April last, and that his inclinations, as well as his needs and interests, are bringing him toward an arrangement with the British Government. It has, therefore, become expedient that you and Mr. Griffin should be furnished with instructions empowering you to conclude the political arrangements which must precede your departure from Kabul, since the evacuation of the city by our troops cannot, in any event, be much longer delayed.

2. In their correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the Government of India have throughout held steadily to two cardinal points. In the first place, it has been declared from the beginning, and throughout maintained, that our measures for withdrawing our troops from Northern Afghanistan are in no essential degree dependent upon the result of our correspondence with the Sirdar. In the instructions transmitted by my letter of the 27th April, regarding the terms of our communications with Abdul Rahman, it was laid down that our evacuation of Kabul cannot constitute any subject for proposals in Mr. Griffin's correspondence with the Sirdar. Nevertheless, since the Government were willing to carry out this evacuation in the manner most conducive to Abdul Rahman's interests, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform the Sirdar of our intention to quit the place, and of our desire, in the interests of order and the restoration of tranquillity to the country, to transfer the government to him. In my letter of the 20th May to Mr. Griffin the same policy was adhered to, and it was said that we could not materially alter our plans for evacuation upon considerations affecting a new Amir. On the 15th May, also, I telegraphed to Mr. Griffin that he should bear steadily in mind that our policy of withdrawing from Kabul is in no way dependent on establishing a friendly Amir, or on an adjustment of friendly relations, however desirable, with any Kabul ruler. The early retirement of our forces was held to be the main object of all political and military measures, an object to which the establishment of a settled Government at Kabul must, in the case of emergency, be subordinated.

3. In the second place, it was decided, in authorizing correspondence with Abdul Rahman, that this correspondence must not take the form of negotiations, in the sense of proposing or entertaining conditions, or of discussing a bargain. The suggestion that conditions should be offered to the Sirdar was definitely negatived; and the scope of the instructions given regarding this correspondence was carefully limited to authorizing an unconditional invitation and offer. The Government informed the Sirdar that if he came to Kabul upon a friendly understanding he should be recognized as Amir, and assisted to establish himself before the departure of our troops. Subsequently, upon your special recommendation, the Sirdar received a distinct statement of the views and intentions of the British Government upon certain additional points. But this statement, although of high importance to the Sirdar, was given him unconditionally; and while it conveys a declaration of the policy and intentions of Government, the Sirdar's assent has been neither asked nor expected.

4. In regard, therefore, to the plan of early withdrawal of our troops from Kabul, and to the continuance of our correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the lines of instruction originally traced have been substantially adhered to. You are thus free, as matters now stand, to complete the arrangements, political and military, preliminary to the retirement of the British forces, while, as Abdul Rahman has accepted your invitation to Kabul, the time may have arrived for the fulfilment of our offers to him of recognition and assistance. Upon these points I am now to convey to you instructions in continuation and expansion of the orders already telegraphed. The Government of India agree with the opinion of yourself and Mr. Griffin that it will probably be advisable that the Sirdar should not enter Kabul immediately, but that he should remain for the present within a distance convenient for intercourse and for personal conference, if necessary, upon the arrangements for his assumption of authority. First, then, in regard to the Sirdar's recognition as Amir (which, as well as any subsequent arrangement with him, is, of course, dependent upon your being satisfied that he is dealing with us in good faith, and in a friendly spirit), he will be recognized under the title of Amir of Kabul; and whenever the announcement shall have been publicly made, it should be understood as entitling him, thereafter, to your full countenance and political support, but not to any co-operation by British troops in his measures for establishing his authority. It will consequently be your duty to discountenance and discourage all claims of candidates and combinations of parties adverse to or inconsistent with the recognition of Abdul Rahman's Amirship.

5. You have been already instructed that, for the purpose of establishing the Sirdar at Kabul, he may be provided with some artillery, and with money sufficient to meet his immediate wants. The precise number of guns to be given, and their calibre, must be left to your judgment, upon consideration of the Amir's position at Kabul, and of his own resources; the general view of the Government being that the guns should be serviceable, and sufficient to strengthen effectively his occupation of the city. In regard to money, it is important to place the Amir beyond the necessity of levying exactions upon the country, in order to collect funds for the maintenance of the troops he may require, and for the payment of his officials; and your disbursements to him will be proportioned, within a maximum of ten lacs of rupees, to your estimate of his actual wants at the time. But the Sirdar should understand that we can engage ourselves to no regular subsidy or continuous supply of either arms or money, and that, after he has taken possession of his capital, he must rely for holding it upon his own resources.

6. It would be manifestly premature at present to discuss the question whether any formal engagement should hereafter be made with the Amir's Government, before the Sirdar has established himself at Kabul, or has shown what disposition towards the British Government, or capacity for rule, he may possess. Nevertheless, since the point has been raised, and since it has been argued that the Amir may have some claim to be admitted into some such engagement, it may be well that you should receive explicit instructions on the matter. The Government of India, I am to say, see no reason for diverging from the line of policy which has, from the beginning of these transactions with the Sirdar, positively excluded any question of a treaty with him. It is true that in transmitting to the Sirdar the replies of the Government to certain questions regarding his future position, Mr. Griffin added, under authority, that if the Sirdar desired these matters to be stated in formal writing, he should first accept or refuse our invitation to Kabul. This formal statement, if he asks for it (but

not otherwise), can now be given to him; and I am accordingly to enclose a letter which may be delivered, after the Sirdar's recognition, to him as Amir. But it appears to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that it would be highly inadvisable to enter into any other engagement at the present time. The actual state of Afghanistan would render futile any attempt to introduce regular diplomatic relations with its ruler; and all questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governments must necessarily be postponed until some settled and responsible administration shall have been consolidated in North Afghanistan. This is the explanation which, if any reference is made to the question of a treaty, may be given to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

7. It will be necessary, before evacuating Kabul, to determine what measures are possible for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted us there from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct. Upon the subject of individuals who may claim our protection, and may not desire to remain in Afghanistan, you will receive a separate letter. You will, however, probably see fit to address some admonition to Abdul Rahman, intimating that, if he seeks to retain our good will, he can give no better proof of his friendly disposition than by his behaviour towards those in whom the British Government is interested. But experience has shown the inutility of making, in favour of individuals, precise stipulations which can easily be evaded, and can very rarely be enforced; while the case of tribes, who, like the Hazaras, may have compromised themselves by taking part against the Afghans in the recent disturbances, must be reserved for separate consideration.

8. The foregoing instructions will have conveyed to you the views of the Government of India on such questions as may be expected to arise in concluding the transfer of the Kabul Government to Sirdar Abdul Rahman. When in the opening of the present year it was determined to withdraw the British troops from North Afghanistan in the autumn, the Government of India considered that an invitation to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan to assume the Amirship afforded the best prospect of replacing the country under some settled and durable rule. As the Sirdar has accepted this invitation, the most desirable issue for the present situation in Kabul lies, beyond doubt, in the direction of concluding arrangements with him. Nevertheless, in the present unstable position of affairs in North Afghanistan, where the course of events is still liable to sudden changes, it is necessary to provide against the contingency of a failure to bring the correspondence with the Sirdar to a satisfactory termination. Your instructions are that if a breach with Abdul Rahman occurs, you can assemble the leaders of the party which would restore Sher Ali's family to power, offer to recognize any *de facto* Government they may be able to establish, and transfer Kabul to that Government. Moreover, you have been empowered, in the case of rupture with the Sirdar, to use all practical means, in the interval before your complete evacuation of Kabul, to communicate with the leaders of any substantial party in the country, who may be able to organize some administration at Kabul capable of discharging the functions of a Government. With this object you will proceed to notify to the Sirdars and to other representatives of the wishes and feelings of the people round Kabul, with whom it may be possible for you to communicate, that your correspondence with Abdul Rahman is at an end, and that the British Government wishes them to undertake the organization of some ruling authority. You would explain that, if no attempts are made on their part, or with their collusion, to embarrass the movement of your troops, their endeavours to restore order will be supported by your influence, so long as you remain at Kabul, and that if they succeed in setting up a Government *de facto*, you will recognize it by transferring the capital to its charge. But you are not authorized to make any further offers of assistance or specific support; and the Government of India must reserve full discretion to act, upon all ulterior questions, according to the future course of events in Afghanistan.

9. On the other hand, while the Government of India do not disguise their reluctance to leave Kabul unprotected and to relinquish as unsuccessful their endeavours to promote the restoration of order under some recognized ruler, it would be in the highest degree imprudent to allow your arrangements for the withdrawal of your troops to be materially delayed or deranged. In the eventuality contemplated it is probable that considerable confusion will prevail in the country, and it might take a long time to bring together the leading men of the alternative party. The prospect of any stable Government being formed within the short period to which your stay can in any case be limited, is uncertain; and in a former letter I have pointed out the need of great

caution in taking steps which might implicate us unprofitably, and, possibly, against the wishes of the country, in struggles among equally matched factions. Subject, therefore, to the foregoing general instructions and limitations, the Government desire to leave you free to use your own discretion as to the measures to be adopted under the circumstances for the establishment of a *de facto* Government in Kabul.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

To His Highness Sirdar ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

After compliments.

July 1880.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has proceeded toward Kabul, in accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and people from the establishment of a settled government under your Highness's authority, the British Government recognizes your Highness as Amir of Kabul.

I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to inform your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal government of the territories in the possession of your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be advisable that a Muhammedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Kabul.

Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government with regard to the position of the ruler at Kabul in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on record for your Highness' information. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by foreign powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that your Highness can have no political relations with any foreign power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary, in repelling it; provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.

I have, &c.,
(Signed)

No. 19.

No. 166 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 27th July 1880.

WE have already reported to your Lordship by telegraph that a durbar was held at Kabul on the 22nd July, in which Sir Donald Stewart publicly and formally recognized Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul.

2. In order to explain clearly the motives and considerations by which we have been actuated in countenancing Abdul Rahman's accession to the vacant rulership at Kabul, it is necessary to give some connected account of the course of affairs in,

Northern Afghanistan, and to define the objects toward which the policy of the Government of India has, during the last few months, been directed.

3. Our Despatch of the 7th April last, upon the situation at that date in Afghanistan, referred to a Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General (the Earl of Lytton) as summing up the policy which the Government of India were then endeavouring to carry out. The Minute stated that the Government were anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond the frontier settled by the Treaty of Gandamak, excepting Kandahar, and that it was desirable, in order that this might be done, to find a ruler for Kabul. Upon this latter point our Despatch reported, more specifically, the conclusion of the Government of India that Sirdar Abdul Rahman, who was known to have entered Afghan Turkistan, would, if he agreed to certain territorial limitations, be more likely than any other of his family to prove a successful ruler. The Sirdar had given, indirectly, some hints that he desired an opening for correspondence with the English, and friendly messages had been sent to him in return; so that there was reason to expect before long some definite overtures on his part. In April last, therefore, the settled policy adopted by the Government of India was to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible from the interior of North Afghanistan, and to open correspondence with Sirdar Abdul Rahman, with the view of facilitating by a friendly understanding his assumption of authority at Kabul.

4. It should be here mentioned that at the end of March a letter had been sent by the British authorities at Kabul to Abdul Rahman, whose presence and movements beyond the Hindu Kush could not in any case be ignored, stating simply that the bearer was authorized to transmit to Kabul any representations the Sirdar might be inclined to make regarding his object in entering Afghanistan. The messenger was empowered also to let the Sirdar understand that the British Government was favourably disposed toward him, and to afford him every opening for a friendly correspondence. This letter elicited a very friendly, though guarded, reply. The Sirdar expressed in very general terms his hope of obtaining power, and said that he greatly desired the friendship of the English and their assistance in restoring peace and order to Afghanistan. At the same time he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for the hospitality which he had received placed him in some doubt as to the terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him. He added, in a verbal message, that he was ready to cross the Hindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers. The receipt of this answer made it necessary to settle carefully the basis upon which the communications, thus initiated, were to be continued, and to define precisely the scope and nature of the arrangements which the British Government might be prepared to conclude with the Sirdar.

5. Accordingly the Government of India, after a very careful survey of the situation, addressed* to Mr. Lepel Griffin at Kabul a full exposition of the policy which was to govern all our relations with the Sirdar, with explicit instructions regarding the language to be held in corresponding with him. In regard to the policy, its main lines and objects, as already determined, were described as follows:—"Our only reasons" (it was said) "for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan, have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country."

"The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated 30th March, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that 'the Government is 'anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points 'beyond those to be occupied under the treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. 'In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will 'be separated from Kandahar. Steps' (continued His Excellency) 'are being taken 'for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of 'strength in Afghanistan, as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will 'overawe disaffection.' * * * 'For this, all that is necessary from the political 'point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition 'he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication 'with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined have 'been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni."

“ With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.”

“ The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.”

6. This being the policy and plan of operations of the Government of India, it appeared to the Governor General in Council that to attach any conditions to the proposals which might be addressed to Abdul Rahman, or to enter into any negotiations with him upon the subject, would be unnecessary and inconsistent with the views and course of action laid down. For, in the first place, the Government of India require from the Sirdar no pledges, concessions, or reciprocal engagements. Our invitation to him was given, not as a preliminary to forming an alliance with the Kabul ruler, or that his consent to our political arrangements might be secured; but chiefly in order that, by transferring the administration to a competent ruler, we might be spared the necessity of leaving something like anarchy behind us whenever our troops should have been withdrawn. In the second place, it seemed that any negotiation with Abdul Rahman must in all probability raise some very embarrassing points, and would be very likely to involve us in a protracted discussion, which might entail delay and affect our plans for the withdrawal of our troops. And finally, the Sirdar's capabilities and disposition were little known, while he was obviously in no position to become responsible for the execution of regular political engagements.

7. Mr. Griffin was therefore directed to reply to the Sirdar, by letter and through his confidential agents, expressing satisfaction at the friendly sentiments which the Sirdar's letter contained, and concurring heartily with his desire for peace and the restoration of order. The political arrangements in South Afghanistan were to be communicated to him, and he was to be informed that we had settled to withdraw our troops from Kabul in a few months. It was to be explained to him that we desired, before leaving, to make over Kabul and its provinces to a capable and friendly ruler, whose accession would be in accordance with the wishes and usages of the country, and who would be able to maintain his authority and restore order. That, with this view we were ready to transfer the Government to him and to recognize him as ruler of the State, and further to afford him facilities and even support in reorganizing the administration and establishing himself at the capital. If (it was said) in future Abdul Rahman should prove by his conduct his friendship towards us, and his confidence in us, such behaviour would be fully reciprocated, very much to his advantage; and it was added that his behaviour towards those who have assisted and have been in close intercourse with British officers in Afghanistan would be taken as a test of the sincerity of his desire to acquire and retain our friendship.

8. Upon this basis, therefore, and subject to the limitations above defined, our political officers at Kabul were authorized to proceed with the correspondence with Abdul Rahman.

9. The mission which conveyed Mr. Griffin's reply, stating formally the views of the Government, and inviting the Sirdar to Kabul, was received by Abdul Rahman at Khanabad with much courtesy, and the whole matter was repeatedly discussed at different interviews. It soon became apparent that the Sirdar's needs and interests made an understanding with the English at Kabul of great importance to him, and that he was by no means indisposed to accept the invitation. But the reports of his conversation with the mission indicated some impression on his part that the British Government contemplated a treaty with him, and it was natural that he should show his desire in any case to obtain some information regarding the extent of territory which would be recognized as his dominion, and generally as to the nature of his political relations and responsibilities as ruler of Kabul. The Sirdar's statement upon these points to the members of the mission proved that until his doubts and uncertainty in these points should have been set at rest, he was unwilling to compromise

himself by moving towards Kabul. After consultation with the Sirdars and officers, he made in durbar the following declaration :—

“When the British Government tell me what are to be the boundaries of Afghanistan, will Kandahar, as of old, be left in my kingdom or not ?

“Will an European Envoy and a Government (British) force remain within the borders of Afghanistan, after friendship is made between the two parties, or not ?

“What enemy of the British Government shall I be expected to repel, and what manner of assistance will Government wish me to give ?

“And what benefits will the Government undertake to confer on me and my countrymen ?

“These are matters which I must place before the Chiefs of my country, and in concert with them I will, having ascertained how far I can do so, undertake such terms of a treaty as I can accept and carry out. For this purpose, as soon as I am informed on these points, I will at once go to Kabul ; and, in order to get a reply quickly, I will at once post mounted couriers at various places on the road. I will also issue a proclamation to my countrymen, directing them to assemble within their own bounds, and to abstain from advancing against the British army, or provoking hostilities. I will send back one of you two with a written reply to the letter sent to me by the British Government, If I receive an answer in accordance with my wishes, and those of my countrymen, I will then set out from here to Kabul. Otherwise, should the conditions be such as I cannot undertake and accept, I will consider carefully whether to go to Kabul and discuss them.”

10. The mission sent to Kabul their report of Abdul Rahman's requests and wishes, adding that his real intentions would be made known by the written reply which the Sirdar was sending. This report was forwarded to us by Mr. Griffin, with a strong expression of his opinion that the Sirdar would not be satisfied without precise information as to the limits of his dominions and the responsibilities which he might incur by dealing with us. The Sirdar's own reply followed on the 2nd of June. It contained merely general expressions of friendship and hope for support, but the Sirdar mentioned that Ibrahim Khan, who took the letter, would add some verbal explanations. The account, however, of the state of affairs at Khanabad and of the Sirdar's disposition, given by the two British agents on their return to Kabul with this reply, appears to have convinced our political officers that the Sirdar had been merely temporizing. They, recommended, therefore, that an ultimatum should be addressed to him, stating plainly his position in certain particulars regarding which the Sirdar was believed to require a clear understanding with the British Government. But the Government of India decided that, since a reply on these points might involve questions of decisive importance to our future course of action in North Afghanistan, it would be right to await, before answering the telegram, the arrival of the present Viceroy at Simla.

11. In the meantime it had become known throughout North Afghanistan that the British Government was in communication with Abdul Rahman Khan. The general uncertainty as to the result of this correspondence, the rumours prevalent regarding the Sirdar's real disposition and plans, and the jealousies of opposing factions, caused much fermentation among the people ; while this uneasiness was increased and extended by letters, purporting to emanate from the Sirdar, and bidding the tribes to be armed and ready, which circulated through the country. Some of these letters were intercepted and brought to Kabul, and the Sirdar was simultaneously reported to be in close correspondence with Muhammad Jan, who was undoubtedly engaged in levying forces against us. These reports, and the spread of excitement throughout the country, suggested to our chief military and political officers grave doubts as to the good faith of the Sirdar, and it became necessary to consider very seriously the expediency of continuing with him amicable communications which General Stewart and Mr. Griffin were disposed to abandon.

12. Upon this situation of affairs, which for the moment assumed a critical aspect, the Government of India, after the present Viceroy's arrival, deliberated carefully. The question to be determined was whether, at this stage of the correspondence with Abdul Rahman, having regard to what had actually passed between him and our representatives at Kabul, to the Sirdar's public acts and letters, to his position in Afghan Turkistan, and to our declared intention of speedily withdrawing our troops from Kabul, we should undertake the responsibility of breaking off the correspondence. It appeared to us to be very probable that Abdul Rahman might be endeavouring

to bring pressure to bear upon the British Government, and at the same time to strengthen himself independently by encouraging the fanatic spirit of the people, and by summoning them to be ready to join his standard. It was manifestly his interest, particularly as our intention to withdraw early from Kabul was no secret, to gain over as many adherents as possible, and in prosecuting these intrigues and combinations he incurred great risk of setting in motion forces which he might be unable to control, and of provoking, intentionally or otherwise, collision with the British troops, or at any rate of straining his relations with us beyond the point up to which they could be prudently maintained. On the other hand, we were without actual evidence that the Sirdar was deceiving us, and that he had secretly resolved not only to refuse our invitation, but to engage in hostilities against us. On the whole, therefore, we resolved that, finding no distinct proof of the Sirdar's duplicity, and taking into account the known difficulties of his position, the fair and politic course of action before finally closing, as we had been advised to do, our correspondence with him, would be to send him plain replies upon the points to which he evidently attached particular importance. There was no reason why these replies should be withheld, while to break off communications abruptly, leaving his questions unanswered, might have afforded the Sirdar some pretext for declaring the British Government responsible for this unsatisfactory conclusion. We therefore telegraphed to Kabul precise instructions on the points reported to be essential, and we desired a letter to be written, in pursuance of these instructions, to Abdul Rahman. The messenger taking this letter was ordered to request an answer within four days of its receipt by the Sirdar, and to set out on his return to Kabul, with or without an answer, on the fifth day.

13. A copy of this letter, dated 14th June, is already in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. It contains a statement of the views which we entertain with respect to the position which the ruler of Kabul holds in relation to foreign powers, and it explains to what extent, and under what circumstances, the British Government would be prepared to afford support to the new Amir against external attack. In regard to territorial limits, the letter bars discussion on certain points settled or held in reserve, but expresses the willingness of the British Government that over the rest of Afghanistan the Sirdar shall re-establish the authority exercised by previous rulers of his family. He is further informed that there is no wish to station English Residents within his territories. In conclusion, he is told that, if he desires a more formal record of these matters, he must first accept the invitation sent him by the British authorities, must proceed toward Kabul, and must state his propositions for ulterior arrangements.

14. On the day after this letter had been despatched, a letter from the Sirdar, dated 9th June, reached Kabul, in which he announced that, after settling all his affairs, he would start in the direction of Kabul. To this Mr. Griffin replied expressing pleasure at this intelligence, but pointing out that the Sirdar's exhortations to the chiefs to collect their men and be ready for action had caused much excitement, and requesting him to use his authority to dissolve and repress these gatherings.

15. The Sirdar replied within the prescribed period of four days to Mr. Griffin's letter of the 14th June, which had reached him on the 20th at Khanabad. In his answer, received at Kabul on the 26th June, he declared that the communications made to him regarding his future position as ruler of Kabul was in all respects satisfactory. He intimated that he had addressed the Afghan Chiefs in the same sense, and he stated that he would himself very shortly reach Parwan, on the southern slope of the Hindu Kúsh mountains. But, simultaneously, a secret message was received from a confidential and trustworthy source, implying strong distrust of Abdul Rahman's sincerity, while it was observed that both in the Sirdar's letter to Mr. Griffin, and in his address to the chiefs, that portion which alluded to the territorial reservations was certainly worded ambiguously. These indications, and the disturbed aspect of affairs round Kabul, increased the strong misgivings entertained by our political officers as to the Sirdar's real intentions, and strengthened their belief that he might be only protracting the correspondence in order to gain an advantageous position for further demands, and possibly for eventual hostility. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin represented to the Government of India, for the second time, their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdul Rahman, the imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the necessity, in this critical situation, of breaking off with Abdul Rahman, and adopting other means for establishing a government in Kabul before our evacuation.

16. We have already, in our Despatch of the 6th July, submitted to your Lordship a full statement of the difficult case which was thus again placed before us for decision upon the issue whether the correspondence with Abdul Rahman should or should not be closed, and we have explained at length the grounds upon which our decision was framed. These grounds, stated briefly, were that, as a rupture with Abdul Rahman appeared to us hardly justifiable, we preferred holding on our course, at the risk of some disadvantage or embarrassment, to incurring, by a sudden premature change, any possible imputation on our good faith and firmness of purpose. We considered, moreover, that, as matters stood then, an arrangement with Abdul Rahman offered the most advisable solution, while we doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement. The subsequent course of events has as yet given us no reason to regret our determination not to pronounce for the rupture, nor has Sir D. Stewart been compelled to use the authority, vested in him conditionally by our final instructions, to break off, in certain circumstances, the negotiations with Abdul Rahman.

17. Ressaldar Afzul Khan, who had remained at Khanabad after the return of the other two members of the mission originally sent from Kabul to Abdul Rahman, arrived at Kabul on the 3rd July. He brought a reply to Mr. Griffin's letter requiring the Sirdar to use his authority to repress tribal gatherings, in which Abdul Rahman pleaded the weakness of his authority, and represented that by ordering the clansmen to disperse he should only alienate all his supporters. We suggested to Sir D. Stewart that, if these excuses seemed to him reasonable, he might consider the expediency of not pressing too closely upon Abdul Rahman the final requisition that he should disperse the gatherings in Kohistan. The general situation was described by Mr. Lepel Griffin on the 7th July :—

“The position of affairs, so far as the probabilities of a settlement with Abdul Rahman, as desired by the Government of India, are concerned, appear far more favourable than they did last week. The firm and decided tone in which the Sirdar has been addressed, the precision and definiteness of the conditions which have been laid down as necessary for his acceptance, have had the anticipated effect. Abdul Rahman has seen that we have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, that trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intends coming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to accept our terms rather than dictate his own.”

18. On the 10th July Abdul Rahman's answer to Mr. Griffin's final letter, desiring him to proceed at once to Kabul, and to take measures for controlling the tribal gatherings, was received at Kabul. Its purport was to adjourn any specific reply until he should have arrived in Kohistan, and as there was at the moment no sign of growing hostility against us, while the country was outwardly quiet, Sir D. Stewart determined that the Sirdar need not be hurried in his compliance with our requisitions. A deputation of influential persons, friendly to British interests, was sent to meet the Sirdar, and was very courteously received by him at Tutandara. He wrote again to Mr. Griffin, explaining that he was detained for a few days at that place; but on the 20th he reached Charikar. A large number of leading chiefs and other influential personages, including Mushk-i-Alam, and some of the principal Ghilzai and Wardak Chiefs, have signified their adherence to his cause, or their acquiescence in his recognition, and many have gone to meet him at Charikar. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin considered that, under these circumstances, it was advisable that the Sirdar's public recognition as Amir should no longer be deferred; and the Sirdar himself, who was consulted, expressed much satisfaction at the proposal. On the 22nd, accordingly, a durbar was held attended by a large number of chiefs and influential personages, and by a deputation representing the Sirdar; when Abdul Rahman was formally and publicly recognized, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, as Amir of Kabul.

19. In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to place before Her Majesty's Government a general summary of the proceedings which have been taken since April last, to accomplish that part of the policy which related to the establishment, before the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul, of a government in North Afghanistan. Our detailed instructions to Sir D. Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which his occupation of the city should terminate, were transmitted to your Lordship in our Despatch of the 20th July; and they need not be here recapitulated. In those instructions it was necessary to provide, not only for the contingency of Abdul Rahman's final recognition, and of his peaceful accession to the Amirship on the basis of a friendly understanding with the British Government, but

also for the possibility of an interruption or breach of that understanding. To this latter case we need not now more specifically allude, except to observe that Sir D. Stewart's instructions for dealing with that eventuality left much, within certain limits, to his discretion, and that he was enjoined to use all practical means for establishing some *de facto* government before his departure. But all his measures for this object were to be subject to military considerations; nor could they be permitted materially to delay or derange his operations for the withdrawal of the British troops.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

CORRESPONDENCE with SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN referred to in the foregoing Despatch.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to MR. GRIFFIN, 15th April 1880.

WHEREAS at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great (British) Government know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia night and day I have cherished the hope of re-visiting my native land. When the late Amir Shere Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated (that I should do so) then, I went to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms, and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested (dishonest) person, and raised fools to power, until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these:—That as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them (England and Russia), for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people.

This is my wish; for the rest it is yours to decide.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 30th April 1880.

On the 21st April I received your friendly letter from Kunduz, and understood its contents, together with the messages which you sent by Muhammad Sarwar. Both were submitted by telegram for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India at Simla, and I am now commanded by him to reply to your letter to the following effect.

The friendly sentiments which you have expressed are cordially reciprocated, and the British Government has only one object in its communications with you, namely, to restore peace to Afghanistan, and friendly relations between that country and itself. For this it is believed that the time is opportune. An army marching from Kandahar has just occupied Ghazni and is now pursuing its march to Kabul; while the Wardaks, who have opposed the march of a brigade sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar army, have been defeated with heavy loss.

The British Government does not desire to annex Afghanistan, and will withdraw its armies from Kabul so soon as it has established an Amir who is willing to live in peace and friendship with the Government.

This you are ready to do, and consequently the Viceroy and Governor General, believing you to be the most capable of the Barakzai family and most approved by the people of Afghanistan, offers you the Amirship, and will assist you to establish yourself, and supply your immediate wants.

What you have said regarding Russia has been fully understood, and the Government appreciates your sentiments towards those from whom you have so long experienced hospitality. But on this point no difficulty need arise, for with regard to your future relations with Russia, the Government desires nothing different from what has already been agreed upon between that country and Her Majesty's Government.

It is of great importance for you to take action at once ; should you accept this friendly offer of the Government, you will do well to come to Kabul without delay, where you are assured of honourable reception and personal safety. But at no place but Kabul can final arrangements be satisfactorily and quickly made.

This letter, in duplicate, is taken by Wazirzada Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, a trusted official of the British Government, who will explain other matters by word of mouth, and by Sirdar Sher Muhammad Khan, who is well known to you, and who is a well-wisher of the British Government and of Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 16th May 1880.

BE it known to your friendly mind that I have received by the hands of Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan and Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan and Sher Muhammad Khan the kind letter which you wrote to confirm our friendship, to show your sympathy with the sorrow of Afghanistan, to exalt me amongst my peers, and to honour Afghanistan with the friendship of the British Government. My heart is filled with joy and with boundless hope for your kindness. You were good enough to write I should proceed to Kabul without delay. My friend, I had and still have great hope from the British Government, and your friendship has justified and equalled my expectations. You know well the nature of the people of Afghanistan. The word of one man can effect nothing until they feel that I speak for their good. For this reason I explained some matters to the Sirdars, of which they have informed you by letter, and I have now sent Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan to you, who will tell you what he has heard and seen. For the rest, I pray to God for your honour that you may work for the honour of myself and nation and for their prosperity. I trust in God that this people and I may some day unite to do you service, although the British Government has no need of it, but occasions of necessity may yet arise in this world. I hope the British Government will strengthen my position (literally reputation) amongst my people, that I may be enabled to keep my faith and my word, for a faithful ally alone is useful. Lastly, I pray for your health and honour. May God preserve you.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 14th June 1880.

My friend, I have received your letter of the 16th May by the hand of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, who arrived at Kabul on the 23rd May, and have fully understood its friendly sentiments and the desire which it expresses for a cordial understanding between the British Government and yourself. This letter, together with the memorandum of the members of the mission, which was shown to you before despatch, and which mentioned certain matters regarding which you desired further information, has been laid before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India ; and I am now commanded to convey to you the replies of the Government of India to the questions which you have asked.

Firstly. With regard to the position of the ruler of Kabul to foreign Powers, since the British Government admit no right of interference by foreign Powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign Power except the English ; and if any such foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.

Secondly. With regard to limits of territory, I am directed to say that the whole province of Kandahar has been placed under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi, which are retained in British possession. Consequently the Government is not able to enter into any negotiations with you on these points, nor in respect to arrangements with regard to the North-Western Frontier, which were concluded with the ex-Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan. With these reservations the British Government are willing that you should establish over Afghanistan—including Herat, the possession of which cannot be guaranteed to you, though Government are not disposed to hinder measures which you may take to obtain possession of it—as complete and extensive authority as has been hitherto exercised by any Amir of your family. The British Government desires to exercise no interference in your internal government of these territories, nor will you be required to admit an English Resident anywhere ; although, for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse between two contiguous States, it may be advisable to station, by agreement, a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government at Kabul.

If you should, after clearly understanding the wishes and intentions of the British Government, as stated in former letters and now further explained, desire these matters to be stated in a formal writing, it is necessary that you should first intimate plainly your acceptance or refusal of the invitation

of the British Government, and should state your proposals for carrying into effect friendly arrangements.

Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan has been ordered to leave Khanabad within five days after receipt of this letter, as it is necessary to understand from him, by word of mouth, the position of affairs, and your wishes and sentiments. Should your reply be sent by his hand, it will prevent delay and accelerate the conclusion of final arrangements, and consequently the Government trusts that you will be able to make use of his agency.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr GRIFFIN, 9th June 1880.

TO-DAY, the 1st Rajab, 1297 A. H. (9th June) I write to you. Yesterday I received a letter from Muhammad Sarwar Khan (Purwani). He writes that the people of Tagao have collected, and considers precautions are necessary to prevent their increasing the present agitation. Sayad Ghous-uddin, my servant, has verbally represented to me that you had desired to know "How it was that I did not come quickly, as the time for doing so was opportune?" The receipt of the letter (from Muhammad Sarwar) and your verbal message have decided me. I will, after settling all my affairs, start for that direction, as reported to you in the letter from Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan. I pray to God for the enlargement of the friendship between us.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 15th June 1880.

MY friend. The receipt of your friendly letter of the 1st Rajab, corresponding with the 9th June, has caused me the greatest pleasure, as also to hear of your decision to proceed, without delay, in this direction. Yesterday, by the hand of swift messengers, a letter was despatched to your address, under cover of a letter to Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, Sirdar Bahadoor, containing the replies of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to those inquiries which you had some time back made as to the limits of the territories of the Amir who would be acceptable to the British Government, and as to his relations with foreign powers. I now only write to express to you the friendly sentiments of Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding Her Majesty's forces in Afghanistan, and of myself. I have also to thank you for the letter of Sarwar Khan, Purwani, and for the copy of the letter addressed by you to the Chiefs and Elders of Tagao. In this letter there is nothing calling for objection, but I desire in all friendliness to point out to you that your exhortation to the Chiefs to be active in the matter of collecting their men, remaining equipped, ready and prepared for service, will be and has been misunderstood by the Chiefs and people.

In proof of this, I enclose, for your information, copy of a letter of General Muhammad Jan to the Maliks of Maidan, forwarding to them your letter to the same Maliks, which is also herewith enclosed. You will observe that Muhammad Jan is summoning the tribes with hostile intentions to the British Government.

I also forward, for your information, copy of a letter of General Nizam-ud-din Khan, of an objectionable nature, together with one of Sirdar Ishak Khan, and one or two others of many that have reached me, from which you will see that your friendly disposition towards the British Government is not shared by those who write in your name. Should those persons, who by thus writing seriously injure you, cause an assemblage of large bodies of armed men in the neighbourhood of Kabul, these will undoubtedly be attacked and defeated, and a friendly arrangement will become more difficult. It will therefore be true wisdom on your part to at once address all those Chiefs or tribes, to whom you may have sent letters which have been thus misunderstood, and peremptorily order them to withdraw their people to their respective districts. If this be at once done, there can be no doubt but that friendship between the British Government and yourself will speedily be cemented; otherwise difficulties will certainly arise.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 22nd June 1880.

THE kind letter, sent by the hand of Taj Muhammad Khan, telling me of your welfare and friendship, arrived on the 11th Rajab (20th June), and caused me great pleasure. What was the wish and object of myself and people, you yourself have kindly granted.

Regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan which were settled by treaty with my most noble and respected grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad, these you have granted to me. And the Envoy which you have appointed in Afghanistan you have dispensed with, but what you have left to (be settled according to) my wish is, that I may keep a Mussulman Ambassador, if I please. This was my desire and that of my people, and this you have kindly granted.

About my friendly relations and communication with foreign powers, you have written that I should not have any without advice and consultation with you (the British). You should consider well that if I have the friendship of a great Government like yours, how can I communicate with another power without advice from and consultation with you? I agree to this also.

You have also kindly written that should any unwarranted (improper) attack be made by any other power on Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford me assistance; and you will not permit any other person to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted.

As to what you have written about Herat. Herat is at present in the possession of my cousin. So long as he does not oppose me, and remains friendly with me, it is better that I should leave my cousin in Herat, rather than any other man. Should he oppose me, and not listen to my words (advice) or those of my people, I will afterwards let you know. Everything shall be done as we both deem it expedient and advisable.

All the kindness you have shown is for my welfare and that of my people, how should I not accept it? You have shown very great kindness to me and my people.

I have written and sent letters containing full particulars to all the tribes of Afghanistan, and I have given copies of these papers to Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, for transmission to you; and I have also communicated verbally to Afzal Khan certain matters.

Three days after this I will give him leave to start. Consider me also, the slave of the threshold of God, as having already arrived at Parwan.

Send me back a verbal reply by Muhammad Afzal Khan, so that he may reach me on the road wherever I may be. Dated 13th Rajab.

(P.S.—In Abdul Rahman's own hand.)

I have signed this, and sealed this envelope with wax.

In this letter, and the former letters, all is written by the same hand, and there is no alteration (erasure) anywhere.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 24th June 1880.

THE friendly letter which you sent by the hand of Sayad Ghous-ud-din has reached me. Enclosed in it were the following letters. One from Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan, dated three months back; two letters from General Najm-ud-din Khan, who has been dismissed; one letter from Ghulam Hydar, dated a month and a half ago; and one letter of Muhammad Jan Khan, Wardak, and copy of a letter which I had sent to Mir Bacha Khan. I read these letters and understood their contents.

My friend, you know well the character of the people of Afghanistan. What shall I write about it? Further, you wrote that I should send orders to the tribes to dismiss their gatherings, lest something untoward should happen. If they disperse their gatherings, friendship will speedily be attainable. My friend, you yourself understand best the management of Afghanistan. I have passed these last 11 years of my life in Samarkand; and of all those who were alive in my time, not one in ten remains. The whole affairs of Afghanistan have gone to ruin; and now all the men who have appeared on the scene are youths, who do not obey their own fathers and mothers. How then will they listen to my words? Nevertheless, as was suitable to the time, I have before this written to all the tribes letters enjoining peace, and have sent copies to you. These will doubtless have been perused and fully understood by you. I cannot apply a forcible remedy. Accordingly, I have written to explain the state of affairs to you. Former rulers in spite of having exercised power and authority during several years were unable to effect this. I, who have only arrived a few days ago, have succeeded so far that I am obeyed, though empty-handed, by people who have never thought of entering into friendly relations with you, but who, their hearts being little by little reassured, are now beginning to give utterance to friendly words. If I should all at once order them to disperse to their homes, they would be estranged from me also, and the whole arrangement will fall through. For this reason I am unable to order them.

Further, with regard to Kandahar, I have already told Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, and also Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, how Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari has done me mortal injury with the Russian Government. He will have explained this to you. I have again talked to Sirdar Afzal Khan on the subject; he will lay my representation before you.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 2nd July 1880.

I HAVE received with much pleasure your friendly letter of 22nd June, which has been forwarded by telegraph to Simla, and laid before his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

As you have desired a reply, I am directed to inform you that the Government of India are rejoiced that the friendly explanations which have been furnished to you have fulfilled your wishes, and that you appreciate the objects of the Government.

With regard to your reference to the resignation to you of Afghanistan up to the limits which were settled of old by treaty with your renowned grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, the Government is not sure what treaty is alluded to by you. But the Government assume that you fully understand the statement in my former letter regarding reservations of territory.

You have written that Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan will explain certain matters verbally. Be assured that these will receive immediate consideration.

With regard to your statement that you will shortly reach Parwan, I am commanded to state that in the present state of affairs it is necessary that you should, without delay at Parwan, proceed at once towards Kabul, with such moderate force only as may be sufficient for your protection, in order that remaining arrangements may be definitely concluded.

You have already written to the tribes to do nothing improper to excite the distrust of the English, and you should now take effective steps to insure immediate obedience to these orders; and especially the gathering of large bodies of armed men in Kohistan must be prevented by you.

These are the points on which his Excellency the Viceroy has directed a further communication to be made to you.

Accept the assurance of my high regard and consideration.

SIRDAR ABDUL KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 6th July 1880.

Your kind and honour-conferring favour of the 20th (evidently a mistake for 2nd) July reached me to-day, Monday, (mistake for Tuesday) 27th Rajab 1297, the 6th of June (July?) at Khinjan. I was glad to learn of your keeping well.

Respecting your kind request that I should make for Kabul, my kind friend, you will fully understand that in case I omit in the first instance to consult the people of Afghanistan, their minds will be estranged from me. Having arrived in Kohistan and explained to the tribes their interests, (I) will be able to come, having secured the consent of the nation.

Respecting the people of Kohistan, they are armed and seated in their homes. In this matter what can I say to them and such outside Baam as Tagawis and Nigrabis, who having come with their collections have all returned to their homes. After I have been some time in Kohistan, the Kohistanis will have been conciliated.

I look upon you as my kind patron. May you keep well.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 8th July 1880.

I RECEIVED your friendly letter of the 3rd July, from Kinjan, with much pleasure, and am rejoiced that you have reached so far in safety. I trust that nothing will now delay your arrival at Charikar at Istalif, on your way towards Kabul, as it is for the advantage of yourself and of the British Government to complete friendly arrangements as speedily as possible.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 16th July 1880.

At this happy time, your kind letter, dated the 6th day of the month of Barat sent by the hand of Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan and Abdul Rahman, Khan-i-Mulla, has been delivered by them to me. I am extremely pleased to hear the news of your welfare, and to learn of your good health. Further, you were pleased to ask me to leave for Charikar, or Istalif, or Kabul. My friend, before I came to Kohistan, I wrote to all the tribes far and near, that in accordance with the desire both of the British Government and of themselves, I was coming to Kohistan; and that in consultation with them (the tribes), I would make arrangements (with the Government). Therefore, when I arrived at Tutandarra, I despatched letters to the leaders of all these tribes by the hands of swift horsemen, asking them to come to me soon. If God please, they will arrive here in five or six days. After I have once seen them and have freed myself from the responsibility of my former promises, which I wrote to them, to consult them, I will leave for Charikar without delay, and there, or at Istalif, I will await your favours.

Your letter to my uncle, Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, sent by the hand of Syud Ghous-ud-din, contained expressions of favour towards me, and I am pleased to learn this. If I live, please God, I will show such friendship as may be suitable for me to show such a great Government, so that I may get a good name in other States, with my own nation, and with the British Government. Further, until we see each other, please remember me. I wish you from God to be kind to me. May you enjoy good health.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 16th July 1880.

Your friendly letter by the hand of Mir Agha Sahibzada has been received by me, and its contents understood. I offer you my congratulations on your safe arrival in Kohistan, and trust that further good fortune may await you. Mir Agha has further verbally expressed your strong desire of friendship with the British Government. Be assured your desire is reciprocated by the Government, which only wishes the good of you and of the people of Afghanistan.

General Sir Donald Stewart, whose letter of congratulation is herewith forwarded, will make arrangements for the withdrawal of the army at an early date. In order to secure this, it is desirable that the personal interviews regarding which you have written should take place as soon as possible. We think that some place in the neighbourhood of Zimma would be suitable; but should any place nearer Kabul on the direct road from Farza to Kabul suit you, this would be preferable.

Kindly intimate your wishes in this matter, and the place that would be convenient to you. There everything that you desire to discuss can be considered; and, if God will, a speedy and satisfactory settlement can be made. This will be far better than sending a British officer to Charikar, as it would not be expedient to send him without a strong escort of Her Majesty's troops, and you know well, my friend, that this would cause excitement among those who are ill-disposed.

I have invited Sirda Musa Jan to come to Kabul; should he do so, he would either accompany his family to India, or would otherwise be free to go where he wished. This invitation is only with the object of preventing disturbances and opposition in the direction of Ghazni.

I have the greatest desire for a personal meeting with you. God willing, this will not be delayed. Do not delay to send me assurances of your good health, and of your wishes with regard to the time and place of interview. With high sentiments of regard, &c.

No. 62 S.P.C., dated Kabul, 4th August 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in North Afghanistan.

1. I have kept the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department so fully and frequently informed of everything connected with the situation at Kabul, and the intentions, action, and prospects of Abdul Rahman Khan, that it is unnecessary, in the present letter, to do more than allude to the circumstances under which you fully concurred in the desirability of acting on the discretion granted by the Supreme Government, and publicly acknowledging the Sirdar as Amir of Kabul. He had, indeed, fulfilled those conditions which the Government had prescribed as essential to such public recognition. He had left Turkistan, at the invitation of the Government, with a portion of his army; he had crossed the Hindu Kush and had marched, contrary to his own intention, but in accordance with the wishes expressed by the British representatives at Kabul, to Charikar, where he had been enthusiastically received by a large number of Chiefs and people. He had publicly, privately, by letters, circulars, and in public speeches in his daily durbars, declared his firm intention of making friendly arrangements with the British Government; he had discouraged the assembly of armed men; had allayed the fanaticism which his previous letters had excited, and had acted in such a manner as to prove his sincerity and good faith. Such being the state of the case, delay in his public recognition by the Government would have been productive of harm. It might be urged that it would have been wiser to delay his public recognition until he had come into the British camp at Kabul; but this criticism would have been uninformed. In the first place, the suspicion, which Abdul Rahman certainly felt when overtures were first made to him, had not disappeared at the time of his arrival in Kohistan, while that of the people was as active as ever. They feared greatly, and he in a less degree, that our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent, and that, had he come straight into Kabul, he would have been arrested, and deported to British India. Foolish as such a fear may seem, it was nevertheless general, and the Afghan nature is suspicious beyond all others. I do not believe that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan would either himself have ventured, or been by his army and the Chiefs permitted, to have entered Kabul or the British camp, or to have marched from Kohistan to hold interviews with the British officers, unless he had been first acknowledged by the Government as Amir.

2. The expressed opinion of Mushki Alam was further entitled to consideration. He wrote from Maidan, and his letter was sealed by many of the principal Chiefs, such as Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, Abdul Ghafur, Akhundzada of Laugar, and some thirty-five men of more or less note, to say that he and all there assembled were ready to accept as Amir whomever the British Government might select, whether Yakub Khan, or Abdul Rahman, or Ayub Khan; but that in the interests of the country and the Government it was essential to at once declare the choice of Government, as there was no other way of bringing to an end the period of uncertainty, and of re-assuring the people. The durbar of recognition was accordingly held, with reasonable but not excessive display, and the intentions of the Government were fully explained to the people. The name of the new Amir recited in the Khutba and public prayers on the following day was received with general enthusiasm, and although there is a very powerful and numerous party who are opposed to Amir Abdul Rahman, yet a very large number of Chiefs and people have joined him and have promised him their support.

3. The public recognition has had a most beneficial effect upon the quiet of the country. All districts in the neighbourhood of Kabul have remained absolutely undisturbed, if petty raids by Safi and Khairo Khel robbers be set aside, and the roads have been opened for trade in all directions to a greater extent than I have known since I have been in Kabul. The recognition of Abdul Rahman was, moreover, specially well timed, as considered in connection with the defeat which General Burrows has met on the Helmund. The unfortunate results of this military disaster can hardly be predicted as yet with any certainty; but the decision of the Government to send a powerful division from here to Kandahar, *via* Ghazni, will, more than any other measure which could have been adopted, minimize and, perhaps altogether,

neutralize its injurious effects. Had the public recognition of Abdul Rahman been delayed till after the defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' brigade was generally known, it might have been difficult or impossible to have made it at all; and the interviews with the Amir would not have been unattended with danger, as his camp is filled with Chiefs and people who had for long been openly and fiercely hostile to us, and who would have been only too glad of an opportunity to compromise him.

4. The news of the Kandahar defeat impelled us to hasten arrangements with the Amir and dispose of the matters for discussion in as few interviews as possible. A meeting was accordingly arranged at Zimma, about sixteen miles north of Kabul, and some six miles from Killa Haji, where General Gough's brigade was encamped, the camp of the Amir being pitched some miles to the north at Ak Serai. On the 31st ultimo, I proceeded to the place appointed, with a strong cavalry escort, composed of a squadron of the 9th Lancers, and another of the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry. The durbar tent was pitched on a hill affording a good out-look on all sides. And His Highness was accompanied by only two or three hundred horse and a few infantry, while a large number of followers, estimated at from three to four thousand, accompanied him to within half a mile of the place of meeting, and remained there till proceedings had terminated.

5. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank, courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who were present at the interview was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of all the Barakzai Sirdars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were characterized by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government, and although his expectations were, as might have been anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous insistence, and the result of the interviews may be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.

6. Before taking leave of His Highness at the last interview, I again expressed my hope that he would be able the next day to come into the British camp and meet General Sir D. Stewart in Durbar; but the Amir said that a large number of the people with him were opposed to this, and that he feared it could not be. I, however, left Mr. Christie to see if this interview could not be quietly arranged without unduly pressing the Amir, who seemed himself sincerely anxious to meet our wishes. His Highness returned to Ak Serai and had a long and somewhat stormy meeting with the Chiefs. The Maidans, Kohistanis, and Kohdamanis were in favour of his visiting the British camp; but the Ghilzai Chiefs, Asmatulla Khan of Joka, Mazulla Khan of Hizarak, Bahram Khan of Lughman, and Badshah Khan of Logar, all men who have been fighting against us, vehemently opposed it, and swore, by their faith, they would leave him if he persisted. Nevertheless the Amir determined to come, telling the Chiefs that the durbar tents were pitched on the Koh-Daman side of the pass, while he really intended to come into the British camp. He also sent me a private note, written with his own hand, to the following effect:—"If you really wish me to come to you, irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What can I do? I am most anxious to meet you."

7. After explaining to you the state of the case, you were strongly of opinion that it would be impolitic to hold the durbar, as instead of strengthening the Amir, as was intended, it would evidently have the opposite effect. The durbar was consequently abandoned, and the following day we returned to Kabul.

8. There is no advantage in writing at great length on the present situation and the probabilities of the future,—firstly, as a few days will show how affairs will tend, and, secondly, that the numberless arrangements, consequent on the immediate march of the army to Gandamak and Kandahar, leave me little time for writing as carefully as I could wish. I would merely observe that I believe Abdul Rahman Khan is sincerely anxious for friendship with the Government, and that, if he can maintain his position, he will hereafter prove a valuable ally. But there is necessarily much anxiety for the immediate present. He is weak, in that he has little money, and

many of the Chiefs are opposed to him, or have only joined him as the best thing to do under the circumstances. They are ready to leave him for Ayub Khan, should he come in this direction. I have not yet heard what effect the Kandahar news, exaggerated as a matter of course, has had in the Amir's camp. The people were riotous enough there before; it was only after great difficulty His Highness could obtain their consent to our interview, and they only half believe that we will really evacuate Kabul.

9. It is not impossible that difficulties may arise before we leave Kabul, and that the people with the Amir may get out of hand and compromise him fatally. Everything possible is being done to keep the people quiet, and it is probable that there will be no opposition whatever to our retirement. But of course we must be prepared for any fortune. The Kandahar news has greatly excited the city, and all the bad characters are ready for mischief.

10. As to money, I have already made over to him one lac, and on the day of our departure I will give him four lacs more. It would be most inadvisable to give him too much before we leave Kabul, as his troops would not be more amenable to discipline, but less so, at the unusual sight of a large sum of money in their master's possession. The remainder of the grant must be paid at Jellalabad.

To secure the unopposed march of the divisions to Ghazni and Gandamak, the Amir has been requested to send an energetic Sirdar to accompany General Roberts' force, and to nominate a Governor who would be left at Ghazni when the division moved from there. The son of Mushk-i-Alam has been asked to accompany this division with some of the Andari, Wardak, and Taraki Maliks. There may be no fighting north of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, but nothing can be confidently predicted. With regard to the Gandamak division, the Amir has been urged to keep the Ghilzai leaders in his camp. If this be successfully done, there can be no serious resistance, though the Khairo Khels and Maruf Khel robbers will doubtless be ready for mischief, as indeed they have been ever since our occupation of Kabul.

No. 21.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 5th August 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

STEWART telegraphs 5th. All our objects here have been attained, and nothing remains to be done but to hand over Kabul to the Amir, who is naturally anxious to establish himself in his capital and bring his government into working order.

Politically, withdrawal now will be well-timed, and it happens that we shall leave Kabul on the day fixed for that purpose two months ago. The state of affairs at Kandahar, moreover, renders it highly necessary that we should avail ourselves of present opportunity, whilst country here is quiet and free from complications. Ends.

We are of opinion that Stewart's proposal to evacuate Kabul must be approved. I entirely agree with him as to the political importance of seizing present opportunity; if we let this slip, the situation may change, and we may be unable to withdraw without serious embarrassment. Evacuation would take place on 11th and 12th. Reply as soon as possible as final orders must issue at once.

No. 22.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th August 1880, to VICEROY.

YOUR Lordship's telegram 5th. I entirely approve evacuation of Kabul.

No. 23.

No. 191 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 24th August 1880.

IN our Despatches of the 20th and 27th July last, we reported to your Lordship the instructions that had been issued to Sir Donald Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which the occupation of Kabul, by the British troops under his command, should terminate, and also the proceedings that had been taken, up to the date of the latter Despatch, for placing the government at Kabul in the hands of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. It had been understood that, whatever might be the result of these proceedings, Sir D. Stewart's operations for the withdrawal of his troops would not be materially delayed or deranged; but this point has been placed beyond question by Sirdar Abdul Rahman's undisturbed accession to power at Kabul.

2. The news of the reverse suffered by a British brigade on the Helmund has not, as yet, outwardly affected the political situation in North Afghanistan. A strong division under Sir Frederick Roberts has left for Kandahar, but we decided that it was not desirable, either upon political or upon military grounds, to change our settled purpose of withdrawing all our troops from Kabul. In a telegram, dated 5th August, we transmitted to your Lordship Sir D. Stewart's urgent recommendation that the evacuation should proceed, and the reasons, with which we concurred, upon which he argued against any alteration of our plans for operating the withdrawal. Accordingly, immediately after the march of Sir Frederick Roberts' division for Kandahar, the rest of the Kabul field force left Kabul on the direct route for India, and Sir D. Stewart's head-quarters have already reached Jellalabad without opposition or interruption of any kind.

3. We have now the honour to enclose, with this Despatch, copy of a letter,* in which Sir D. Stewart strenuously advocates, and supports by reasons of much cogency, the entire withdrawal of our troops from North Afghanistan. Having regard to these strong representations of the General in chief command (with which the Chief Political Officer concurs), and upon a careful survey of the military and political considerations involved, we have determined, after consultation with the chief medical authorities, that the Kabul field force shall be withdrawn continuously, on its present line of retirement, until all the troops shall have passed the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak, in 1879. The posts at Lundi Kotal and in the Khyber Pass will for the present continue to be held by our troops, since the whole question of maintaining our advanced military positions on the north-west frontier is necessarily reserved for future determination and report.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

From Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 415, dated Kabul, 10th August 1880). (Extract.)

IN accordance with instructions which have been conveyed to me, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign

Department, the reasons which appear to me of sufficient weight and urgency to determine the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces from Northern Afghanistan with as little delay as possible. These reasons are military, sanitary, and political; and from whatever point of view the question is regarded the conclusion appears to me the same.

2. The sanitary question is one of primary importance, as it would not be justifiable, except for urgent military reasons, to move troops under conditions dangerous to their health or life, and it has to be considered whether their march towards India during the hot season of the year will be as injurious to them as their continued maintenance at Gandamak, and on the line of communication between it and Peshawar. I do not hesitate to express my conviction—a conviction in which I am supported by the best medical advice at my disposal—that an early withdrawal would be more advantageous to the troops than their remaining in Afghanistan. I do not under-estimate the inconvenience of a march during the hot season; but it is not necessarily prejudicial to health or dangerous to life if the season be, as fortunately this year it has so far been, free from severe epidemic disease. The last reports received from the Punjab show that province to be almost entirely free of cholera, and, although there have been severe outbreaks at some of the north-west stations, yet these have been of short duration, and the disease has not shown a disposition to spread over an extended area.

3. Troops on active service in Afghanistan and India must occasionally be exposed to some risk and inconvenience from the climate. But the withdrawal being necessary on military and political grounds, there is no such sanitary risk in the withdrawal as to cause its postponement until a cooler season. In many ways I am disposed to think that the troops will be healthier withdrawn than remaining for the rest of the hot weather in Afghanistan. The climate of Kabul may no doubt be favourably compared with that of many Indian stations, but during the last two or three months sickness has been greatly on the increase, and a very large number of invalids have been sent to India. The cantonment and its surroundings have been polluted by the long-continued presence of so large a body of troops, camp followers, and animals; and it will be obvious to the Government of India that, in spite of all possible precautions, there are neither appliances nor staff to carry out those efficient sanitary measures which can alone ensure the health and safety of a large resident population.

4. At the stations along the road, more cramped for space and with a worse climate, that of Jellalabad, Pesh Bolak, and Dacca being hardly cooler than the plains of India, the sanitary conditions are still more unfavourable; and in these, as in Kabul, the causes of sickness must be held to be the same, and the activity of these must continue and not diminish. Indeed, the exposure of marching to India is no more than that to which the troops are now constantly exposed in their harassing convoy duty, while their tents are a poor substitute for barracks. On sanitary grounds, therefore, and in the interest of the health of the troops, I am strongly of opinion that no delay in the withdrawal from Afghanistan should be sanctioned.

5. The political question covers much of the ground which is occupied by that portion of the subject which is purely military, and may be conveniently discussed next. But here no lengthened remarks appear to me to be required. I firmly believe, and the Political Department at Kabul is entirely in accord with me, that on political grounds it is most expedient to withdraw from Northern Afghanistan as quickly as possible. If His Highness the Amir had felt himself so insecure as to have urgently requested us to remain and garrison for him, for a time, the eastern districts of Afghanistan, then it would have been for the Government of India in the Foreign Department to decide whether this, under the circumstances of the case, was expedient or possible. But he has made no such request. On the contrary, he has expressed his strong wish that the withdrawal from Gandamak should not be postponed or delayed. He feels that, once established in his capital, he will be stronger and not weaker by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces. The people will then associate his accession to power with the retirement of the invading army, and this will confer upon him some additional popularity.

6. As the Amir, then, desires the withdrawal of the troops, the question can be regarded from a more general point of view, and here there can be no doubt it is politically expedient to leave the country at a time when it is altogether tranquil, and when our withdrawal will probably be unaccompanied by any hostile manifestations. This state of affairs has been brought about by much labour, and by the concurrence of many fortunate circumstances; although the reverse which our arms have

experienced in Kandahar threatened for a time to shake severely the arrangements which had been all but completed at Kabul. It is of the highest political importance to withdraw while the tribes are peaceful, if not friendly, and, were we to delay, the temper of the people might and probably would change; and our retirement, though not less secure, would undoubtedly be less dignified.

7. The military question is, as before noted, in a great measure identical with the political, as it is obviously important that the troops on their retirement should not be harassed along difficult mountain roads and passes by a hostile population. Although the army which I have the honour to command is equal to any task which may be imposed upon it, yet such a harassed retreat would not improve either its credit or its *morale*.

8. I may here mention, though the details of the scheme will be communicated to the Government of India by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I propose that the force retire from Gandamak by brigades to Dacca, from which place they will file through the Khaibar by detachments of from 1½ to 2 regiments, as there is not accommodation in the Pass for large bodies of troops. The retirement will thus be slow from Dacca.

It is further my intention to leave a brigade of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery in the Khaibar (the main body at Lundi Kotal and a regiment of Infantry at Ali Masjid), until the Government has decided what is to be done in the matter of Pass arrangements.

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd September 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

The Jajis of Upper Kurram being inclined to place themselves under Amir of Kabul, we decided in Council to-day, in accordance with advice of chief military and political officers in Kurram, to inform Abdul Rahman that he might take over those tribes and the Hariob District, but that he must not touch the independence of the Turis.



No. 25.

No. 208 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 14th September 1880.

IN your Despatch of the 21st May last,* on the state of affairs in Afghanistan,

* No. 23, paragraph 27.

your Lordship observed that it would be necessary for us to consider carefully the expediency of maintaining

the advanced military positions on the north-west frontier which were acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. And the Despatch also intimated that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that our decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

2. This question, accordingly, we have examined carefully from the point of view indicated by Her Majesty's Government. It will be remembered that since September 1879, and indeed (with a brief interval in 1879) since they were first taken up in 1878, the positions in the Khyber pass and the Kurram valley have been held as important points upon actual or possible lines of communication with the army at Kabul. By the withdrawal of our force from Kabul, and by its retirement within the line of frontier acquired under the Gandamak Treaty, these posts have now again become advanced frontier positions; so that the ground is cleared and the time has arrived for considering the necessity of maintaining them permanently in that character. Upon this subject we have had the advantage of consulting all those among our chief military

and political officers who, by their personal knowledge of the Khyber and Kurram districts, and by their general experience of the north-west frontier, are best qualified to advise. We forward papers containing the more important opinions and information thus collected; and we also take this opportunity of enclosing two Minutes recorded by the late Viceroy (the Earl of Lytton) upon the comparative value of the Kurram and the Khyber routes. We have now the honour to report to your Lordship our decision regarding the permanent maintenance of these military positions, with a brief explanation of the grounds upon which we have proceeded, and of the subsidiary arrangements that it has been necessary to make in consequence of this decision with certain tribes in the Khyber and in the Kurram valley.

3. The question of retaining our military positions in the Khyber Pass, at Lundi Kotal, and Ali Masjid, offers little or no room for discussion. On the one hand, the expediency of keeping open this difficult and important pass, so far as may be necessary to prevent its being held and fortified against us by regular troops, and to maintain it as a tolerably safe and uninterrupted thoroughfare for commerce between Afghanistan and India, is very generally admitted. On the other hand, from whatever side the subject is considered, there is an entire concurrence of opinions, on political as well as on military grounds, against garrisoning the pass with British troops; nor, indeed, has it ever been proposed to do so as a permanent military arrangement. The extreme unhealthiness of the stations in the pass, the discontent which its regular occupation by our forces would excite among the tribes, and the strong political reasons in favour of placing the road under their independent charge, are considerations which have always militated forcibly against keeping the Khyber in our own possession; while to contest this conclusion no single argument has, so far as we know, been adduced. It has already been observed that since our troops first entered the pass in 1878, the positions have been held almost entirely for the protection of communications with an army in front of them; and we consider that with the retirement of that army their object and value have disappeared. Nevertheless, there are obvious reasons why the pass should not be abruptly evacuated, before the existing arrangement with the tribes for its independent charge and management shall have been revised and consolidated, or until our future relations with them shall have been thoroughly made known and understood. There are also various matters of detail connected with the recent operations, such as the disposal of the fortifications and other buildings in the pass belonging to the British Government, which require some little time for proper regulation. But when these affairs are satisfactorily terminated, we intend that our present garrisons in the pass shall withdraw across the frontier of British India.

4. We propose that the immediate management of our future relations with the Khyber tribes shall remain in the hands of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, by whom these affairs have been administered, during a period of difficulty and occasional anxiety, with skill and success. We enclose copy of instructions issued to the Punjab Government for summoning the representatives of the tribes, and for ascertaining what modifications in the present arrangements have been rendered practicable by the cessation of our military operations in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of our troops from the pass. There may probably be material reduction in the Jezailchi Corps that has been entertained for the duties of escort and convoy; and questions may arise regarding the taking of tolls, and as to the compensation to be fixed in lieu of their collection by the tribes, with other similar points which will need careful examination by the local authorities on the spot.

5. Your Lordship will observe that our instructions to the Punjab Government desire that the representatives of the Khyber tribes be informed that their independence is, as heretofore, recognized, and that the conditions of our arrangements with them will be that the pass shall remain under their independent and exclusive charge, and shall be kept by them open and free from interference. We have said, moreover, that so long as these conditions are fulfilled, it is not our desire to station any troops in the pass; but we shall also, if necessary, take care to make it plainly understood that no other regular troops will be permitted, without the consent of the British Government, to occupy posts in the Khyber. This arrangement will be most congenial to the traditions and wishes of the Afridis themselves, who prefer to be left undisturbed in their own country, acknowledging obligations of service and duties only to those with whom they have made engagements, and from whom they receive the customary allowances.

6. In the Kurram district our chief military position, to which all other posts, in front or in the rear, are subsidiary, is the Peiwar Kotal. The question of the strategical value of this position, and of the expediency of holding it permanently with a

strong garrison, has been very thoroughly debated. The arguments used and the opinions elicited will be found stated at length in the papers accompanying this Despatch, and they may be summed up as representing an almost unanimous verdict against our permanent retention of any military positions in the Kurram district. It is true that Sir Frederick Roberts' judgment against holding the Kurram presupposes, to some degree, the maintenance of a base of operations within South Afghanistan, which is a matter that lies beyond the limits of the question discussed in this Despatch. But his main argument is directed toward proving the inutility of holding positions on the Kurram line by showing that, in any future war in Afghanistan, we ought to remain on the defensive on our North-West frontier, and that our most effective line of advance against an enemy in the interior of the country would be from the southward, while, apart from strategical considerations of this general nature, the special weight of his reasoning on military, political, and financial grounds bears decidedly against our maintaining garrisons on the Kurram headlands.

7. We have therefore determined that our troops may leave the Kurram district as soon as this can be conveniently arranged. But the military evacuation of Kurram inevitably raises questions, connected with our relations to the tribes of the valley, that are not altogether free from difficulty. For whereas in the Khyber the tribes have been always treated as independent, and our dealings with them have concerned only the passes which traverse their territory, the whole Kurram district, including the Hariob tract beyond the Peiwar Kotal, has been more or less in our possession since the beginning of 1879, so that our relations with the people, especially in the lower valley which we have administered, have naturally taken a character corresponding to the belief that our tenure of the country might be expected to last for some time. There can be no doubt that the Turi tribe, inhabiting the greater part of the cultivated valley from the eastern slopes of Peiwar Kotal south-eastward toward the Indian border, have received from our officers repeated assurances that they will not be replaced, without their consent, under the power of the Barakzai dynasty at Kabul. It is equally certain that, relying on these pledges, they have conducted themselves in a friendly and loyal manner toward us during our occupation of their country, rendering us help in various ways, and abstaining from all attempts to molest our troops. As Mussulmans of the Shiah sect, they are to some extent isolated among the neighbouring Sunni tribes, while they have little sympathy with the Barakzai rulers, to whom they voluntarily submitted themselves only some 15 years ago, and under whose dominion they are said to be decidedly unwilling to return. They have, in fact, claimed from us the fulfilment of our pledges that they shall not pass again under a Barakzai ruler, and to this extent their claim upon us appears incontestable.

8. In this state of affairs, although under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government our decision regarding the permanent tenure of the military positions in Kurram would not be affected by the announcements that have been made to the Turis, we felt bound to take measures to prevent the withdrawal of our troops being followed by the reoccupation of the Lower Kurram valley by the Amir's officials, against the will of the Turi tribe. Whether the territory thus set apart should be placed under a separate Governor, nominated and upheld by the British Government, was a point on which some difference of opinion existed among the local political authorities. The difficulties which such an arrangement would entail are obvious, for it is very questionable whether a Sirdar, whoever he might be, appointed by and holding from our Government, could govern without our strong military support. His subordination to our authority would render us responsible for his acts; the Kabul Government and the neighbouring tribes might foment troubles and intrigues against him, and he might find himself in the position of a representative of our dominion, without the strength and order which are its chief advantages to the people. Against these objections were to be set the drawbacks to leaving the district altogether without a government. On the whole, however, since it appeared to be the conviction among those best acquainted with the wishes of the Turis that they themselves are anxious to be left to manage their own affairs, we have finally resolved to recognize the tribe's independence, and to undertake that it shall be maintained against any interference from Kabul, without attempting to select for them a Governor, or to impose a government upon them against their expressed will. General Watson has accordingly been authorized to announce to them their future status, and to warn them that they must avoid disputes with the Kabul Government, and must comply with the wishes of the British Government in matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier. The question of their future self-government has not, however, been finally and unalterably decided,

for Major-General Watson, our chief Political Officer in the Kurram, has been empowered to take any further steps that he may judge necessary to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis. Any practicable arrangement that may be acceptable to a substantial majority of the tribe, and that is not incompatible with the early withdrawal of the British troops, will be carefully considered by the Government of India.

9. With the Jaji tribe inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal, our connection has been much slighter, and of a different nature. They were indeed informed, in the earlier period of our occupation of the Shuturgardan line, that the Hariob had passed under British jurisdiction, and this tract has since been more or less under our control. But any obligations that the announcements made to them might have been supposed to involve, have been cancelled by the subsequent turbulence and hostility of the Jajis, who took active parts in the attacks made on Ali Khel and upon our communications beyond the Peiwar Kotal in the autumn and early winter of 1879. Moreover, while they have shown no inclination whatever to appeal to their former relations with us, or to claim our intervention on their behalf as against the Amir Abdul Rahman, there have been strong indications that they seek neither our patronage nor our protection, but, on the contrary, are content to return again into their former state of semi-allegiance to Kabul. Upon these considerations, the advisability of permitting the Amir to resume authority in the Hariob was pressed upon the Government of India by the political officers on the spot, who urge that, as the Jajis, when left to themselves, will certainly revert to Kabul, it will be in accordance with good policy that they should do so with our consent and sanction. This view we have accepted, and the requisite communications have been sent to the deputies whom the Amir has sent across the Shuturgardan, with orders to make territorial arrangements with our officers, and to settle any question regarding the future border or the control of the tribes. The opportunity has been taken to inform His Highness the Amir that the independence of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley has been recognized, and His Highness has been reminded that, in the correspondence with him regarding the establishment of his authority in Afghanistan, the districts assigned in 1879 to the British Government by the ex-Amir Yakub Khan were expressly excluded from discussion.

10. We enclose copies of the orders that have been issued for the completion of these political arrangements, and we trust that our proceedings, which appear to us to be in accordance with the general lines of policy marked out for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May last, will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

11. Our late colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, who was a member of our Government when these arrangements were under discussion, wishes us to state that, while agreeing with the measures proposed, and thus consenting to give up the command over Kabul which the Khyber positions in his opinion possess, he considers that such a measure only renders it still more incumbent on us not to relax our hold on Kandahar, nor to abandon the strategical advantages which he believes its occupation affords. He desires it therefore to be understood that any change in respect to our tenure of Kandahar would materially alter the conditions of the discussion, and the state of affairs with which the present Despatch deals, and that it would therefore set him free to reconsider altogether his opinion on the subject. Sir Edwin Johnson considers that this view is supported by the recorded opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch.

12. We enclose copies of three separate Minutes recorded by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, upon the main questions dealt with in this Despatch. The Hon. Whitley Stokes concurs in one of these Minutes.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

MINUTE by the VICEROY (LORD LYTTON) on the Comparative Value of the Khyber and Kurram Lines. (Extract.)

1. IN all probability one of the first questions which the Government of India will have to settle in connection with the close of the Afghan campaign is, whether such funds as may be available for either purpose shall be devoted to the improvement and development of the Khyber, or to those of the Kurram, line of communication with North Afghanistan.

2. So far as I can judge, the present preponderance of opinion on the part of our higher military and political authorities is in favour of treating the Khyber as our main permanent line of advance towards Kabul, and either abandoning or leaving unimproved our present advanced position in the Kurram. As, however, I do not share that opinion, I write the present Minute; not with any wish to prejudge a question which cannot be satisfactorily decided without very careful reference to financial and engineering, as well as political and military considerations, but for the purpose of placing on record the reasons which induce me to attach very great political importance to the permanent maintenance of a commanding military position in the Kurram, and to contemplate with aversion and mistrust any permanent military expenditure upon the Khyber.

3. In the first place, I observe that all those who advocate, whether on political or military grounds, the virtual projection of our frontier along the Khyber line towards Kabul, have hitherto assumed, as a *sine quâ non* condition of the advantages they ascribe to it, the extension of this line considerably beyond the point to which our hold of it was distinctly limited by the Treaty of Gandamak. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, for instance, and Mr. Lepel Griffin, so far as their views have been made known to me, lay great stress on the value of a military cantonment and political officer at Jellalabad, as a means partly of protecting Kunar and other petty States, and partly of strengthening and superintending in the direction of Badakshan those British interests which are at present confided to the management of our Political Officer at Gilgit.

4. Now, the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Gandamak were fixed with great deliberation, after lengthened reflection, and frequent consultation with the highest military, political, and financial authorities. All the arguments for and against the annexation or permanent military occupation of Jellalabad were fully examined and discussed in a conference held by me at Lahore, and attended by Sir Robert Egerton, Sir Louis Cavagnari, Sir Edwin Johnson, and Sir John Strachey; and the suggestion in favour of extending our frontier, or our frontier liabilities, along the Khyber line, in any sense other than that which is implied by the assertion of our right and intention to deal directly with the Pass tribes, instead of assigning to the Amirs of Kabul a responsibility, which experience had proved our complete inability to enforce, for the good behaviour of those tribes, was then unanimously rejected. The reasons for this decision I need not now recapitulate, but they have, in my own judgment, at least, been strongly confirmed by subsequent events. In any case, however, the soundness of those reasons has been virtually reaffirmed by the Government of India in framing the programme of present and future Afghan policy, which was submitted by it last winter to the Secretary of State. From that programme we unanimously and distinctly excluded any alteration or extension of the territorial settlement fixed by the Gandamak Treaty, except in so far as regards the arrangements subsequently carried out for the permanent severance of the Kandahar province from the jurisdiction of the Kabul power, and its guaranteed protection by the British Government. This decision was approved by Her Majesty's late Government. It is, I venture to think, unlikely to be upset by Her Majesty's present Government in favour of extended political or military liabilities; and it has up to the present moment governed every instruction issued to our political authorities at Kabul for the guidance of their relations, on behalf of this Government, with the various aspirants to the vacant Amirship of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

5. In view of all these facts it seems to me perfectly clear that the Government of India is practically precluded from even discussing the views which I understand to be held by the Punjab Government, and urged by some of our own political and military officers, in favour of extending our Khyber frontier in any sense or form beyond Lundi Kotal, the point to which its recognized extension was formally limited by the terms of the Treaty of Gandamak.

6. But, even were it otherwise, even were the Government of India equally free to contemplate the extension of its Khyber frontier beyond that point, I am still most

strongly of opinion that any such arrangement is altogether inexpedient. The following are, briefly stated, the main grounds on which I base this conclusion.

7. Although we hold (and, in my opinion, rightly) that our arrangements in regard to Kandahar, coupled with the advanced frontier positions secured to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, suffice for the practical protection of our frontier interests from relapse into their previous condition of dependence on the good or ill will, the strength or weakness, of the Kabul Power, it is, nevertheless, *cætaris paribus*, a thing obviously to be desired that our permanent relations with the future representatives of that Power should be, so far as possible, of an amicable character, and free from all avoidable causes for mutual mistrust. Now, whether the next ruler of Kabul be Abdul Rahman or any other Sirdar, it cannot be reasonably expected that he will submit without reluctance and regret to the loss of the Kandahar province; involving, as it does, a limitation of his power and resources which the Government of India, deems indispensable for the protection of interests otherwise liable to serious injury from the unfriendly employment of that power and those resources. There are, however, numerous reasons why the Kandahar arrangement, regarded as the result of two wars ostentatiously provoked by the action of the Kabul Power, which throughout the course of them has been defeated in every engagement, cannot constitute any legitimate grievance on the part of that Power. It is but recently that the rulers of Kabul acquired possession of Kandahar by conspiracy and violence. Their authority has always been repugnant to the inhabitants of the province, whose local Government has welcomed its release from an uncongenial yoke. Between the Kandaharis and the Kabulis there is the strongest possible antipathy. But Jellalabad has never before been independent of the Kabul Power. On the contrary, it represents all that remains to that Power, in the direction of British India, of territory once belonging to Afghanistan, and now belonging to us. It lies close to the very capital of the country; and, from every point of view, it naturally coheres with the provinces of Kabul Proper. If an ambitious Amir could dream of, and plot for, Russian aid towards the pre-conquest of Peshawur, can we reasonably expect that even the most unambitious of his successors will view with indifference the loss of Jellalabad? And, if we take from the next ruler of Kabul, Kandahar with one hand, and Jellalabad with the other, can we hope that his subsequent relations with us will not be animated by a sentiment of chronic resentment, and a strong desire to seize the first favourable opportunity for reversing the basis on which we have settled them?

8. What are the alleged political advantages to be set off against this obvious consideration? If the management of our north-west frontier were to remain permanently in the hands of the Punjab Government, the retention of Jellalabad would doubtless enable that Government to extend a strong local influence over the petty chieftoms of Kunar, Dir, Swat, Bajour, &c. But for the attainment of that object, the Punjab Government would probably require frequent support from the resources at the disposal of the Supreme Government; and, although I do not say that the creation of a fringe of small States east of the Khyber, under British influence and protection, would be without political advantage to the security of our frontier, I must say that it seems to me extremely undesirable to furnish any local Government with the inducement or the power to involve the resources of the empire in the prosecution beyond its frontier of a policy not completely under the control of the Supreme Government of the empire. Her Majesty's late Government has, however, acquiesced in my strong recommendation that the political and military management of the frontier be withdrawn from the Punjab Government and placed under the undivided authority of the Government of India. If this arrangement be adopted, the Government of India will, I doubt not, reflect very seriously before it embarks upon a policy certain to bring it into increasingly close contact with fresh tribes and numerous petty Chiefs, all impecunious, greedy, and untrustworthy. As regards the alleged value of Jellalabad as a fulcrum for political influence in Badakshan, I do not underrate the political importance which Badakshan is likely to assume in the development of events which must be foreseen. But it seems to me that we have certainly no sufficient evidence of the alleged political value of Jellalabad to justify our retention of that place on any political grounds, considering the strong probability that our presence there would prove a constant stumbling block in our relations with the future rulers of Kabul.

9. It remains to consider the military and financial conditions of a permanent occupation of Jellalabad. It is notoriously impossible to keep troops in this city, owing to its extreme unhealthiness during the hot season. We should therefore be obliged to construct and maintain at a considerable distance from our present frontier two large cantonments; a winter one at Jellalabad, and a summer one at Gandamak, or along

the slopes of the Safed Koh. For their security, I gather from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and all the military authorities hitherto consulted that it would be necessary to connect them by a line of military posts with their base at Peshawur; and possibly even to strengthen the permanent garrison of that unhealthy place, which on every other account it seems to me most desirable to reduce.

10. In consequence, however, of the almost deadly unhealthiness of the Khyber in summer, and the known repugnance with which permanent or prolonged service on that line is contemplated by our Native troops, it would probably be impossible to serve the line thus extended without some special system of frequent reliefs, or special recruitment of local levies. I need hardly point out that the financial conditions of such an arrangement would be very onerous.

11. On general grounds, therefore, I am of opinion that the extension of our Khyber line beyond Lundi Kotal would be inexpedient, not to say impracticable, even were the Government of India free to adopt such a measure. But, as I have already shown, the Government of India is not free to adopt it. And therefore the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram lines must be considered only in strict reference to the permanent limits assigned to each by the Treaty of Gandamak.

12. Under these conditions, I would almost say, *cadit quaestio*. For the superior advantages of a military position at the Peiwar, as compared with those of a military position at Lundi Kotal, appear to me incontestible.

13. It must be remembered that the reason why we dispense with treaty engagements, European Agents, and other guarantees for the future good behaviour of the Amirs of Kabul, is that our present frontier positions, if properly utilized, will enable us promptly and easily to punish their bad behaviour when necessary; and that their knowledge of this fact constitutes the best guarantee we can have for the regulation of their conduct in accordance with it. Placed between permanent British garrisons at Kandahar and the headlands of the Kurram, the Kabul Power cannot misbehave with impunity: and, so long as we virtually command possession of the Shuturgardan when required, we shall be at all times, except during a few months of the year, within five days' easy march of Kabul.

14. But, it is urged, access to Kabul by the Kurram is closed during the winter months by snow on the Shuturgardan; whereas during that season the Khyber is open. True. But military operations in Afghanistan are notoriously impossible during the winter months. Throughout the whole of the past winter General Roberts with a strong force, well supplied and equipped, has been unable to move out of Kabul, or undertake active operations in the field. If during this comparatively short period of the year, a military advance upon Kabul should at any time be absolutely or urgently requisite, the Khyber will of course be still, as heretofore, available for that purpose; nor can any money spent on the improvement of this route up to Lundi Kotal render it very much more available for such a purpose than it is already. But during the whole of the fighting season which covers the greater part of the year, while the Kurram route is open and perfectly healthy, the Khyber route is so unhealthy as to be practically useless for military purposes. At no time between spring and autumn can we employ this pass for the withdrawal or reinforcement of troops in Afghanistan,

15. I sincerely hope that the Government of India will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the Khyber. I feel little doubt that such a course would tend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of troops would be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die like flies. We should probably lose more men during peace time every year, in the Khyber, than we have yet lost in any single engagement beyond it. I believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, will prove the best guardians of the Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it open for us if we make it worth their while to do so.

16. All that is known of the climate of the Kurram completely justifies the opinion expressed by General Fraser that "we shall find there sites for military stations "rivalling Simla in regard to healthiness." And I entirely agree with him that such an advantage can scarcely be overrated. The rapidity and vigour of General Roberts' masterly march upon Kabul was in no small degree attributable to the splendidly healthy condition of the troops after a summer passed in the Kurram. Peshawur is in summer a perfect fever pit; and I should rejoice to see its permanent garrison reduced to a minimum.

17. Finally, it is as yet by no means certain that the Kurram would, even in the depth of winter, cease to be available for an advance upon Kabul, owing to the obstruction of the Shuturgardan. There is much reason to believe that the Shuturgardan is turned by an easy route, along which a strong force starting from the

Kurram could reach either Kabul or Ghazni without difficulty. Complete information on this very important point is greatly to be desired.

18. I should much like to see a cheap surface narrow gauge railway carried as far as possible towards the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. But I purposely refrain from discussing in this Minute all questions relating to the construction of railways, tramways, or improved military roads, through the Khyber and Kurram Valleys. On these questions a considerable amount of useful information will be found in the Public Works Department of the Government of India, with valuable notes upon it by General Fraser, General Trevor, and Mr. Molesworth. But all such questions can be more profitably considered after the close of the present war. Further information will probably be required to enable the Government of India to come to a sound conclusion upon them; but their treatment must obviously depend to a great extent upon a final decision of the preliminary question whether it is to the Khyber or the Kurram route that the Government of India attaches most political importance.

19. I wish this Minute to be circulated, and then placed on record in the Political Department.

LYTTON.

Simla, 20th May 1880.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25. (Extract).

MINUTE by the VICEEROY (Lord Lytton).

1. IN connection with my Minute of 20th ultimo on the subject of the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram as permanent lines of communication with Afghanistan, I wish in the present Minute to add a few observations.

2. This question was, many months ago, commended by me to the attention of Generals Stewart and Roberts, from whom, I have no doubt, the Government of India will, in due course of time, receive official statements of their opinion, and who should, I consider, be consulted before the Government commits itself to any final decision on the subject. A confidential official report for record in the Foreign Department is, I know, being prepared by General Roberts; and although that report has not been yet officially received, my private correspondence with General Roberts has sufficiently acquainted me with the views which it will probably embody, to justify the opinions which I now wish to place on record in regard thereto.

3. Broadly speaking, the conclusion arrived at by General Roberts is that it is not worth while to keep up either the Khyber or Kurram. He considers that the importance of each will be practically superseded by the maintenance of a permanent British garrison at Kandahar. The Khyber he condemns on precisely the same grounds as those I have previously indicated. The political and military advantages I myself attach to the Kurram, he admits; the first wholly, the second with some qualification. But he, nevertheless, condemns the Kurram on financial grounds, and these, as stated by him, are certainly very strong, much stronger than I had previously realized. They unquestionably demand the most serious consideration, and I am not sure that they are not conclusive in favour of the military abandonment of the Kurram. But I wish to point out that what we have to guard against is, not the military, but the political action of Russia in Afghanistan. We must take it for certain, I think, that wherever the failure of British influence leaves a political vacuum in that country, Russian influence will speedily fill it, and we have still to guard, most vigilantly, against the professedly spontaneous hostile or insulting action of the Kabul power itself, if it again becomes the puppet of Russia's unavowed diplomacy. Now, as we cannot avert such a contingency, either by treaty engagements with a new Amir, or by keeping an agent at his court, or by reliance on his gratitude for any subsidy, or other assistance we may give him, it is, in my judgment, absolutely indispensable that, at the close of a war so serious and costly as that of the last two years, we should leave ourselves permanently in a position to punish promptly, easily, efficaciously, and inexpensively any outrage or insult on the part of the Kabul power, which a great Government, especially a Government in such a position as that of the Government of India, could not leave unpunished without damaging its reputation, and weakening the foundations of its security. It is, moreover, to a wholesome and very real knowledge, on the part of future Amirs of Kabul, that we have retained in our hands the permanent, practical means of inflicting such punishment, that we must look mainly to our future exemption from the necessity of inflicting it. Now, Kandahar, though a position of the greatest importance as regards Western Afghanistan, does not, so far

as I can see, furnish us with any fulcrum from which we could, in case of need, deal a rapid and decisive blow at Kabul, without entangling ourselves in lengthened operations, or requiring any large force for that purpose. The Kurram does all this for us, at least so it seems to me; but, as I said before, against the political advantages must be weighed the heavy cost of its permanent military occupation. I would certainly, in no case, restore an inch of it to the Kabul Power; but, on the whole, I am inclined to think that the best way of treating it would be to keep no troops in it, no cantonment, but to place it under the government of some Sirdar selected and protected by us, retaining, in our arrangements with him, the right of sending troops into it whenever we require to do so, and leaving him in undisturbed possession of the entire revenue and administration of the district. So far as I can at present perceive, no small ruler placed by us in such a position could have any possible inducement to intrigue against us with the Kabul Power, from which he would have nothing to gain. On the contrary, that power would be, I should think, a constant bugbear to him, and he would fear to be absorbed by it if he forfeited our protection. If there is, amongst the present Kabul claimants to protection, any Chief or Sirdar sufficiently intelligent and suitable for such a position, this arrangement would, perhaps, enable us to satisfy, with advantage to ourselves, an otherwise inconvenient claim. As for the Khyber, nothing on earth would induce me to keep troops in such a fever trap, or to spend money upon it, and the permanent extension of our Khyber line to Gandamak, either in a military or a political sense, appears to me quite out of the question. In saying this, however, I wish it to be understood that I by no means advocate, or contemplate, the relinquishment of our present hold upon the Khyber. My view is that such a hold over the pass, which it is, I think, essential to retain, can be sufficiently secured by proper arrangements with the Pass tribes, if the authority of the Kabul Power over those tribes be excluded as it now is, and that the Pass should be held for us by Jezailchis, not by British troops, European or Native.

4. As regards the Kurram line, it is certainly true, as pointed out by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that General Roberts, when advancing upon Kabul by this line, was obliged to cut himself off from his base of operations, and that, until that base was transferred to the Khyber, his force was virtually acting as a flying column. It must be remembered, however, that he could not, by any other line, have struck an equally rapid blow at Kabul, at a time when the Amir and his councillors were confidently reckoning on the assumed inability of any British force to march upon their capital for six months. The considerations urged by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and which I do not underrate, in favour of abandoning the Kurram, as a permanent military line, appear to me to point very strongly to the expediency of the arrangement I have suggested, viz., that the occupation of the Kurram on our behalf should be entrusted to some friendly chief independent of the Kabul power. All these matters must now, however, be settled by Lord Ripon, whom I expect at Simla on the 7th or 8th instant.

5. To be circulated, recorded in Political Department, and submitted, together with my previous minute on the same subject, to the Secretary of State, and to my successor.

(Signed) LYTON.

Simla, 5th June 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 25.

From Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., Commanding 1st and 2nd Divisions, Northern Afghanistan Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 11 K.-L., dated Kabul, 29th May 1880.)

WITH reference to the wish expressed by you when at Kabul last March, I have prepared a memorandum regarding the best line of communication connecting India with Afghanistan; I now beg to submit the same for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. His Lordship will observe that, while I advocate the exclusion of Afghan control over the whole of the country acquired by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, I am in favour of the withdrawal of our troops to the limits of the frontier held by us previous to the present campaign, excepting in the direction of Kandahar.

3. My reasons for this are explained at considerable length in the memorandum; they are, briefly, as follows:—

- I. The altered conditions of Northern Afghanistan since operations commenced, consequent on the overthrow of the Amīr's power.
- II. The announced intention to maintain a British garrison permanently at Kandahar.

4. We are thus committed to communication with Kandahar being ensured, and are, in my opinion, relieved from the necessity of incurring military responsibility in the direction of the Khyber or Kurram.

MEMORANDUM by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan, dated Kabul, 12th May 1880.

THE question as to which is to be the permanent line of communication between the frontier of India and North-East Afghanistan, is one of such importance that I feel it needs no apology on my part for bringing it to the early consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

2. It will, I think, be admitted that we are not justified in maintaining two separate lines of communication. Their existence causes a drain on our resources which the Indian army is ill calculated to meet. I will therefore place before His Excellency what appear to me to be the relative advantages and disadvantages of the routes to Kabul *viâ* Kohat and Kurram, and by Peshawur and Gandamak.

3. Rawalpindi may be looked upon as a common starting point for both, and the distances to Kabul *viâ* Kohat and Peshawar respectively are as follows:—

	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Kohat - - - - -	106
„ Kohat to Thull - - - - -	66
„ Thull to Kuram - - - - -	50
„ Kuram to Kushi (<i>viâ</i> Shutargardan) - - - - -	67
„ Kushi to Kabul - - - - -	43
Total - - - - -	332
<hr/>	
	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Peshawar - - - - -	101
„ Peshawar to Jamrud - - - - -	10
„ Jamrud to Jellalabad - - - - -	66
„ Jellalabad to Gandamak - - - - -	30
„ Gandamak to Kabul (<i>viâ</i> Lataband) - - - - -	58
Total - - - - -	265
<hr/>	

4. It will be seen from this table of distances that the route *viâ* Peshawar is about 67 miles shorter than that by Kohat. There will doubtless be a rail as far as Jamrud (beyond which point Engineers have decided that a line could only be laid at prohibitive rates), and therefore, from that place to Kabul, 154 miles, the ordinary route march would be followed.

5. From Rawalpindi to Kohat a line of railway may perhaps also be laid at some future time; and there are no physical reasons why this line should not be prolonged to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. The terminal station on this line would then be about 93 miles from Kabul. Showing a gain of quite 60 miles over the Khyber line. Of this distance, that section which lies between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi (which includes the Shutargardan Pass) alone presents any difficulty to the construction of an easy road.

6. I propose to consider these two routes separately, and balance as carefully as I can their respective merits and drawbacks. It would be as well, perhaps, that I should here note the number of men and guns now employed in keeping open communications along these lines. Between Kohat and Ali Khel, 19 guns, 829 cavalry, and 5,313 infantry are engaged; and between Jamrud and Butkhak (the post next to Kabul) there are 34 guns, 2,134 cavalry, and 15,545 infantry.

Kurram could never probably do with less, and at least as many more men would be required to maintain the safety of the communications between Ali Khel and Kabul.

7. The advantages of the Kurram route, with which I will first deal, are—

I.—If a line of rail is constructed to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, there would remain but 90 miles between it and Kabul.

II.—At the Peiwar Kotal, Ali Khel, and on the table-land of the Hariah which lies between these places, any number of troops could be located in a climate admirably suited to Europeans.

III.—The only period during which the Shutargardan Pass is closed to the passage of troops is from the middle of December to the end of March, and though it is of course objectionable to have an army practically cut off from Kabul for from three and a half to four months, still it must be remembered that during this period the plains of Kabul are more or less covered with snow, and that this season of the year would certainly not be selected for military operations in Afghanistan except under very pressing circumstances. But I think I may safely assert that, even in the depth of winter, were a move necessary, an enterprising commander could cross the Shutargardan. Practically, therefore, troops quartered in the upper portion of the Kurram Valley are capable of being pushed on to Kabul all the year round.

IV.—Kushi once reached, the force enters the rich and fertile valley of the Logar, where supplies are immediately procurable.

V.—From Kushi, Kabul is approached by the least defensible and least difficult line; the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, within five miles of Kabul, being the only point at which an effective stand could be made, and even if this position were held, there would be no difficulty in turning it by following the Indiki route and passing across the Chardeh Valley to either the Deh-i-Mozang gorge or the Kotal-i-Nanuchi.

VI.—As far as Thull the road runs through British territory, and from Thull to the Peiwar Kotal the country of the Turis is traversed. This tribe have been most friendly all along, and, being Shiah, would not easily be induced to combine with the fanatical Afghan Sunnis against us.

From the Peiwar Kotal to Dreikula (eight miles beyond Ali Khel) the route lies through the country of the Jajis, a people not well disposed to us, but whose villages and crops are so completely at our mercy that they could never exhibit open hostility.

Beyond Dreikula the country is absolutely uninhabited; and, though Jajis, Mongals, and Ghilzais can undoubtedly collect there in considerable numbers to oppose the advance of a force both in the Hazardarakht defile and on the slopes of the Shutargardan, still what has been done before can be accomplished again, and the difficulties to be overcome are certainly not greater than must be looked for and encountered on entering any mountainous district with hostile intent.

8. The disadvantages of this line are as follows:—

I.—From Rawalpindi to Kohat the country is sparsely cultivated and inhabited; from Kohat to Thull this remark applies with even greater force; whilst from Thull to Kushi no supplies whatever are procurable to meet the requirements of an Anglo-Indian army. This difficulty would, in a great measure, disappear with the construction of a railway, and the further the line could be pushed the better. The nearest point whence a fair amount of supplies could be drawn is the Kuttak country, and the next district is Bunnu, famous for its grain-crops; but good roads, assistance in carriage (for local transport is scarce), and safe communications are needed before this source could be thoroughly utilized. Large quantities of ghee can be brought down from Tusafzai, but such articles as dhal and rice would have to be drawn from more distant districts of the Punjab.

II.—Viewed from a sanitary point, the prospect of an occupation of the Kurram Valley is not cheering. During the past eighteen months it has proved very unhealthy to Native troops, more especially at Thull and Balesh Khel, while throughout the valley pneumonia and fever have been very prevalent.

III.—The physical difficulties of the road between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi are certainly far greater than any which present themselves on the Khyber route. Doubtless in time they could be materially lessened, and at no very considerable outlay; but the construction of a really good cart road between the points indicated would be a matter of great difficulty and vast expense.

IV.—From a political stand-point this route possesses no marked advantages. It is, as it were, but a by-road to Kabul or Ghazni, and its possession does not place us in a position of vantage with regard to the tribes whose districts it skirts.

9. I will now deal with the Peshawar-Gandamak route. Its advantages are—

I.—The total distance from Rawalpindi to Kabul is 67 miles shorter than by the Kurram line.

II.—It is never rendered impassable by snow. In the depth of winter the Lataband Kotal is not closed for more than a couple of days at a time.

III.—A good cart road might be made from Jamrud (where the railway will end) to Kabul.

IV. The road leads *via* Jellalabad through the country of the important eastern Ghilzais, and is a direct line of communication with Badakshan and the western confines of Kashmir, the command of which routes some few years hence may be of considerable importance to us.

V.—It enables us to get behind the Mohmands, Bajouris, Swatis, and Afridis; and, lastly, it is the old historical road to India by which former invasions have swept, and the great commercial highway between Hindustan and Central Asia, along which trade has passed for centuries, and from which nothing will divert it.

10. The disadvantages of this line are—

I.—The great heat in the summer months, which renders it most unhealthy from Jamrud to Gandamak, and to a great extent closes it at the very period most suited for military operations in Afghanistan.

II.—The almost entire absence of supplies between Gandamak and Butkhak, and the fact that the road traverses for its entire length a country inhabited by warlike and fanatical tribes who possess both the will and the means to give considerable trouble in the event of an organized and combined disturbance.

III.—The very large force required to keep open communications, and the numerous defiles and positions ready made for defensive action.

11. Comparing, then, the two routes from a military and sanitary point of view, I think there can be little or no doubt that the Kurram line possesses most advantages, provided that the troops are located principally at the upper end of the valley, that is, at Peiwar Kotal, Shalozan, and the Hariab. But for political and commercial reasons there can be no question as to the Khyber line being preferable; indeed, I am of opinion that, for political reasons alone, it is a point of paramount importance to hold it, if communication with Kabul is to be kept open at all.

12. I now approach a subject the importance of which I do not underrate, viz., whether any necessity will really exist for the maintenance of a road from the north-western frontier of India to Kabul after the retirement of our force from Afghanistan has been effected.

The Afghanistan of to-day is very different from the Afghanistan which existed at the time that the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Ruled by a strong Amir, possessed of a large standing army, and equipped with a numerous artillery and vast munitions of war, Afghanistan was a power which it became absolutely necessary for India to have access to and some control over. Kabul, the seat of government, had become a huge arsenal and barrack, and it was inexpedient that her ruler should be permitted to hold direct communication with Russia, receiving a Russian whilst declining a British Envoy, and neglecting all offers of friendly intercourse with India.

Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and, though no doubt still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India.

13. The occupation of Kabul in October 1879 revealed to us much valuable information concerning the offensive power which the Amir possessed in his army, his well-stocked arsenal, and his skilful artisans. With such means at his disposal for good or evil, it is easy to foresee what serious complications might at any time have arisen were he assisted by Russia either with men, money, or officers.

14. This unmasking of the Amir's considerable warlike preparations, hitherto carefully concealed from us, is surely in itself a sufficient justification of the line of action taken by the Indian Government when it declared war against Afghanistan in 1878. Moreover, these revelations prove the wisdom of that portion of the Gandamak Treaty which insisted on the rectification of our own frontier and the location of British troops in the Khyber and Kurram. So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill-disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital.

15. Were the Afghan nation in the same condition now that it was a year, or even less, ago, no one thoroughly conversant with the policy of the north-west frontier of India would hesitate to recommend that either the Kurram or Khyber, or both routes, should be held in such strength as would admit of a considerable force being moved

rapidly on Kabul. But, as I have stated above, these conditions are quite altered, and it is open to consideration whether there is any real necessity for us now to incur the expense and responsibility of occupying with troops either the Kurram or Khyber line.

16. The first point to decide is, what probable use in the future would be made of these routes, and to what extent would they contribute to the security of our Indian empire, considered either in an offensive or a defensive sense.

17. This is a point, however, which cannot be decided, or even fairly discussed, without, at the same time, carefully considering a route which is now, I venture to think, of even more importance than either the Khyber or Kurram. I mean the line *viâ* Sukkur, Jacobabad, and the Bolan to Kandahar and Western Afghanistan.

Kandahar, where we can, if we so desire, permanently station a garrison of British troops, is being rapidly brought into communication with the main railway system of India, and will soon be (as regards time) within a comparatively short journey of the rising and important seaport of Karachi. This port must inevitably be the base of all military operations undertaken in the direction of Kandahar-Herat, which line, unless I am much mistaken, will henceforth be the theatre of any war carried on by us against the Afghans or Russians in Central Asia.

The Kandahar-Herat line certainly presents to us fewer difficulties than any other line, and, with the completion of the railway to Kandahar, that place would be our starting-point. Thence Herat is distant only 350 or 400 miles according as the northern or southern route is adopted. The road is quite practicable for wheeled guns, and for some part of the way a fair amount of grain and forage is procurable.

18. It is of course impossible to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but, looking to the altered conditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously contemplated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch from India to Persia or Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that it is by this line that all offensive operations on our part could most advantageously be carried on.

19. We have learnt by experience what a very considerable force is required to occupy Kabul and to maintain our communications with India by the Khyber route. There is no denying the fact that, if the ruler of Kabul should at any future time be assisted by Russian officers, the army of 25,000 men which we now find it necessary to employ on the Khyber line alone would have to be very considerably increased. Nor do I think that, even if the Afghans themselves were on our side, we could deal as effectually with Russia in Eastern as in Western Afghanistan.

20. I may briefly summarize these remarks by expressing it as my opinion that, in future, considering the very altered circumstances under which the Afghan nation now exists, we should make up our minds to refuse our right and act offensively from our left; in other words, that we should decide to remain merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. We have neither sufficient men nor material to warrant our operating on more than one line.

To what extent those offensive measures might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan, and the valley of the Helmand. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on. If this point be admitted, it only remains for us to consider to what extent communication should be maintained between the north-west frontier of India and Kabul.

My own opinion, which I offer with considerable diffidence, is that the Kurram line should be given up altogether, and that the responsibilities which we ought to incur on the Khyber route should be limited to such as would ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we have given to the rulers of Lalpura and Kuner.

21. Viewing Kabul in the altered and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and knowing

(as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can again at any time make ourselves masters of Kabul by either of the two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber.

We are now also fully aware of the extraordinary difficulties which Russia would have to encounter were she at any time to advance upon India *via* Kabul, and to how great an extent we could injure and harass her by raising the tribes along the line of communications which it would be necessary for her to maintain, or by taking the initiative from our advanced, yet secure, base at Kandahar. The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber Pass.

22. On political grounds it would probably be necessary for us to have control of the Khyber, or perhaps as far as Lundi Kotal, Pesh Bolak, or any other selected place. To secure this I would make use of Hazara or Afridi levies, but I would strongly deprecate the employment of any regular troops beyond Peshawur.

It seems to me very unlikely that we shall for many years to come enter sufficiently far into the hills to the south and west of the Khyber to enable us to find a suitable and healthy cantonment for British and Native troops; and as it is scarcely possible to continue the occupation of such stations as Jamrud, Ali Musjid, or even Lundi Kotal, without a greater exposure of life and health than the result warrants, my recommendation is to withdraw our troops altogether from the Khyber, and to place them in such situations *cis*-Indus as will ensure our having a healthy and serviceable force, fit to take the field at any time of the year.

23. To attain this result, I would go as far as to withdrawing all, or nearly all, the European troops from Peshawur, and reducing the garrison to the lowest possible strength.

The present seems to me to be a most favourable opportunity for carrying out this project, which has long been considered and recommended by many who know the Peshawur valley well. We have humbled Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the Amir of Kabul. We have taught the Afghans and the tribes between Kabul and India that we accept no denial, that we can go where we will, that it is possible for us, whenever we may so desire, to advance rapidly on Kabul, and, what is even more important, to remain there as long as we wish. This was deemed impossible by all the tribes, even as far down as the Afridis, and it was implicitly believed that the inclemency of the winter, backed up by a powerful combination of the Afghans, must result in our destruction. The reduction of the garrison at Peshawur would not, therefore, now be attributed to either fear or weakness; it would be regarded as part of the general scheme determined upon by us after the total overthrow of the Afghan power.

So long as our troops are located in the Khyber, a large garrison must be maintained at Peshawur. The occupation of these places cannot but be expensive, and will make the military service of Government distasteful to the classes from which the Native army is recruited. This is a most serious matter, and ought not to be dealt with theoretically; only persons who live amongst soldiers know the effect of quartering them in unhealthy places.

24. When Afghanistan was governed by an able man like Sher Ali, who, whatever the cause, had become bitterly hostile to the British Government, and had under him an army of at least 50,000 men in fair order, with some 300 guns and any amount of ammunition, Peshawur was a place of great importance. Nor was it possible to ignore the Khyber when there was an Afghan garrison in Ali Masjid, and when the Afridis were, as they said, weighing in the balance the fortunes of the British Government and of the ruler of Kabul. But, as I have already explained, this state of affairs has passed away. The Afghans are no longer a united nation; their army has been defeated and dispersed, and most of their guns are in our possession.

25. If I am right in supposing that our next struggle will be on the Kandahar line, it would be very inconvenient to have 10,000 or 12,000 troops locked up in the Khyber and at Peshawur. An advance, or even a demonstration, through the Khyber would be of very doubtful advantage, and we should certainly not create difficulties for ourselves at such a time by stirring up the tribes that live near the Kabul river.

It must also be remembered that, if the commencement of a third campaign finds us in military occupation of the Khyber, we shall not then be able to retire from it. We must either give it up at the close of this campaign, or continue to hold it at all hazards. What would be an act of prudence, wisdom, and moderation at a time when we are successful, would certainly be considered by the tribes on our border as an act of weakness if undertaken at the commencement of a war.

26. The political authorities, I understand, agree that arrangements might be made with the Afridis to hold the Khyber with levies, and that the greater portion of the Peshawur garrison might be withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus, and stationed on the high land to the south of the trunk road, near the line of railway, and probably not far from Campbellpore.

Such a disposition, provided we have a proper system of transport, would make us far stronger for offensive purposes than we have been hitherto. The garrison of Peshawur has only been formidable on paper: the unhealthiness of the place, and the necessity of providing for the safety of a straggling cantonment close to the hills, have on many occasions proved this.

27. I have had five years' experience of Peshawur, and can therefore bear reliable testimony to its unhealthiness; and it is a fact that, on visiting the station in the autumn of 1878, and again in 1879, I found the troops so sickly that it was with difficulty the ordinary guards could be relieved. I have also observed that regiments which have come on service, after having been quartered at Peshawur for some time, are invariably more sickly than corps from other cantonments.

28. Troops stationed at Campbellpore would have the following advantages over the Peshawur garrison:—

- (1) They would have healthy quarters.
- (2) They would not be harassed by excessive sentry duty.
- (3) They could march in any direction at a few hours' notice, without having to leave strong detachments to guard their cantonments.

The completion of the railway to Peshawur, perhaps even to Jamrud; the bridging of the Indus at or near Attock; and the maintenance of a sufficient number of transport animals with the troops at Campbellpore, are necessary conditions of the proposed changes.

29. While I strongly advocate the complete withdrawal of troops from the Kuram valley, I must here record my earnest hope that this district will, under no circumstances, be again restored to the Duranis. On behalf of the Government of India, the Turis were distinctly informed by me that this should never happen.

No better arrangement could, I think, be made than to confer the district of Kuram upon some Native gentleman of approved loyalty, such as, for instance, Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan, K.C.S.I. It would be practically held in our interests, and would be a fitting reward for a border chieftain whose family have faithfully and devotedly served the British Government upwards of thirty years.

30. The district of Khost might be made over in life-jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, who, joining me in the Kuram Valley early in 1879, has, it may be said, thrown in his lot with us, and it is very doubtful whether he would be able to stay in Kabul after our departure.

The Sirdar and Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan are fast friends, and would doubtless be able to afford each other mutual assistance and protection while ruling the adjoining districts of Kuram and Khost.

I am inclined to think that it would be better to include the Jaji country with Khost, and make it over in jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan. It would prevent the important position of the Pciwar Kotal falling into the possession of the ruler of Kabul, and would keep the Kabul authorities away from the neighbourhood of Kuram.

31. As to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. None of the leading nobles or Sirdars of Afghanistan that I have come across have sufficient power or influence to hold their own, without such a measure of support as I am convinced no British Government would be willing to promise or supply. Abdul Rahman alone amongst them will probably be able to do so; even *he* would certainly be dependent on our

Government for considerable monetary aid at the first start, but, if the accounts of him are to be believed, he is the one man in the country capable of ruling it and firmly establishing his power.

32. No other arrangements appearing practicable, I would recommend that Herat and Turkistan should be comprised in the principality of Kabul. In fact, with the exception of Kandahar (on which I maintain our grasp should never be loosened), the Kurram valley, the Khyber Pass, and the proposed life-interest of Wali Muhammad in Khost, Kabul would retain all her original possessions.

33. In venturing thus freely to express my views as to the relations which we should entertain in future towards Afghanistan, I trust I shall not be considered inconsistent in advocating a policy so opposed to that which I, for one, have hitherto held advisable, and to enforce which the Government of India have deemed it necessary to incur a long and expensive war.

I would ask His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General to bear in mind that no one has been a more zealous supporter of the present policy, and that no one has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan, than I have. The objects of this policy have, I consider, been most thoroughly attained. Nearly a year's residence at Kabul has convinced me of the truth of this, and manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian empire.

34. The state of affairs which brought about the Treaty of Gandamak has completely changed. In place of our being obliged to occupy the advanced strategic positions secured to us by that treaty, and which the safety of our Indian empire forced us to hold as long as Kabul was the centre of a great political and military power, we can now afford to withdraw our troops within our original frontier. We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself.

35. It may not be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us.

Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime.

The military occupation of Kandahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance; even there we should make our presence but little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province.

36. If the present negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, I should hamper him with the fewest possible conditions; if they fail, I would be inclined to let the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan please themselves about an Amir. In course of time some strong man would win his way to power, and meanwhile it would be wiser not to force a ruler upon them. Any nominee of ours would certainly not be acceptable, and in all probability would not be able to hold his own after our departure.

37. Under any circumstances I am strongly in favour of not remaining at Kabul after the great heat of the Indian summer has passed and travelling through the Khyber is possible. If we cannot settle matters with the Afghans at this season of the year, when everything is in our favour, we shall certainly not be able to do so in the winter, when the difficulties of an occupation are immeasurably increased.

38. Moreover, I cannot too strongly urge upon the consideration of the Government of India the desirability of not leaving the Native portion of the army in the field after the ensuing autumn. Many of the regiments will then have been on service since October 1878; they have done admirably,—indeed, I doubt if at any former period the Native army has ever behaved more loyally or gallantly; all ranks are in good heart, and will cheerfully carry out any work they may be called upon to perform. There is, however, a limit beyond which it would be impolitic to require them to remain away from India. This limit I place at two years.

It would be found difficult, if not impracticable, to relieve the troops now on service. All the Goorkhas, and nearly all the Punjab corps, are in the first line. This is another strong argument in favour of an early withdrawal.

39. On their return to India I earnestly hope that Native officers and men will have every facility afforded them of visiting their homes, and be treated liberally in every respect. They deserve all that the Government can do for them, and, though a

prolonged absence from India has already affected recruiting, I feel sure that the men have only to show themselves in their districts for recruits to come forward in sufficient numbers. After two years' rest the Native army should be even better than it is now. I confidently predict that this will be the case, and that it will be fit and willing for another campaign, if required.

40. I trust I may be excused for broaching a subject somewhat foreign to the original purport of this paper, but the fact is that the condition, welfare, and loyalty of the Native army must always be important factors in determining questions of Indian foreign policy.

Enclosure 4 in No. 25.

MEMORANDUM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN submitting my views on Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum of the 29th May, on the subject of the lines of communication connecting India with Afghanistan, it seems necessary at the outset to explain that I do not propose to enter into a detailed criticism of General Roberts' paper, with the drift of which I heartily agree.

Though some difference of opinion may be allowed in the arguments set up in General Roberts' Memorandum, they are sufficiently strong to satisfy my mind that the political and military necessities of our frontier do not, under existing circumstances, require us to maintain garrisons either in Kurram or the Khyber.

We do not require any greater facilities for the invasion of Afghanistan than are secured to us by our position in the south, and our control of the Khyber in the north; and the objections put forward by General Roberts to the permanent location of the troops either in Kurram or the Khyber seem to me to be absolutely conclusive, whether viewed from the stand-points of strategy, policy, or economy.

I also concur with General Roberts in thinking that our frontier would, in reality, be stronger if the moveable troops maintained for its security were quartered in healthy positions on the eastern side of the Indus, from which they could at any time be withdrawn without inconvenience, instead of being quartered, as they now are, trans-Indus, in advanced and unhealthy stations, which are strong only in name.

As Peshawur will probably be the terminus of the railway now in progress, it will not be possible to denude it entirely of its European garrison, but the general idea suggested in this paper can, I think, be consistently maintained by completing the entrenched position, commenced at that station some twelve or thirteen years ago, to such extent as may be considered necessary for a garrison that can hold its own for a time.

The entrenchment should be strong, but need not be extensive, as it could be reinforced at the shortest notice, and when the railway has been completed, the European garrison holding it might be relieved every two or three months.

This memorandum is submitted in accordance with Foreign Office telegram of the 28th ultimo.

Enclosure 5 in No. 25.

NOTE by the Honourable SIR R. E. EGERTON, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, upon SIR F. ROBERTS' Memorandum, dated Kabul, 12th May 1880, on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan.

IN this Memorandum Sir F. Roberts has examined, not only the question of the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan, but he has also made proposals regarding the future military position which we should take up on the North-West frontier of India, which require some examination, as they involve many and weighty matters to which it appears that sufficient consideration has not been given.

2. In the conclusion stated in paragraph 11 of the Memorandum, that the route *viâ* Peshawur and the Khyber to Kabul is superior to that *viâ* Kurram and Shutargardan Pass, I entirely concur.

3. My opinion on this point was expressed in my letter in the Foreign Department, No. 868 C., dated 18th September 1879; and for the reasons therein stated, to which I adhere, I have no doubt whatever that the route *viâ* Khyber and Jellalabad is the best of the northern routes into Afghanistan. It is the main trade route; it is free from snow in winter, and is open at all seasons.

4. Peshawur, which has been and will always be the base of operations of any army advancing to Kabul, is 154 miles from that place; while, on the Kurram line, Rawal Pindi, which is 332 miles from Kabul, must be the permanent base, if this line is adopted.

5. Considering both the distance and the physical difficulties of each of these routes, I submit that the Khyber route is far the best.

6. Sir F. Roberts next reviews the question of the line of frontier which it is necessary for us to hold when we retire from Kabul.

7. He advocates* the retention of Kandahar, and considers that, if we hold Kandahar and complete the railway to that place, we may give up the Kurram line altogether, and incur only such responsibilities on the Khyber line as may be necessary to ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we may have given to the rulers of Kunar and Lalpura.

* Paras. 17, 20.

8. In this view he proposes to make over Kurram and Khost to Native Chiefs, and to withdraw all regular troops from places to the west of Peshawur on the Khyber line, holding the Khyber Pass and any selected place to the west of it with levies. He would also reduce the garrison of Peshawur to the lowest possible strength, and would withdraw all, or nearly all, European troops from Peshawur to more healthy stations east of the Indus.

9. I agree in all that General Roberts says regarding the importance of Kandahar and the necessity for holding it.

Kurram, if we are to give up the route through this valley to Kabul, is not a desirable possession. The revenue derivable from it is small and insignificant. The territory from Thal up to the Peiwar Kotal, which is all that need be held for any purpose, is a narrow slip, a few miles wide and about 65 miles long, exposed on both sides to incursions from independent tribes. There is no object in holding it except to secure a road, or to redeem pledges made to the people. We have made a distinct promise to the inhabitants that they shall not be replaced under Kabul; and I think this promise should be fulfilled. I see no objection to making over Kurram to a Native Chief who is well disposed to us, provided he can hold his own there without our help.

10. If, as I think probable, our nominee requires military force to assist him in holding the territory, we had better hold Kurram ourselves and reward the Chief in some other way. If Khost cannot be held by our nominee, I would abandon it. We are under no pledge to its people, and need not have any scruples about giving it up.

11. I am inclined to think that Khost and Kurram together would not be too large a territory for one man to hold; and if Sirdar Wali Muhammad is detached from Kabul influence, and made dependent upon us, both Kurram and Khost may be granted to him without violating our promise to the people of Kurram. There is this advantage in making over Khost to some friendly Chief, that we should thereby save Kurram from predatory attacks from the south from Wazirs and Dauris, which our experience of the last year leads us to think may be frequent. If we were under no pledges to the people, I would give up Kurram altogether; but if we are obliged by our promises to detach it from Kabul, no better plan than granting it with Khost to a friendly Chief can be followed. A plan for annexing Kurram and placing it under the Punjab as a frontier district is under consideration, but it is, I think, more advisable to make that territory over to a Native Chief, or to abandon it entirely, than to add it permanently to this province.

12. On the Khyber side the necessity of keeping the road open, and our promises and engagements to the Khyber Afridis, to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura, and to the Syud Badshah of Kunar, and also the security of the Peshawur valley, have to be

considered in determining what extent of territory we should hold, and what should be the strength and composition of the Peshawur garrison.

13. General Roberts argues that, as we have nothing to fear from Kabul, and as any attack upon India from the north will be made along the Kandahar line, and not from the Kabul direction, it will be embarrassing to have troops locked up at Peshawur. We should take the present opportunity to reduce the Peshawur garrison, and withdraw all, or nearly all, our European troops to the healthy stations east of the Indus, holding the Khyber with levies and taking as little territory beyond the actual pass as possible.

14. If the engagements we have made with the Syud Badshah of Kunar do not require us to protect him against Kabul, one reason for holding territory beyond the end of the Khyber is removed, but if we are pledged to protect him, we must take up a position which will enable us to fulfil our promise, as we have reason to know from past experience that no treaty engagements will prevent the ruler of Kabul from injuring and oppressing those Chiefs and people who have been friendly to us when they come again into his power. Should our engagements with Kunar oblige us to take territory as far as Jellalabad, we must hold the line with troops. Should our promise to Kunar not necessitate so large an annexation, we have still to consider what is necessary to enable us to fulfil our engagements to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura. This Chief, Muhammad Akbar Khan, has received distinct assurances from the Political Officer, under the sanction of the Government of India, that he will be maintained in his possessions, notwithstanding any change in the Government of Kabul. These promises were given when Muhammad Akbar's cousin, Muhammad Sadik Khan, who was Yakub Khan's nominee and cousin, turned against us in December 1879.

15. In order to protect the Lalpura Chief, it is necessary that we should have an open road through the Khyber as far as Dakka. I think that the Khyber may be held by levies raised as at present almost entirely from the Afridi tribes under the command of a British officer, provided that there is a force at Peshawur strong enough to hold that place and to keep up a moveable column properly equipped with transport, ready to operate on the border when required.

I would deprecate reducing the Peshawur garrison below the strength necessary to effect this object at all seasons. It is not necessary to keep a large force of Europeans at Peshawur, where they are extremely unhealthy. The garrison may be composed of Native troops. It is true that Native troops have hitherto been as sickly as European at Peshawur, but this is owing, I believe, in both cases, to the system of reliefs, which supplies the garrison with fresh men who have not time to become acclimatized. If the Native garrison of Peshawur were composed of local regiments, like those of the Punjab Frontier Force, I believe that the inefficiency arising from sickness would, in a great measure, disappear.

16. The danger of attack at Peshawur and along that frontier arises not so much from Kabul as from the independent tribes on the border, to whose attacks the Peshawur frontier is eminently exposed.

17. Although the military power of the ruler of Kabul has been broken, the danger from the tribes still remains and must not be overlooked. For some time to come the excitement, which our operations in Afghanistan have caused amongst the border tribes, will continue, and our retirement from that country will efface the impression caused by our successful advance, and will make the tribes more inclined for mischief than before.

18. I consider, therefore, that the garrison of Peshawur must not be weakened in numbers to much below the strength at which it stood before the Afghan war began. The number of European soldiers should be reduced, but the number should be replaced by Native troops, and I think the Peshawur Native garrison should be composed of local regiments which might, if necessary, form part of the Punjab Frontier Force. There was never anything in the position of Peshawur itself, in the nature of its border, and in the character of the tribes of independent Pathans, whose incursions have to be resisted, to distinguish Peshawur from other districts on the frontier. The sole difference lay in the proximity of Kabul and of the troops of that power. Now that the Kabul army has been disorganized, there is less reason than ever for maintaining at Peshawur a force differing from the Punjab Frontier Force, which, from being constantly changed, suffers so greatly from sickness.

19. I cannot recommend that the Peshawur garrison, whatever may be its composition, be placed within a fortified enclosure. Mobility and vigilance are most

important qualities for a force employed in border duties, and these are not promoted by accustoming the troops to live inside fortifications.

20. There is one thing which is apparent in the Memorandum of General Roberts,* and that is, the desire to move the army out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible. No doubt this is desirable for many reasons,

* Para. 38.

if we do not intend to remain in the country; but I deprecate any display of eagerness to leave, because such display is sure to make the enemy anxious to delay and baffle us. It is by no means certain that the settlement which we now hope to make in Afghanistan is so final and complete that we shall not have to return to that country. It will be fortunate if the proposed settlement is made quickly, and our troops are able to withdraw from the country by the autumn. But should anything detain them, it may be necessary to relieve them, and I think it worth while to mention here that it is not so impracticable to relieve the Native troops of the force as it at first sight may seem.

21. I say this with much diffidence, and venture to put the following scheme forward, as a suggestion for relieving the Native Infantry and

† See Annexure A.

Cavalry. It has been proposed by Colonel Black, Secretary to this Government in the Military Department. The plan involves the abandonment of the Kurram line, which I think advisable in any case, if the occupation is prolonged. The Kurram force has done nothing since the Zaimusht expedition to coerce the Wazirs, who have given so much trouble on the south. It is unable to occupy the Shuturgardan and to co-operate with the army from Kabul; it has shown itself powerless to operate against other tribes, which have continually molested the line of communications. It is absolutely useless in its present position, and I can see no necessity to retain it in Kurram.

22. The scheme shows that the divisions in the front can be relieved, except the Artillery.

23. I trust that it will not be necessary to keep the troops in Afghanistan; but, if it is, I think the force can be relieved in the manner indicated. I may remark that it is only recently that the urgent necessity for relieving the regiments on service has become apparent. A few months ago, when I wished to relieve the 5th Punjab Infantry, the measure was not allowed by the military authorities, though the regiment had been on service almost continuously since October 1877.

24. I think it necessary to put forward my views of the possibility of relieving the army in Afghanistan, as it seems to me of much importance that the Government of India should not have its hand forced by the supposed necessity of withdrawing our army immediately, for reasons connected with the discipline and organization of that army. If such a view is entertained, we may possibly be induced, or think ourselves compelled by the exigencies of the case, to accept a hasty and partial adjustment of affairs, which will not last and will lead to fresh difficulties.

25. It follows from what I have said above, that I recommend the completion of the railway line to Peshawar as soon as possible. That line is necessary for the safety of our north-west frontier, whatever turn affairs in Afghanistan may take. The line from Rawul Pindi to Kohat will not, so far as I can foresee, be of much use for military purposes. A good road from Rawul Pindi to Thal, fit for wheeled traffic, will be sufficient for the wants of that line. For the portion of road between Rawul Pindi and Kohat, a line of road fit for carts, running through the Kohat Pass, may in time be substituted.

26. This last-named line will not exceed 42 miles in length, as against 106 miles from Rawul Pindi to Kohat. The Adam Khel Afridis are under obligations to permit the construction of the road from Peshawur to Kohat, through their territory. This line is one of much importance for controlling this division of the Afridi tribe, and for enabling us to enter their country, and also that of the Khyber Afridis, when we please.

27. I need hardly say that I concur heartily in all that General Roberts says regarding the good service performed by the Native troops of the Indian Army, and that I agree thoroughly in the opinion that they are deserving of every indulgence which can be granted to them on their return.

28. I have no doubt that their merits and deserts are fully appreciated by the Government of India.

21st July 1880.

(Signed) R. G. E.

Annexure A.

NOTE by Colonel S. BLACK, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, on the manner of effecting a relief of Native Cavalry and Infantry Regiments now in the front line at Kabul.

I HAVE in a former note stated how we could relieve the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, and I may as well repeat it here.

Cavalry.

4th Punjab Cavalry is the only regiment available to take the place of the Guides, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 2nd Punjab Cavalry, so that, in this arm, the Generals in the front must consent to reduced numbers. I think this can be managed without incurring risk, as cavalry is not the arm required in Northern Afghanistan.

Infantry.

We have 5 regiments in the front, and these I would relieve as follows:—3 regiments in the autumn, and 2 in the spring.

Guides should be relieved by 1st Sikhs	-	-	} 1st relief in autumn.
5th Punjab Infantry should be relieved by 6th Punjab Infantry	-	-	
5th Goorkhas should be relieved by 4th Sikhs	-	-	
3rd Sikhs should be relieved by 4th Punjab Infantry	-	-	} 2nd relief in autumn.
2nd Sikhs should be relieved by 3rd Punjab Infantry	-	-	

But the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief are more difficult to replace.

I would, however, recommend withdrawal from the Kurram Valley, and this would give us 3 cavalry and 6 infantry regiments to take the places of regiments required for the relief of the front line.

In the front line there are 7 regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry. I would relieve 6 of the cavalry and the whole of the infantry (*see* Tables A and B).

The notes made on these Tables explain that we require (supposing 6 cavalry regiments will suffice for front line in Northern Afghanistan):—

In Cavalry.

4 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
1 regiment of the Punjab Frontier Force.

In Infantry.

8 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force.

A.

Cavalry, Native.

Front line:—

3rd B. C.	-	-	} 7 regiments, of which	} 13 regiments on service. By giving up Kurram, 10 would remain on service. But relief required only	
17th B. C.	-	-			
3rd P. C.	-	-			
Guides	-	-	} 4 belong to Punjab Frontier Force.		
19th B. C.	-	-			
1st P. C.	-	-	} All, except 3rd P. C., should be relieved.		
2nd P. C.	-	-			

On communications:—

4th B. C.	-	-	} 3 regiments
5th B. C.	-	-	
C. I. H.	-	-	

In Kurram:—

1st B. C.	-	-	} 3 regiments
13th B. C.	-	-	
18th B. C.	-	-	

In India :—

2nd B. C.	-	-	} 13 regiments.
6th B. C.	-	-	
7th B. C.	-	-	
8th B. C.	-	-	
9th B. C.	-	-	
10th B. C.	-	-	
11th B. C.	-	-	
12th B. C.	-	-	
14th B. C.	-	-	
15th B. C.	-	-	
16th B. C.	-	-	
4th P. C.	-	-	
5th P. C.	-	-	

Total - 26 regiments, including Central India Horse.

In effecting the relief, I should propose to reduce the 7 regiments in front line to 6. The 3rd Punjab Cavalry should stand fast.

The 3 regiments on communications should go to the front, and the following 5 corps might be taken (2 for the front line and 3 for communications) :—

2nd Bengal Cavalry.
6th ditto.
9th ditto.
16th ditto.
4th Punjab Cavalry.

We should then have 9 regiments on service; front line and communications.

I would bring the Kurram force back to India, and this would give, in India, 17 regiments.

B.

Native Infantry.

In front line, Kabul, 16 regiments :—

5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force, viz., Guides, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Sikhs, and 5th Goorkhas.
3 Goorkha regiments, viz., 2nd, 3rd, and 4th.
8 Native Infantry regiments, chiefly Punjabis.

16 regiments. Of these, 13 regiments should be relieved.

(The 3rd Sikhs, the 2nd Sikhs, and a Goorkha regiment might remain another year.)

On communications :—

8th N. I.	-	-	} 13 regiments. These should take the front line.
9th N. I.	-	-	
16th N. I.	-	-	
22nd N. I.	-	-	
27th N. I.	-	-	
30th N. I.	-	-	
31st N. I.	-	-	
32nd N. I.	-	-	
41st N. I.	-	-	
1st Goorkhas	-	-	
1st Madras	-	-	
4th ditto	-	-	
15th ditto	-	-	

In Kurram :—

5th N. I.	-	-	} 6 regiments. I would withdraw these regiments to India.
13th N. I.	-	-	
20th N. I.	-	-	
21st N. I.	-	-	
29th N. I.	-	-	
Deoli Infantry	-	-	

In India.

1st N. I., Peshawur*	-	<p>If we withdraw from Kurram, we should get back 6 regiments, so that in effecting the relief of the 13 regiments in the front line, we should get back to India $13+6=19$ regiments.</p> <p>Amongst these, there are some good regiments. We can give 5 excellent regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force to take the place of 5 to be relieved, provided the relief is effected in autumn and in spring. This would require only 8 regiments from the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief, and I should take those marked.*</p>
2nd N. I., Cawnpore	-	
4th N. I., Ferozepore*	-	
10th N. I., Cachar	-	
12th N. I., Agra*	-	
17th N. I., Morar	-	
26th N. I., Jhelum*	-	
34th N. I., Cachar	-	
36th N. I., Barrackpore	-	
38th N. I., Meerut*	-	
40th N. I., Gorackpur	-	
43rd N. I., Assam	-	
1st Sikhs, Kohat	-	
1st P. I., Edwardesabad	-	
3rd P. I., Dera Ismail Khan	-	
6th P. I., Murdan	-	
6th N. I., Peshawur	-	
3rd N. I., Dinapore	-	
7th N. I., Lucknow*	-	
11th N. I., Rawul Pindi and Kohat.	-	
14th N. I., Amballa*	-	
18th N. I., Buxar	-	
33rd N. I., Delhi*	-	
35th N. I., Allahabad	-	
37th N. I., Bareilly	-	
39th N. I., Nowshera	-	
42nd N. I., Assam	-	
44th N. I., Assam	-	
4th Sikhs, Dera Ismail Khan	-	
2nd P. I., Abbottabad	-	
4th P. I., Edwardesabad	-	

Enclosure 6 in No. 25.

LINES of COMMUNICATION between India and Afghanistan.

HAVING been invited to record my opinion on a Memorandum written by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., on the above subject, and agreeing, for the most part, in that distinguished officer's views, I have only, as briefly as I can, to state the points on which I dissent from those views, and my reasons for doing so.

1st point. General Roberts does not, to my mind, give a sufficiently decided preference to the Khyber over the Kurram route, viewed as lines of advance for our troops.

2ndly. That he has not taken into calculation the relative value of these routes, as "Keys of India."

3rdly. He states that the power of Sher Ali has been broken, the Afghan nation humbled, and that therefore we have no more to fear from Afghanistan as a military power.

4th. That we may therefore now withdraw our troops, not only from the Khyber and Kurram, but also, with the exception of a small garrison, from Peshawur itself.

1st point. It is freely admitted on all sides that we cannot afford to keep up both routes in time of war, the one requiring, in round numbers, 15,000 and the other 12,000 troops to do so, and balancing the arguments in favour of each General Roberts says that, "from a military and sanitary point of view, the Kurram line possesses most advantages, but for political and commercial reasons the Khyber is preferable."

I am bound to challenge the military advantages of the Kurram route, because I consider that, owing to the height of the Shuturgardan and the extreme cold in winter

between that pass and the Peiwar Kotal, *it is no use at all as a single route*, and can never be looked upon but as an alternative summer route in case we should at any time have a very large army in Afghanistan and found it necessary to relieve the pressure on the Khyber line. General Roberts says (para. 7, Section III., of his memorandum), "An army in Kurram is practically cut off from Kabul for from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 months in the year;" but he concludes by saying that "practically troops can be pushed on to Kabul all the year round."

Now I have heard this latter assertion made by other distinguished officers; and I should be sorry to allow such an opinion to be placed on record unchallenged.

A selected band of Europeans without animals or camp followers might perform such a feat at certain times, but nothing in the shape of an Anglo-Indian army could attempt it in winter. We must remember that from the eastern side of the Peiwar Kotal to the western side of the Shutargardan is 45 miles of uninterrupted snow with the thermometer often below zero in the day time,—through this snow Native troops, camp followers, mules, and doolie-bearers would not struggle more than 8 or 10 miles a day,—they would therefore have to encamp three, if not four, nights in the snow, devoid of shelter, forage, or firewood; and, even if the weather overhead were fine, I am sure that the number that would die of cold or be crippled by frost-bite would completely destroy the force. I say that not practically only, but *positively*, this route is closed in ordinary winters for many weeks, in severe ones for many months. It is true that snow in the plains around Kabul prevents military operations being carried on in the winter months; but if we had any troops in Kabul in the winter, neither letters nor telegrams could reach them were the Kurram their only line of communication.

Passing from the cold to the heat, General Roberts lays much stress (Section 10) on the great heat between Jamrud and Gandamak. I am inclined to think that from Kohat to Kurram it is, though not quite so bad, yet nearly equal in temperature. Last year our troops, marching down the Khyber in June, suffered terribly. Our troops did not march down from Kurram; but the Punjab contingents did, suffered much from heat, and lost 50 sepoy from cholera. On the Bolan line I suppose the heat to be greater than on either Khyber or Kurram and to last much longer in the year.

Railways.—It is said that a railway through the Khyber can only be laid at a prohibitive cost, whereas a rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal could easily be made and land the troops within 93 miles of Kabul, but I have not heard that the cost of a line, which, passing through the Khyber, would land troops 93 miles from Kabul, has been estimated for, this would be only 61 miles from Peshawur as against 134 miles from Kohat to Peiwar Kotal, the one rail being capable of extension to Kabul, the other absolutely incapable of extension, save by works such as are seen on the Alps.

For these reasons alone I am of opinion that there can be no comparison between the two routes, and if one is to be selected it must be the Khyber.

The 2nd point is the relative value of these routes to an invading army, in other words, as "the Keys of India."

I cannot speak particularly on the different defensive positions on the Khyber line. I have heard that there are many good ones, and Lundi Kotal among the best.

On the Kurram line there are four; 1st, the crest of the Shutargardan, too far from our base, and to hold which permanently would be tantamount to holding Kabul; 2ndly, Ali Khel, a very strong position, but according to modern strategists at the wrong end of the long defile in its front; 3rdly, Peiwar Kotal, strong towards the east, but very weak, almost useless, towards the west; 4thly, Thull, a position of great natural strength, completely commanding the Kurram route and holding Daour and Khost in check. Should an invading army ever attempt to enter India by the Kurram, I consider that Thull would be the place to meet him. It is not likely, however, that any strategist invading India from his base (as it must be) at Kabul would attempt to operate on a line 226 miles long while we held a parallel one only 164. There need be little fear of an invasion by the Kurram line.

3rd point. The military power of Sher Ali was built up in a dozen years, doubtless much by our aid, but should Abdul Rahman prove as able a ruler as Sher Ali, he may follow his example with equal success, and he will not have far to look for assistance; and if we withdraw our attention entirely from Kabul and the Khyber, the task will be all the easier to him.

4th point. I deprecate any withdrawal of troops from Peshawur, or any lessening

of our communications with, or influence over, the Afridi or Mohmand tribes. We have not got very far in this direction in the last 30 years; but it is absolutely necessary that we should go on increasing what we have gained, and the withdrawal of our troops or any portion of them from Peshawur will be a retrograde step.

The Afghan, either as an individual or a nation, is never humbled, and he is not humbled now. Twelve months hence it will be the boast of Kabul and the Khyber that the British were forced out of the country which they could take but could not hold. General Roberts, looking forward to future military operations in Afghanistan, thinks that Kandahar will be the chief scene and theatre of war; but the enemy may have something to say to this. Our troops at Kandahar might be held in check, and at all events, so distant a base in a foreign country as Kandahar would be a bad one to operate against Kabul; for history teaches us that an army invading India by the Khyber would bring all the tribes on its flank with it to the plunder of the plains; and we could not hope for a moment to raise them against a foe which could offer them such glorious loot. When that day comes, Afridis and Mohmands must be under our thumb, or we shall indeed have cause to rue it. The Khyber Pass has been a bugbear to us for 40 years. We have "laid the ghost" now, and we must make the pass our own. A railway at Peshawur will give us opportunities for relieving our troops rapidly and saving them to a great extent from the effects of the climate; but if we wish our political officers to increase their influence over Mohmands and Afridis, our troops must be seen on the spot.

I trust that General Roberts' valuable remarks on the Native army will be allowed full weight. It must be remembered that to a mercenary and Asiatic army the invasion of a foreign country conveys the idea of plunder and rapine; that under our civilized rule such expectations are seldom realized; and if long absence from home is coupled with this disappointment, service in Afghanistan can never be anything but unpopular.

(Singed)

J. WATSON, Major-General,

Commanding Kurram Force.

24th July 1880.

Enclosure 7 in No. 25.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Simla. Dated Peiwar Kotal, 10th August 1880.

GENERAL WATSON's telegram No. 1 of yesterday will have given you the pith of the information asked for in your demi-official of the 1st instant. What Sir F. Roberts' declarations to the Jajis at his Ali-Khel Durbar amounted to I have not been able exactly to ascertain,* beyond the fact that he is believed to have told the Jajis that they would always remain our subjects.

2. So far the Jajis have said nothing to me (or as far as I can learn to either of the Native Assistants here and at Starkili) about any promises or declarations, and I think this abstention from any reference to what was said is very significant: in fact they have never thrown in their lot with us, or looked forward to our permanently occupying their country as the Turis had. From the fact of their being "Sunnis" too, there is naturally a sympathy and fellow-feeling between them and the surrounding tribes and also with the Kabul Government which could not exist with the "Shiah" Turis; and they are all the more ready to revert to Durani rule as Abdul Rahman has no quarrel with them,† and they can come under his rule with a "clean sheet," so to speak.

3. A continuance of our rule would of course mean more money-making, redemption of mortgages, clearing off debts, and the purchase of many luxuries (including fresh matrimonial engagements), security of life and property, and exemption from the inevitable "squeezing" which will follow on the advent of a "Durani Hakim;" but these advantages, substantial as they are, are no doubt more than counterbalanced by

* As I never had a copy of his speech, nor does Christie appear to have one.

† As has (?) Yakub Khan (or even his brother Ayub), who, if in power, would retaliate on the Jajis for their plundering the Kabul troops after their defeat on the Peiwar Kotal.

the satisfaction of being rid of the infidel invader and finding themselves once more under a ruler, who, in spite of his rapacity and licentiousness, is after all one of their own race and religion; one under whose sway they are more at liberty to carry out, in such

‡ Giving up a murderer to be killed in cold blood by the relatives of the victim.
§ Reprisal.

matters as revenge for murder, reprisal for raids and settlement of cases, their own time-honored customs of "Kisas,"‡ "baramta"§ and ordeal by fire or water, and last, not least, one who is

always open to bribes.

4. Moreover, the Jajis have always felt the taunts of their independent neighbours and co-religionists at their want of enterprise in not combining with them against the "Feringhee," and making at least one effort, as all the other tribes have done, to rid themselves of the foreign yoke, and it would be a relief to find this source of reproach removed.

5. As regards *our* interests in the matter, my own views are as follows:—That whatever we do with Kurram,* it is not worth our while, and would be a mistake, to attempt to retain any hold over the Hariob. The proximity to, and sympathy with, the warlike tribes under the direct rule of Kabul (through whom it is approachable, by a Durani army, by the three highroads of the Tikrai, Shuturgardan and Spega passes); its inaccessibility to us, especially in winter, its distance from our furthest outpost (presumably Thal) and consequent difficulty of supporting a governor or reinforcing our troops; its inability to supply the wants of a force occupying it; and the source of irritation which its retention would certainly be to the Kabul Government—all combine to render it, to my mind, a very useless and undesirable acquisition.

* See paragraph 7.

6. Should it be necessary at any time to advance on Kabul again,† and were it decided to take this route, the forcing of the Peiwar Kotal and Shuturgardan would, with our present knowledge of the country, be by no means the formidable task presented to us in December 1878, and I think it likely enough that the Jajis, having learnt by experience the futility of resistance, and knowing the wealth which we bring into the country, would make a virtue of necessity and allow the passage of our troops readily enough after an empty show of fighting.

* Such a contingency, considering the uncertainty of Kabul politics, is always possible.

7. As to Kurram, I suppose it is only a choice of giving them as Governor one of our own men, or some Kabul Sirdar whom we may wish to reward.‡ Military occupation of the valley does not appear to be contemplated, nor would I advise it myself under present conditions, which it is pretty generally admitted involve a waste of troops and money. But it might, and I think in time would, repay the cost of occupation by appropriating the whole of the revenue (of which none should be ceded to Kabul), both of Kurram and if possible of Khost. The latter is undoubtedly a fertile province, and its resources could in time be developed to our advantage, if we occupied Kurram; but on this head Christie, when you see him, will be able to give you better information than I can.

† From all I can learn Wali Muhammad Khan is loathed by the Turis and would very likely be assassinated. The post might be a fitting reward for Sir Ghulam Hossein Khan, who must know so much of Afghan politics, and would in point of loyalty and trustworthiness be worth a hundred Wali Muhammads.

8. About the result of possible occupation of Ghazni by Ayub Khan and declaration of his independence, there is no doubt it would rally the Yakub party, and Abdul Rahman's power of opposing him would probably depend mainly on the support, moral or material, that we could afford him. The causes of the contending parties would be espoused and fought out, I think, by the tribes lying between Ghazni and Kabul; and the Jajis, who are well off that line of country would have but little to say to the struggle, merely throwing in their lot with the side which promised to be victorious, though they would prefer to see Abdul Rahman win.

9. There is nothing else in connection with the subject that I can think of at present: but will write if I do.

Enclosure 8 in No. 25.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Commanding Kurram Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
(Dated Shalozan, 13th August 1880.)

YOUR telegram, as per margin, reached me on the 11th instant, and I directed Major Conolly to send in his opinion on the subject referred to, and I now proceed to offer mine.

"Your opinion with Conolly's, as to possible arrangements with the Turis, wanted soon."

2. A residence of nearly two years in the Kurram valley has convinced me that, from any point of view, the country is absolutely worthless to the British Government, and it only remains to get rid of it in such a manner as, while keeping it independent of the Kabul Government, we may ourselves be called upon to interfere as little as possible in its concerns. We are to a certain extent bound, I believe, by some more or less positive promises to the Turis, not to restore them to the Government of Kabul, and to do our best for their future welfare.

3. The present feeling of the people is that they would wish to remain entirely under our rule, but they have tasted nothing but the sweets of our rule, and I doubt if, after a little experience of regular British Government, they would not become restless and give us great trouble.

4. The Turis are divided into so many factions that any kind of independence or self-government would be impossible. During the greater part of Amir Dost Mahomed's reign there was no Governor in Kurram. An army visited it every two or three years to collect the revenue. I have heard that during those years the state of Kurram was a very unenviable one.

5. The valley should be given in free jagir to some one who, 1st, understands the art of governing Afghans; 2ndly, who has wealth and influence enough to raise some levies, and assert his power to govern; and, 3rdly, whose interests are bound up with the British Government, and who is not likely to court the friendship or suffer the interference of the Kabul Government. The Government of India knows best where such a man is to be found. The only one I know of is Sirdar Wali Muhammad.

6. On the 31st July I telegraphed as per margin. Further conversations with the Turis leads me to suppose that this feeling is not by any means universal, though strong in that faction which is united with the Tirah Syuds.

"Turis believe that they are to be made over to Wali Muhammad, and are much excited against him."

7. Sirdar Wali Muhammad, as the nominee of the British Government, and to a certain extent responsible to it, would be a very different man to Wali Muhammad, the Government deputed from Kabul, against whom was no appeal, and whose tenure of office being uncertain and expensive, was bound to squeeze the people to the utmost. He had no interest in the welfare of the country, no inducement to withhold his exactions. The Government may, however, have better men for the jagir. I know of none at present. Khost should go with Kurram, and in time a small independent State might be formed, which the Kabul Government would fear to touch, but which could be conquered and annexed, if necessary, by a single division of the frontier army.

8. I agree with Mr. Christie in his views generally, but I cannot believe with him that the Turis could be left without a Governor, to manage for themselves. Their management would be disastrous; they would soon come entirely under the influence of Kabul.

9. With Major Conolly's views regarding the Hariob I concur, but I cannot agree with him regarding Kurram, "that military occupation could ever, in any period of time, become remunerative," nor that his scheme for taking hostages from surrounding tribes for the safety of a paid Governor of our own could ever be carried out.

10. If the Hariob be restored to Kabul, and Kurram and Khost given to a jaghirdar of our own, the Peiwar Kotal should be considered neutral ground, and no customs or taxes taken on either side. The rights of wood and grass should be with the Paiwar Mangals, the Kabul rule extending only over Zubburdust Killa and Goondy Kheyl.

Enclosure 9 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Khyber line, dated
27th August 1880.

As we are to hold no advanced position beyond the Khyber, such as Safed Sang with the line of the Surkhab for instance, I do not think the Khyber alone worth holding by means of a considerable garrison located between Jamrud and Lundi Kotal.

The object to be attained is, therefore, an arrangement with the Afridis, under which they shall hold for us, and strictly in our interests, the line of the Khyber. The Shinwaris and Mohmunds being dealt with in like manner wherever the road touches their territory. If this can be arrived at in the manner suggested by Colonel Waterfield, through the intervention of Jirgahs and Maliks, so much the better.

As regards the posts to be left to the Afridis, I would suggest that Ali Musjid should be thoroughly dismantled. It would only be useful to those who would hold the pass against us. The Afridis could make no military use of it as a work. The buildings, not part and parcel of the fortifications, which could be used as dwellings, I would leave to them, also those on the bluff (51st hill) and near the river. The towers, such as that at Kalu Khusutia, might be left standing, but Fort Maude and Mackeson's work (improved) should be destroyed, as these works command important points on the road, and, like Ali Musjid, could only be used to our detriment. If required at any future time, we can easily reconstruct them.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

27th August 1880.

Enclosure 10 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to General J. WATSON, Kurram.

You are instructed to assemble the maliks, or representatives, of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley, on this side of the Peiwar Kotal, and to declare to them that the British Government understands they desire their country to be made independent; that, consequently, the British Government recognizes their independence, and will maintain it, if necessary, against any interference from the Kabul Government; that no Governor will be appointed by us, but that they will be left free to make their own arrangements for the management of their country and for its protection against neighbouring independent tribes. They must be warned to be careful to do nothing that might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachment, and they must comply with the wishes of the British Government in regard to matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier.

In regard to the Jajis, if our intentions are asked, you should reply that we do not desire to retain any authority over them after the withdrawal of our troops, but that if they wish to be independent of Kabul we are willing to recognize their independence, although we can undertake no obligation to maintain it, and have no intention to interfere in their affairs.

Enclosure 11 in No. 25.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the OFFICIATING SECRETARY
to the GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

Foreign Department.
Political.

SIR,

Simla, the 31st August 1880.

THE orders under which the Kabul Field Force is now being withdrawn from North Afghanistan, instruct the military authorities to retain for the present the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass. It has now become necessary to

determine without delay our permanent political relations for the future with the tribes immediately connected with the Pass; and upon this subject I am to communicate to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor the decision of the Government of India.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has resolved that the arrangements with the Khyber tribes for keeping open the Pass, and the maintenance of their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, shall be continued. With this object it is of importance to assemble as speedily as possible, at Peshawur, the representatives of the tribes, to inform them that their independence is, as heretofore, recognised, and to explain to them that the Government intend to maintain in force, subject to such modification as events and circumstances may require, the existing arrangements with the tribes for holding charge of the Khyber Pass, and for keeping it open and free of interference. In consideration of their proper performance of these duties, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber; although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. If, after the withdrawal of our troops, it is still found advisable, for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass, to retain some of the Jezailchis, or to keep up any similar levies, there will be no objection to this arrangement or to any other measure of the kind that may be found, upon discussion, to be just and reasonable. It may be explained to the tribes, that although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the Pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khyber, so long as the Pass is kept open, under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government.

3. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council considers that it is very important to make known to the tribes, as soon as possible, the intentions of the Government of India. I am therefore to request that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor may have the goodness to cause the necessary preliminary instructions for carrying into effect these arrangements to be issued, by telegram, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. His Excellency in Council is fully aware that the completion of our permanent arrangements for the Khyber may be a work of some political difficulty, which will require careful and deliberate handling; since the experiment of inducing the tribes to combine upon systematic engagements for the independent management of the Pass has never yet been thoroughly tested. Various material questions of detail will come up for consideration,—such as whether our officers should collect the transit dues for which compensation is to be paid, and, if so, at what place; in what way we should, after withdrawal of our troops, dispose of the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber belonging to the British Government; whether, and under what conditions, a British officer should occasionally visit the tribal levies and posts in the Pass; and up to what limit westward we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road. In regard to this last mentioned question, I am to observe that the western limit of the Khyber Pass was carefully demarcated, for the purpose of determining the range of independent tribal responsibility, in a Memorandum by Major Cavagnari, dated 1st July 1879; and that the Government of India have no intention of extending the present arrangements for protection of the road beyond the limit therein laid down; while it may be worth considering whether Lundikhana should be permanently included. But upon these and all other subsidiary points, which do not at this moment seem to need immediate decision, His Excellency in Council will await the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor.

5. In regard to our relations with the Mohmand tribe immediately adjoining the British border, and with the Khan of Lalpura, any necessary instructions will be communicated separately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 12 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Kurram Valley.

1. PARAGRAPHS 2 to 13 of this Minute were recorded as a memorandum on the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram lines, under date the 2nd of June 1880. I now convert that paper into a Minute, offering some further remarks on the question more immediately before us.

2. Regarding the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram routes, I hold the opinion expressed in my Minute of the 25th August 1879, on frontier communications. Further, in this opinion I find myself fortified by the events, then undreamt of, but which have occurred since.

3. In paragraphs* 6, 7, and 8 of that Minute I attempted to show under what conditions a column

* "6. The Shuturgardan must ever be considered a bad line of military communications. From Habib Killa, upwards, the road passes through a difficult country over the Peiwar Kotal (8,500 feet) onward to the narrow defile of Ilazar Darakat, attaining on the crest of the Shuturgardan an elevation of 11,200 feet. The descent to Dobundi and Kushi is extremely difficult and steep; for wheeled carriages it is impracticable, and it would take a vast expenditure of money to make it passible. The variation of altitude in the short distance which separates Habib Killa from Kushi is surely in itself prohibitory of all thought of a railway beyond Kurram.

"7. The above features indicate enormous difficulties for those who may have to provide such continued transport of munitions of war and food supply, as the advance of an army by this route would imply.

"8. Unless a transport train far more extensive and more efficiently organized than any we have seen in the last campaign, were available for him, a commander who would advance to Kabul by this line would find enormous difficulties in his way, for, having expended the limited number of days' supply he could hope to carry with him, he must, of necessity, become dependent on the means of some other column operating either by the Ghazni or by the Jellalabad road. This would have been General Roberts' condition had he been called upon to advance in March or April last. With a thoroughly friendly Afghanistan, and with supplies prepared at Kabul, such a movement might be made by the line on to the Bamian Pass, as would prohibit the use of it to troops advancing from the Oxus. The base in Kurram must be abandoned, and the operation becomes more that of a flying column than that of an army acting on an independent and an assured line of communications.

operating from Kurram towards Kabul would have found itself, had we been called upon to advance by that line in March or April 1879.

4. In September—October 1879, General Roberts was called upon to advance upon Kabul over the Shuturgardan, and his operations have been carried out under the exact

conditions anticipated by me, as applying to the preceding campaign. For as he passed over the Shuturgardan, and advanced towards Kabul, his communications could not be maintained, and the posts established on the Shuturgardan were attacked by Ghilzais and others, as was that at Ali Khel subsequently,

5. Sir F. Robert's communications were re-established temporarily by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, sent back from Kabul, by which means the last of the troops destined for the column and the last convoy were enabled to join the Kabul force. Since that, there has been no communication by the Kurram line, and the supply of the Kabul force has been entirely dependent on local resources, or on the Khyber line. Sir F. Roberts' force in fact became a flying column without any assured communications with India, until the Khyber was opened.

6. I do not in any way wish to detract from the value of a strong force located in the Kurram valley as a means of controlling Kabul. By such a force at a most critical period, we were enabled to take Kabul by a *coup de main*, and to maintain ourselves there until the Khyber route was opened. Since that time we have had in Kurram a large force, which has virtually been in a *cul de sac*, contributing in no sense towards the success of the main operations in the neighbourhood of Ghazni and Kabul. As yet we know, of a certainty, of no outlet by which we may be enabled to turn the Shuturgardan. There are reports of two passes giving out by Girdez and Kosein, but how far these may prove more practicable than the Shuturgardan, exploration alone will show; moreover, they are in Khost, and not available unless we occupy that province.

7. The line of communication between Kohat and Kurram is essentially weak, requiring strong posts at short intervals, and even these subject to continual raids, and a large number of troops is required to meet these demands. So much is this the case that Major-General Watson, with a force of 8,000 men under his command, cannot hold his communications and, at the same time, operate even with a light column, upon the crest of the Shuturgardan. The whole line is menaced by hostile and predatory tribes, so situated as to be able to bring pressure to bear with effect on almost any point of it they may desire. The Kurram river, fordable at almost any part, gives them facility for their guerilla operations.

8. I agree with His Excellency the Viceroy* in thinking that a light rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal would vastly improve the state of things in Kurram, but, even with that aid, a good and safe communication with Kabul open all the year round remains, according to our knowledge of to-day, unattained.

* The Earl of Lytton.

9. I cannot affirm that the valley of Kurram affords altogether healthy sites for the occupation of troops, the lower part of the valley is distinctly unhealthy, both for Europeans and Natives; Thull, an obligatory post, is especially so. The Peiwar Kotal gives every promise of affording healthy sites for stations.

10. I quite admit that the Khyber has many drawbacks; no place in Kurram is so unhealthy as Ali Masjid has been found to be; Lundi Kotal is not as favourable to health as we expected to find it; Jellalabad would probably be totally unsuited for troops in the hot weather. Gandamak and the slopes of the Safed Koh would, no doubt, afford sites equally good with those to be found on the Peiwar Kotal, but we shall probably not be allowed to occupy these, however desirable it might be from a military point of view.

11. Whatever our frontier of the future may be, there can be but little doubt that the problem we had to solve last September will be presented afresh some day to our successors, and I am inclined to think that it will be found then, as we have found it in our day, that whatever may be done from the Kurram line, in the first instance, the Khyber will be the main line of operations in the end, for, with all its drawbacks, it has the merit of being open all the year round and available for wheeled traffic.

12. On these grounds I think it necessary to maintain a strong position in advance of the Khyber. If we can trust the Khyber section of the road to tribal guards it will greatly lighten our task.

13. I propose to raise the question of the readjustment of the Peshawur cantonment and garrison on the selection of a site for the railway station. This is a most important element in the defence of the place, and I think the matter should be referred to the Permanent Defence Committee.

14. Perhaps the value of our early operations in Kurram (great as it really was) was somewhat overrated, as balanced with that assigned to the capture of Ali Masjid and our subsequent advance on Dakka and Jellalabad; and a somewhat fictitious value may for a time have been assigned to this route, as a line of operations against Kabul. But, in considering the question of the final withdrawal from Kurram, and our assumption of the responsibility of maintaining the independence of the Turi tribes, I wish to point out the two salient military features which have given value to the hold we have maintained of the valley. First, the power of delivering a sudden blow to Kabul. Secondly, the strong and dominating position afforded to those who hold the Peiwar Kotal.

15. The first has stood us in good stead in the early days of the second phase of the Afghan War, when General Roberts was enabled to capture Kabul almost by a *coup de main*. But, as a line of military communications, experience has condemned it, and I abandon it as such without the slightest regret.

16. The second point affects our recognition of the independence of the Turis, and our determination to maintain it under certain conditions.

17. I am not sure that in order to carry out this guarantee it may not be necessary to maintain a force, for a time at least, in the neighbourhood of Thull, for otherwise nature seems to me to decree that the Turis should fall under the government of the power which holds military possession of the Peiwar Kotal.

18. The garrison of the Kotal would naturally draw its supplies from the valley, and in the valley the garrison would naturally seek a winter residence.

19. To garrison the Kotal merely for the purpose of assuring the independence of the Turis would be an intolerable burden to us, as it would entail the same long line of communications which we have found to be so onerous throughout the operations in the two phases of the war, and so wasteful of human and animal life.

20. The day will probably come when the Turis, influenced by the close relations which must spring up between them and the garrison of the Peiwar Kotal, will gravitate towards Kabul, as the Jajis have already done. Their relations with those

who hold the Peiwar must of necessity be far more intimate than any we could establish or maintain with them from Thull, Kohat, or Bunnu, in spite of religious animosities, or the recollection of the previous grinding oppression of the Barakzaies.

21. I would repeat here what I have often previously affirmed, that Kurram without Khost could give us but an unsatisfactory frontier at best.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

Simla, 7th September 1880.

Enclosure 13 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th September 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Major-General WATSON, Kurram.

IN regard to a Governor, we are quite willing to consider any proposal that is practicable, acceptable to majority of tribe, and consistent with withdrawal of our troops from valley before long. If you wish to submit such proposal, you have discretion to postpone the announcement ordered by my telegram, 28th August, which need not, in any case, be formal proclamation, but should be communicated to Turis after discussion and explanation. Reply early as to postponement.

Enclosure 14 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

11th September 1880. Your telegram of 7th September. I have not yet issued formal proclamation to Turis, but have assured them of the Government guarantee to maintain their independence of Kabul. There is no one here who could be made Governor of the district, but the Punjab Government must know of many men fit for it. Meanwhile, I am endeavouring to ascertain if, by any arrangement, the Turis could carry on without a head of some kind.

Enclosure 15 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

I SHOULD, with Sir F. Roberts, wish to assert that my view of the propriety of the withdrawal from Kabul and from Gandamak is based on the supposition that Kandahar will be held in force. This is the keystone of the whole military situation as modified by our withdrawal from Kabul.

To insure an effective advance from the southward against an enemy in the interior of the country, as contemplated in this despatch, the retention of Kandahar is a necessity.

Further, it appears to me that to ensure the acquisition of some knowledge of the Amir's foreign relations, over which we have so recently asserted some power of control, and to give us some real power of influencing them, we must hold Kandahar.

If we decide all the points referred to in this despatch, without reference to Kandahar, we may some day be told that, when we were engaged in the settlement of our relations with Afghanistan, there was no evidence of our having considered Kandahar of any value.

10th September 1880.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

I CONCUR in the above Minute.

18th September 1880.

(Signed) W. STOKES.

No. 26.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 40.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 30th September 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 191, dated the 24th August last, reporting the evacuation of the city of Kabul by Her Majesty's forces, and your decision to withdraw the British troops from Northern Afghanistan to the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. Of both these measures I have already expressed to your Excellency by telegraph the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government. At the close of the month of July, the political and military situation at Kabul was highly favourable to that early withdrawal from the city and neighbouring districts for which arrangements had been for some time in preparation. In spite of excitement amongst the tribes, which naturally followed from a protracted political crisis, the military supremacy of the British Government was complete and unchallenged; while Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, who, at the close of negotiations, in regard to which I shall address you hereafter, had been recognized as Amir of Kabul, was awaiting our retirement to enter the capital and assume the administration. The decision of your Excellency in Council, under these circumstances, not to delay the movement in consequence of the reverse which was suffered near Kandahar on the 27th July, has been completely justified by the event, the march of the army having, as Her Majesty's Government learned with great satisfaction from your Excellency's telegrams, been accomplished without opposition or untoward incident of any kind.

3. The further question whether the army should be halted for a time at Gandamak, or be at once withdrawn within the Indian frontier, was one which your Excellency in Council properly referred to the judgment of the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces in Northern Afghanistan. The reasons, stated by Sir D. Stewart in his letter of 10th August, in favour of a continuous withdrawal of the troops, were extremely cogent; and as it appeared that the character of the season was such as to render delay above the passes unnecessary, and even inexpedient, on sanitary grounds, your Excellency in Council was at liberty to allow their full weight to the political and military considerations advanced by the General in support of the course which he recommended. Her Majesty's Government have not yet received details of the movement, but, from the tenour of the telegraphic reports, they trust they may infer that it has been effected with no less success than was the march to Gandamak, and without grave sickness amongst the troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 27.

No. 225 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 19th October 1880.

WITH our Secret Despatch, No. 164, dated the 20th July 1880, we forwarded the draft of a letter which Sir D. Stewart had been authorized to deliver to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan after his recognition as Amir, if he should ask for a formal written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position.

2. We have now the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Mr. Griffin, reporting the delivery to the Amir of a translation of this paper.

* No. 440, dated 4th October 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ D. M. STEWART.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 27.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., late Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 440, dated Simla, 4th October 1880.)

YOUR confidential letter, No. 2431 E.P., dated the 20th July 1880, forwarded a draft Memorandum, containing a recognition by the British Government of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, to be presented to His Highness if he appeared anxious to obtain a formal document of this nature.

2. I think it necessary to report, even though late, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, that at the first interview which I had with the Amir at Zimma, His Highness pressed so earnestly for some agreement on the part of the British Government that I considered myself justified, in accordance with the instructions contained in the letter above quoted, to deliver to him a translation of the paper therewith received, duly sealed with the seal of the representative of the British Government in Kabul.

3. This document was intended to form the subject of further discussion with the Amir after he should have perused it at his leisure; but His Highness was apparently satisfied with the paper as it stood, and suggested no alterations, which, in any case, would have been out of place, seeing that the document was not an agreement between two States, but merely a memorandum of obligation granted to the Amir by the British Government.

No. 28.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 45.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 11th November 1880.

IN my Despatch of 21st May, I drew your Excellency's attention to the measures which had been taken by the Government of your predecessor for providing a Government for Kandahar and the adjacent province. I informed your Excellency that while Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of some arguments in favour of the subdivision or disintegration of the kingdom of Afghanistan as established under the rule of the late Amir, Shere Ali, and his father, Dost Mahomed, they also recognize the objections to that policy, and I especially pointed out to your Excellency that it seemed likely to entail the necessity of a permanent military occupation of Kandahar by a British force, a measure to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the strongest objection. Holding these opinions, I requested your Excellency carefully to examine the nature and extent of the engagements which had been entered into with the Wali, Sher Ali Khan, with the view of enabling Her Majesty's Government to determine how far they were of a permanently binding character, or how far it might be possible, consistently with a strict adherence to pledges and engagements to which the honour of Her Majesty had been committed, to reconsider the policy which had been adopted. The events which almost immediately followed your Excellency's assumption of the Government dispensed with the necessity of any detailed inquiry into the engagements which had been entered into with Shere Ali Khan, into the sense in which he regarded them, or into his capacity to maintain himself, with or without our assistance, in the position in which we had placed him.

2. The advance of Ayub Khan from Herat, and the arrival of his advanced guard on the border of the province of Kandahar, were sufficient to detach from their allegiance almost the whole of the Wali's troops, and to cause serious symptoms of disaffection in several districts of the country. The Wali himself, who is described as having been "much depressed," took refuge with the British force, and, neither during the operations which preceded the reverse sustained at Maiwand, nor during the siege of Kandahar, nor in the subsequent movements which led to the complete defeat and dispersion of Ayub Khan's army, has he been able to take any part whatever, or to give the slightest assistance to the British troops. It does not appear in the least probable that his position, difficult as it has been from the outset, as a mere nominee of the Indian Government, and fatally weakened as it must have been by the events of July and August, and his complete helplessness and inaction during that period, can ever be re-established; or that, if restored to the Government, he can ever become anything more than a nominal ruler, absolutely dependent on the support of the British troops. I do not conceive that it can possibly be held that we are any longer bound by any promises of support which have been given to the Wali, or that either our own interests or those of the inhabitants of the country can be served, by the restoration of a Government which possesses no element of strength or permanence. The time appears, therefore, to have arrived when it is possible for the Government to consider the question of the future government of Kandahar, without any reference to arrangements which have already failed, under circumstances which do not invite a repetition of the experiment.

3. Her Majesty's Government see no reason to change the opinion expressed in the Despatch to which I have referred, that any measure which would make necessary a permanent military occupation of Kandahar would be considered by them as open to the gravest objection. I am aware that there are many persons, whose opinion is entitled to much respect, who consider that the events to which I have referred, instead of affording to us a most favourable opportunity of relieving ourselves from onerous and unnecessary engagements, only prove the necessity of adopting as a permanent and settled policy, a measure which was only an incident, possibly temporary in its character, in the arrangement adopted by your predecessor, viz., the military occupation of Kandahar.

4. The arguments on which that opinion is formed are in the main those which have been urged, and which have been controverted, for more than forty years, ever since the question of our relations with Afghanistan have assumed a prominent position in Indian politics. I will not attempt in this Despatch either to repeat them or to summarize them. They have been stated with so much ability and force in numerous State papers that it is impossible to add anything to what has already been said. The question is one on which those who are responsible for the government of India must form their own judgment upon two absolutely conflicting lines of policy, between which there is no room for compromise. It is not contended that there is now, more than in the past, anything in our relations with the tribes on our frontier, or the more powerful tribes which inhabit Kandahar and the surrounding province, which makes it necessary for us to establish a military post or a military protectorate at Kandahar. It is as a measure of defence against some power far more formidable than any Afghan race that the extension of our military frontier is recommended; and it is both as to the existence of such a danger, and as to the expediency of this mode of resisting it, if it does exist, that it is deprecated.

5. Her Majesty's Government, sharing the opinions of some of the most eminent Indian statesmen of past and present times, and, up to a very recent date, of every Minister of the Crown responsible for Indian policy, consider that there exists no such danger or apprehension of danger to the security of India from possible foreign invasion as would justify the Government in taking measures which must certainly lead immediately to very heavy additions to their large military expenditure, which will cause a constant strain on the organization of the Native Army, and which will almost certainly involve us in future complications and difficulties, the nature of which it is easy to anticipate, though their exact form cannot be predicted. They are of opinion that recent experience has done nothing to strengthen the arguments of those who desire, as a military measure, to advance the Indian frontier, and much to verify the forebodings of those who were opposed to that policy. The advances of the Russian frontier which have taken place in recent years were foreseen, and their influence upon our position in India was deliberately considered, by Lord Lawrence

and other Indian statesmen, on whose advice the Home Government repeatedly declined to permit itself to be committed to a policy of military extension. Those advances, although they have been continuous and steady, have not been effected without great difficulties, both of a military and administrative character. They have secured to Russia no position of formidable strength; they have added nothing to her military resources; and they have been and are still attended by all the disadvantages which had been anticipated, as the result of an indefinite extension of her military position in an unproductive region inhabited by uncivilized and hostile tribes.

6. Her Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the mere fact of the existence of Russian military positions some hundred miles nearer to the North-Western frontier of India constitutes in itself any cause for anxiety, or for apprehending the possibility of an invasion of India from that quarter. On the other hand, the consequences of any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan have been precisely those which had been foreseen and apprehended by the opponents of this policy. It has been proved that there existed no organized military power in Afghanistan which could resist the advance of the British army, or prevent the occupation of any position in that country. But the difficulties of permanent occupation, or of supporting by a military force any Government imposed on the people by the British power, have been exemplified to the fullest extent. The large force which recently occupied Kabul and the neighbouring country, and the line of communication through the Khyber Pass, was found to be barely sufficient to enforce the administration of a temporary government over a comparatively small portion of the country. The experiment of supporting a Native Government by military assistance at Kandahar has been found to entail equally onerous sacrifices, and it has been, in fact, so far discredited that most of those who still desire the maintenance of direct British influence in that quarter openly advocate its annexation and administration by the Government of India. It must be remembered, when the annexation of Kandahar is advocated on account of its strategic importance, that it is not merely a question of the occupation of that position. The boundaries of the province over which it was intended Sher Ali should rule have never been defined, but it is clear that the extent of territory which must be governed by any authority which may be established at Kandahar must be very large. Unless the districts which extend in one direction towards the dominions of the Amir of Kabul, and in others towards Persia and Herat, be reduced under some settled form of Government, the power which occupies Kandahar must be involved in continual embarrassments and complications on every side. The occupation of Kandahar, would, therefore, certainly involve the administration and the military occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the one side, Farah on the other, and an undefined territory in the direction of Herat.

Your Excellency's military advisers would be able to form a more precise estimate of the force which would be required permanently to hold these positions, with their lines of communication, and to provide an adequate reserve; but I conceive that recent events have proved that it would not be safe to estimate that less than 20,000 men would be required for this purpose.

7. But it is not only on the ground of its risk and costliness that Her Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to this policy. The expedition against the late Amir Sher Ali was undertaken with the object of punishing an act committed by him, which was held to be of an unfriendly and even insulting character. It was expressly declared that the British Government had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. It is true that the Afghans have, notwithstanding these assurances, resisted the advance of our forces, and, in accordance with their semi-barbarous character, have frequently committed acts of cruelty and treachery totally inconsistent with the usages of civilized nations in war, even in the defence of their own country. But Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that such acts,—acts which must have been anticipated when the invasion was undertaken,—release them from the declarations which were made. They hold that nothing but the most imperative necessity of self-preservation would justify them after such declarations in the annexation, against the will of the people, of Afghan territory. Attempts have been made to prove that the rule of the British Government would be willingly accepted by the inhabitants of Kandahar; but it is admitted by almost all those who are most competent to form an opinion, that the mass of the inhabitants of the territory which it would be necessary to annex would be bitterly opposed to the loss of their independence, and to the Government of a power alien in race and religion.

8. Apprehensions are entertained by some that the retirement from Kandahar would be regarded by the people of Afghanistan and of India as a confession of weakness, and such a result may be one of the inevitable results of a policy which Her Majesty's present advisers have from the outset deplored. But in their opinion, the moral effect of a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and a striking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of India that the British Government have no desire for further annexation of territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect in removing the apprehensions and strengthening the attachment of our Native allies throughout India and on our frontiers.

9. Others, again, who have never shared the apprehensions which are entertained as to the military weakness of the Indian frontier, who would have done everything in their power to avert the late war, and who perhaps even now do not attach a high importance to the position of Kandahar, nevertheless deprecate its abandonment, because its possession or military occupation might satisfy those who are now disposed to apprehend danger from foreign invasion, and might prevent the recurrence of popular excitement on this subject both in India and at home. The Government are convinced of the grave evils which result from this cause, and from its tendency to distract the minds of those who are engaged in the administration of the Government of India from the important questions of internal policy, of finance, of the construction of necessary public works, and, above all, of the agrarian condition of the people, which are so closely connected with the prosperity, and even the security, of our Indian empire. Nor can they feel any confidence that the experience which has been gained during the last two years will have any more lasting effect than that which had been acquired 40 years ago, or that a similar combination of circumstances may not again lead the Government of India into a similar policy and be attended with similar results. Any means, therefore, which could reasonably be expected to lay to rest these apprehensions would have a great attraction for Her Majesty's Government.

10. But they cannot believe that the measure which is now advocated would really satisfy the demands of those who propose it. They are inclined rather to believe that it would only be the first step towards still more extensive enterprise. In the Despatch of your predecessor's Government of the 7th July 1879, they said, in discussing the question of the retention of Kandahar, "The local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence, much more extensive than any we now require or have ever contemplated." Whether this be an accurate statement of the strategic value of Kandahar or not, it cannot, I think, be doubted that its acquisition as a permanent military post would quickly be followed by fresh apprehensions as to its security, and further demands for the completion of a system of defence of which it would be represented to constitute only a part.

11. Although Her Majesty's Government have been influenced in the decision at which they have arrived, mainly by considerations of a broad political character, they are not insensible to the weight of the military opinions which attach great importance to the value of Kandahar as a strategic position. For the reasons I have indicated they do not consider the question of the military defence of the frontier against invasion by a formidable power, as an urgent one, but admitting its possible importance at some future time, they are of opinion that the military occupation of Kandahar, should it ever become necessary for the defence of the Indian empire, would be far more advantageously undertaken when an advance of some hostile power should have made it clear that not only the safety of India but the independence of Afghanistan is threatened. Whatever strategic advantages may be looked for from the occupation of Kandahar, they must be immensely increased by its occupation with the assent and good will of the Afghan people, as a measure needful, not only for the defence of our own dominions, but for the protection of their independence. If the Afghans have ever been disposed to look with more friendship on either their Russian or Persian than their British neighbour, it is not an unnatural result of the fear for the loss of their freedom which our past policy has been calculated to inspire. There is nothing in the character of the Afghan people which would lead to the belief that they would welcome invasion or subjection by any power whatever, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government not unreasonable to hope that a policy of complete withdrawal from Afghan territory, coupled with a steady abstinence from interference in their internal affairs, adopted after the signal vindication of our military superiority, will, if

publicly announced and steadily adhered to, have the effect of converting these semi-civilized but brave tribes into useful allies of the British power.

12. These are some of the considerations by which Her Majesty's Government desire that your Excellency in Council should be guided in the policy now to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan. They regret that it has not hitherto appeared possible to withdraw the troops immediately from Kandahar, not only because the occupation must involve the continuance of a heavy military expenditure, but because they apprehend that, so long as it is maintained, local disturbances or renewed hostile combinations may make ultimate retirement more difficult than it would have been during the present temporary condition of tranquillity which has followed the total defeat of Ayub Khan.

They, however, desire that your Excellency should steadily keep in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion.

They recognize that it is as desirable in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan to assist, if this be found possible in a limited time, in the establishment of some settled Government in the place of that which has been destroyed by the events of the recent campaign.

The restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan under a powerful ruler would be the arrangement which Her Majesty's Government would prefer, as offering the best guarantees for permanence, and for the avoidance of internal dissensions. That solution would also probably be the only one which would enable the Amir of Kabul to establish his authority at Herat, and thus prevent the constant intrigues and conflicts for the possession of that place which, in the present disorganized condition of Afghanistan, appear inevitable. But it appears doubtful whether the position of Abdul Rahman is yet sufficiently established to enable him to assume the government of Kandahar, nor do I possess sufficient information to be able to judge whether the people of that province are prepared generally to accept his authority.

13. If it should appear impossible at present to reunite Afghanistan under the rule of the Amir Abdul Rahman, an endeavour should be made to ascertain under what form, temporary or permanent, and under which of the Sirdars, provision may be made for the restoration of Native government. In any event, Her Majesty's Government consider it essential that, as in the case of Kabul, having assisted in the establishment of that form of government which appears to offer the best prospects of permanence, and to be most in conformity with the wishes of the people, the Government of India should make it clearly understood that the future ruler should be left to rely on his own resources, and that it is not their intention to interfere further in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of Her Majesty's forces beyond the frontier.

14. The mission of Mr. Lyall to Kandahar, and the information which your Excellency has at your disposal, will enable you to form a more accurate judgment on the details of the policy to be adopted than can possibly be in my power. These, as well as the time for the final withdrawal of the troops from Afghan territory, Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to the decision of your Excellency in Council; but I have felt it my duty to place on record, for the information of your Excellency, in the plainest and strongest terms, the opinions which they entertain on the important question at issue, and the expression of the disapprobation with which they would view any measure involving the permanent occupation of Kandahar by British troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 29.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, dated 12th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

WALL sent to Lyall, Kandahar, following letter, addressed to Viceroy. *Abbreviation begins.* I have understood from conversations here that arrangements for affairs of this country, after recent events, are still undetermined, and may require some time for settlement. The British Government is, of course, entitled to act upon its own interests. I agree, under any circumstances, with any views British Government may entertain regarding future arrangements, but from my knowledge of the people I fear lest, during present uncertainty, they may do evil which may, by displeasing British Government, ruin me; therefore, with permission of Government, I, with

family, will proceed to Kurrachee, which also is British territory. If, in future arrangements, my services are required, I shall be ready there, but if other arrangements are made British Government can act as it pleases. I shall be always its sincere friend.
Letter ends.

No. 30.

No. 233 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 16th November 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 208, dated the 14th September 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the papers noted in the accompanying abstract of contents, regarding the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) J. STRACHEY.
,, C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, No. 3299 E.-P., dated 1st October 1880.

From OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan.

MILITARY Department represent importance of very early evacuation of Kuram Valley in connection with question of supplying winter clothing for troops. What is your opinion as to earliest date on which movement could begin consistently with due regard for our political interests and obligations? Is there any present likelihood of the Turis coming to a settlement, and if not, do you see any strong objection to retirement of our troops before definite arrangements have been made for government of tribe?

Please answer very early.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM dated 2nd October 1880.

From GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan, to FOREIGN UNDER-SECRETARY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of yesterday. I know of no reason for keeping troops any longer in Kuram. I understand that we have no political interest in the valley, and with regard to our obligations to the Turis, as Government declines to give them a Governor, and they cannot elect one for themselves, I will divide the country into districts under leading maliks, giving each set one of our forts for their protection. Districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will all unite to resist a common enemy. I will now issue the Proclamation forwarded under your telegram of 28th August. Can you send me some printed copies? Turis attach great importance to this, and if widely circulated, the Kabul Government will know that we are in earnest. These arrangements can be made in a few days.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October 1880.

From OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Lieutenant Governor's Camp, Punjab.

It has been determined, on military grounds, to evacuate Kurram with the least possible delay. Announcement will be made to Turis that we recognize their inde-

pendence, and will maintain it against Kabul. No Governor will be appointed, and they will be left to make their own arrangements for internal administration and protection against neighbouring independent tribes. Evacuation expected to begin 15th. Amir has been told he can have Khost. Please arrange with Watson for any necessary rectification of boundaries.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October, 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I HELD a durbar this afternoon, and read Government Proclamation to Turis. We have united the hitherto hostile factions under their respective leaders, Badshah Gul and Mir Muhammad Khan, and, by the voice of the people, these two men are appointed to administer the general affairs of the country. Arrangements for local and district management progressing. Full report will be shortly submitted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Shalozan. (No. 3338 E. P., dated Simla, 7th October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 2nd October, regarding the proposed evacuation of the Kurram valley.

2. As there is no prospect of the Turi tribe electing a Governor, you propose to divide the Turi country into districts under leading maliks. These districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will unite against a common enemy. The necessary arrangements can, you think, be made in a few days, and you therefore see no reason for prolonging the military occupation of the valley.

3. I am to say that the Governor General in Council, under the circumstances stated in your communications, accepts your proposals, and that the troops under your command will very shortly be withdrawn to the British border. In the meantime it is desirable that you should assemble the representatives of the Turi tribe, and announce to them the final intentions of the British Government regarding their future position. It is unnecessary to give you detailed instructions upon this point, as the enclosed copies of a proclamation to the Turis, which are sent at your request, sufficiently indicate the views of Government. But I am to observe that the Governor General in Council would be disposed to issue no written proclamation on the subject if it were not for the fact that you appear to consider the measure an important one; and you are authorized, if you think there would be no serious objection, to retain the written proclamation now sent you, substituting for it a verbal announcement to the Turi Maliks. This matter the Governor General in Council leaves to your discretion.

4. In conclusion, I am to say that the Turis should be warned to do nothing which might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachments.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

PROCLAMATION issued to the MALIKS and PEOPLE of the TURI TRIBE in Kurram.

I, Major-General John Watson, commanding the British troops in the Kurram valley, am instructed to announce to the maliks and people of the Turi tribe that the British Government intends to withdraw its forces very shortly across the border.

Under these circumstances, it has become necessary to make some arrangement for the future administration of the district, and the matter has been considered with an earnest desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the people. The British Government understands that the Turi tribe desire their country to be made independent. Consequently, I have now to announce that the British Government recognizes their independence, and, so long as the Turis desire it, will regard their country as having no connection with the Amir of Kabul.

Regarding the internal administration of the district and its protection against neighbouring independent tribes, the British Government does not wish to interfere, and the Turis will be left free to make their own arrangements. In this matter also the British Government believes that it is consulting the interests of the tribe.

In return for its recognition and support the British Government requires that the Turi tribe shall conform in all respects to any advice which may be given them at any time on behalf of that Government.

JOHN WATSON, Major-General.

Enclosure 7 in No. 30.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 1508, dated Lahore, 6th October 1880.)

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3198 P., dated 18th September, asking for the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor on the proposal to place a Governor over the Turis of the Kurram valley.

2. The Lieutenant Governor understands that the Government is under a pledge to protect the Turis from interference from Kabul, but not to preserve them from internal dissensions, nor to protect them from predatory tribes in their vicinity. Sir Robert Egerton considers that one of the main objects to be kept in view is to avoid holding Kurram with a military force. If a Governor is nominated by the British Government, it is more than probable that at no distant period of time we shall be called upon to support him against his own people, or against his neighbours, or the Kabul Government. It is certain that no Punjab chief or noble would accept the governorship, unless he were assured that the Government was prepared to render him substantial support in such contingencies. Without such a guarantee the Lieutenant Governor does not know of any one to whom it would be possible to make over the governorship with any hope of success. Even if any chief or Native gentleman of distinction were induced to accept the offer, on the understanding that he must stand or fall on his own responsibility and on his own resources, it would be hardly possible, on the grounds of friendship, to refuse assistance to him, if he became hard pressed. For these reasons, Sir Robert Egerton considers it unadvisable to appoint a Governor at all. His Honour would give the Turis their independence, making them understand plainly that interference from Kabul is the only contingency under which the British Government is prepared to render them assistance. We should thus incur liability only in one event, instead of three, any one of which might occur if a Governor were appointed.

3. In expressing this opinion, Sir Robert Egerton is well aware that the position of the Turis is one of some difficulty. They are surrounded by tribes who are independent, and some of whom are only too ready to harass them; but it is by no means certain that they cannot create a good government of their own if they desire to do so; and, at all events, it will be quite possible, if at any future time necessity arises for forcible interference in their affairs, to render such support as circumstances may indicate, without, in the first instance, committing the Government to a policy which would most probably render such interference obligatory.

4. The Lieutenant Governor has omitted the consideration of another alternative which has been discussed in previous correspondence, namely, to include the Kurram valley in British territory, and bring it under British administration, because he understands that the only proposal under consideration is to appoint a Governor over the Turis. For the reasons above stated, the Lieutenant Governor is unable to recommend such an appointment being made.

Enclosure 8 in No. 30.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Kurram, 14th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to enclose a detailed report of the final arrangements made with the Turi and Bungesh tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

CONTENTS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	1880. 3 Jan.	Proposed assurance to Sirdar Shere Ali of Kandahar.	1
2	Letter	Government of India	" -	7 " (No. 2.)	Review of circumstances connected with the massacre of the British Mission at Kabul.	1
3	"	"	" -	7 Jan. (No. 3.)	Policy to be adopted in reference to Afghanistan.	4
4	Telegram	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	8 Jan.	Assurance to be given to Sirdar Shere Ali of Kandahar.	8
5	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	11 Feb.	Report of passage of the Oxus by Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	8
6	"	" - -	" -	3 March	Political arrangements at Kandahar.	9
7	"	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	4 "	Approving the above - -	9
8	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	14 "	Proposed recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman as ruler of Northern Afghanistan.	9
9	"	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	15 "	Conditionally approving the above.	9
10	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	17 "	Movements of Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	9
11	Letter	Government of India (with 6 enclosures.)	" -	31 " (No. 81.)	Recognition of Sirdar Shere Ali as Wali of Kandahar.	9
12	"	Government of India (with 3 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	7 April (No. 90.)	Policy of the Government of India in Afghanistan.	14
12A	"	Mr. Griffin -	Sir F. Roberts -	15 April	Durbar at Kabul on the 13th April 1880.	16
13	"	Government of India (with 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	27 April (No. 93.)	Kandahar Diary, 15th March 1880.	20
14	"	Government of India (with 4 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	4 May (No. 104.)	Correspondence with Sirdar Abdul Rahman. Instructions to Mr. Griffin.	22
14A	"	Mr. Griffin -	Sir D. Stewart -	8 May	Date of Evacuation of Kabul -	28
15	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	21 May (No. 23.)	Policy of Her Majesty's Government in reference to Afghanistan.	29
16	Letter	Government of India (with 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	15 June (No. 131.)	Kandahar Diary, 11th May 1880. Delivery of the Viceroy's letter to Wali Shere Ali.	34
17	"	Government of India (with 2 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	15 June (No. 134.)	Reply of Wali Shere Ali to the Viceroy's letter.	35
18	"	Government of India (with 2 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	—	Instructions to General Sir D. Stewart in reference to the political situation at Kabul.	37
19	"	Government of India	Secretary of State -	27 July (No. 166.)	Recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman as Amir of Kabul. Review of negotiations.	40

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page
20	Correspondence between Mr. Lepel Griffin and Sirdar Abdul Rahman			1880.	- - -	46
20A	Letter	Mr. Griffin -	Sir D. Stewart -	4 Aug.	Interview with Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	51
21	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	5 "	Recommendation of Sir D. Stewart for evacuation of Kabul.	53
22	"	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	6 "	Approving evacuation of Kabul.	53
23	Letter	Government of India (With 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	24 " (No. 191.)	Proposal of Sir D. Stewart for continuous withdrawal from Northern Afghanistan.	54
24	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	3 Sept.	Permission to Sirdar Abdul Rahman to occupy the Hariob District of the Kuram Valley.	56
25	Letter	Government of India (With 15 enclosures.)	"	14 " (No. 208.)	Withdrawal from the Khyber Pass and Kuram Valley. Future government of the Turi Tribe.	56
26	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	30 Sept. (No. 40.)	Approving evacuation of Kabul and Northern Afghanistan.	88
27	Letter	Government of India (With 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	19 Oct. (No. 225.)	Delivery to Amir Abdul Rahman of a letter defining his political position.	88
28	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	11 Nov. (No. 45.)	Policy of Her Majesty's Government in reference to Kandahar.	89
29	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	12 Nov.	Proposal of the Wali of Kandahar to retire to Karachi.	93
30	Letter	Government of India (With 11 enclosures.)	"	16 " (No. 233.)	Arrangements for future government of the Turi Tribe.	94
31	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	17 Nov.	Acceptance of retirement of Wali of Kandahar.	103
32	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	19 " (No. 46.)	Approving arrangements in reference to the Khyber Pass and Kuram Valley.	103
33	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	30 Nov.	Intended departure of the Wali of Kandahar.	104
34	"	" - -	"	" "	Public announcement of the above.	104
35	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	3 Dec. (No. 48.)	Review of negotiations with Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	105
36	"	"	"	17 Dec. (No. 53.)	Approving final arrangements for government of the Turi Tribe.	107
37	Telegram	President in Council.	Secretary of State -	29 Dec.	Arrival of Sirdar Shere Ali at Karachi.	107

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd January 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING from Stewart, 1st. Begins :—Effect of Kabul disturbances begins to be felt here. Another Ghazee yesterday. Seditious meetings in mosques last two nights. Sirdar alarmed, and has twice asked permission to send his family to India. Please remember I have nothing to offer him but vague assurances, and cannot even promise our friend that we do not intend to abandon Kandahar again. Ends.

I consider it is now necessary to give Sirdar confidential but precise assurance, that if he behave well, Kandahar will be placed under his hereditary government, supported by us, in order to secure him to our interest, and detach him permanently from other influence, which may increase through his uncertainty of our intentions.

No. 2.

No. 2 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

IN our letter, No. 160, of the 7th July last, we reviewed the course of events which preceded the signature of the treaty concluded at Gandamak with the Amir Yakub Khan. We explained the objects and reasons of this treaty, and stated the grounds upon which we considered ourselves justified in regarding it as an advantageous resettlement of our relations with Afghanistan. We drew attention, at the same time, to contingencies which might affect the character and permanence of the relations thus established; observing that the practical value of the treaty mainly depended upon the conduct or disposition of the Amir himself; that a settlement effected under the most favourable conditions, and with the most promising prospects, might be impaired by the disloyalty of Afghan princes; and that, for these reasons, we had been careful to render our position substantially independent of the caprices of any Afghan ruler, by securing permanent command of the main avenues from India into Afghanistan. But we thought, and still think, that the arrangements entered into with Yakub Khan at Gandamak were the best that could then be made; we believe that, at the time, the treaty was regarded by the Amir, and his best advisers, as a satisfactory conclusion of hostilities; and, even if an advance on Kabul had, in these circumstances, been justifiable, the serious inexpediency of it has, we think, been sufficiently proved by the political disorganization which has ensued from the unsought, and unavoidable, renewal of hostilities.

2. On the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir returned to Kabul, accompanied by his Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, his Commander-in-Chief, General Daud Shah, and a Native Agent in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, named Bakhtiar Khan, who was entrusted with the duty of making preparations for the reception of the British Mission. As already reported to your Lordship, the Amir had at no time evinced reluctance to the subordination of his foreign relations to British control, as a necessary condition of British protection. This claim, with the subsidiary one requiring him to admit British officers to reside at certain places, not specified, within his territories, the Amir had accepted unhesitatingly. When these two conditions were proposed to His Highness in reply to his overtures for the cessation of hostilities, and for the renewal of friendship, he characterized the former as "a good and proper" proposal, in conformity with friendship, leaving "no room for discussion or refusal."

To the second condition the Amir added only the qualification that the British officer should reside at Kabul, under his immediate protection; and during subsequent negotiations the Amir's language certainly conveyed the impression that he admitted the presence of a British Envoy at his capital to be, on the whole, the best means of giving practical effect and recognition to the alliance between the two Governments. It had not been our intention to propose Kabul for the residence of our representative; but, when the capital was thus expressly selected by the Amir himself, there were many motives for deferring to the choice of His Highness, and there was no tenable ground for opposing it. If the Amir felt reluctance to the establishment of a British Embassy at Kabul, he certainly exhibited no sign of it, he raised no difficulties, he suggested no impediments, and while strenuously combating some clauses of the treaty he expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to receive the Envoy, nor any mistrust of his power to protect him.

3. In these circumstances, we deemed it desirable that the British Resident should proceed without delay to take up his appointment at Kabul. Assuming the Amir to be dealing with us in good faith, the advantage to both parties of early action under the treaty was incontestable, while hesitation or inactivity appeared likely to operate adversely not only to our own interests, but to those of the Amir. This view of the situation was strengthened by reports received from Bakhtiar Khan, whose letters warned Sir L. Cavagnari that the party opposed to the British alliance were making open endeavours to neutralize the effect of our recent successes, and to render the Amir averse to a liberal treatment of those persons in whose interests the amnesty clause had been framed, and in whose protection the honour of the British Government was specially concerned. The Amir himself had expressed to Bakhtiar Khan his desire for an early meeting with Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the impression produced by these letters and messages was that the mission should be organized as speedily as possible, and that it should proceed to Kabul without loss of time. This was undoubtedly the view of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was at the time at Simla, and whose opinion on such a point necessarily carried great weight.

4. The constitution of the Envoy's staff, and of his escort, was carefully considered with Sir Louis Cavagnari at Simla. A strong military escort had been attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission; but the duties which this escort was intended to perform, and the contingencies against which it was meant to provide, were of a wholly different character. Sir Neville Chamberlain, carrying with him valuable gifts for Sher Ali, was about to enter the country of predatory and probably hostile tribes, while the disposition of the Kabul Government toward his mission was very uncertain. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on the other hand, entered Afghan territory under the safe conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, who had recently been a guest in our own camp. Moreover, the strength of Sir Neville Chamberlain's escort, although, for the reasons above mentioned, it was in our opinion absolutely requisite, had furnished the late Amir with a pretext for attributing an unfriendly purpose to the mission which that escort accompanied. It had also been criticised by others, on the ground that, whilst too great for an escort, it was too small for an army, and calculated to provoke an opposition which no mere escort could overcome. Such criticism, though inapplicable to the conditions of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission, would have been relevant to those which the Government of India had to consider in connection with the Embassy of Sir Louis Cavagnari. If our original plan of placing British officers at some points in Afghanistan, other than the capital, had not been overruled by the Amir's express stipulation regarding Kabul, it might have been expedient to attach to the Envoy a force that would have rendered him independent of the Afghan Government for protection against sudden attacks of local outbreaks. But Sir L. Cavagnari went, at the special desire of the Amir, to reside at the capital of the Amir's country, within the Amir's own stronghold, and in the closest proximity to the Amir's own residence. It was well known that the Bala Hissar was always occupied by the household troops upon whom the actual ruler believed he could best rely; and it was recollected that, at previous periods of extreme anarchy and revolt, the fort had afforded a secure refuge to those officers who succeeded in reaching it. To have required the Amir to entertain within the Bala Hissar a British escort sufficient for ensuring the safety of the Envoy in all eventualities, or to have demanded that these troops should be allowed to occupy an entrenched position within the Amir's own fortifications, would have been inconsistent with the whole character of the relations which Sir Louis Cavagnari's embassy represented; and compliance with such a demand would have relieved the Amir from the greater part of the responsibility

which his treaty guarantees had solemnly affirmed. It is probable, indeed, that a force of this strength and character would not have been admitted within the fortress; while the objections against placing our Embassy, thus guarded, upon the confines of the city, would have been found to be very serious. All experience shows that in such situations the risk of collisions and misunderstandings is multiplied in proportion to the number of British soldiers and camp followers that are brought into contact with an armed and excitable population. The dangers to which Sir L. Cavagnari considered himself and those who accompanied him most liable were those of assassination by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort and those of the Amir; and he was therefore personally desirous that his staff and escort should be reduced to the most moderate and manageable dimensions. In accordance with these considerations, the Envoy's suit was restricted to a Secretary (Mr. Jenkyns), a Medical Officer (Dr. Kelly), and a Military Attaché (Lieutenant Hamilton) in charge of a carefully picked escort of 25 cavalry and 50 infantry of the Guide Corps.

5. Sir Louis started for Kabul from the British frontier at Thull on the 14th July, and entered that capital on the 24th of the same month. He was received beyond the Shutargardan pass by the Amir's Ministers and troops, treated with distinguished attention along the route, and conducted to the Court of His Highness with every possible demonstration of honour and respect, as a welcome guest. The unfortunate death of Bakhtiar Khan, who died suddenly, just before the arrival of the Envoy, had closed a valuable channel of information regarding intrigues or movements below the surface. So far, however, as the disposition of the Amir and his chief officers could be judged from their public acts, such as, for instance, their dismissal of the Russian Envoy, and their compliance with various minor requests and suggestions, it betrayed no tendency towards reaction against the British alliance. The letters and telegrams of the Envoy mentioned the disorderly and mutinous behaviour of some regiments recently arrived at Kabul from Herat, but expressed confidence in the Amir's determination and ability to remove or overcome any danger arising from the disaffection of the soldiery. There had been a dispute in the bazaar between some men of the British escort and some of these troops from Herat, but this had been settled to the satisfaction of Sir Louis Cavagnari; the regiments from Herat were being paid off and dismissed to their homes, and the uneasiness caused by their presence and conduct at the capital appeared, from later news, to be passing away. The principal difficulties anticipated by our Envoy arose from the opposition of Sirdar Yahia Khan, the Amir's father-in-law, who had great influence with the Amir, and from the general discontent created throughout the country by the maladministration and oppression of the late Kabul Government, from which all classes hoped to obtain relief through the agency of the British representative. As regards the second article of the Gandamak Treaty, which engaged the Amir to publish a full and complete amnesty, Sir Louis more than once mentioned in his correspondence that the persons it concerned had not been dealt with in a liberal spirit, and that the Amir showed no disposition to treat them with generosity. He added, however, that there had been no actual infringement of the article; that the persons protected by it had been molested neither in person nor in property; and that His Highness had "done nothing and will do nothing" opposed to the letter of the treaty. His last letter (30th August) concluded with the words, "I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." Sir Louis Cavagnari always described the personal relations between himself and the Amir as satisfactory. The Amir had suggested that his proposed visit to the Viceroy should take place in the end of December, and had commenced some preparations for carrying it out. His Highness had given orders to tradesmen for the equipment of his retinue, and many of the later communications from Sir Louis Cavagnari referred to the details of the forthcoming visit. The last personal telegram addressed by Sir Louis to the Viceroy was on this subject. That telegram was dated the 2nd September, and it concluded with the words "all well."

6. On the 3rd of September the British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three regiments, called the Ordal regiments, who had come to the Pay Office in the Bala Hissar to receive arrears of pay. These regiments, it is understood, were the Amir's household troops, composed of men picked from the whole army, and principally, it is said, recruited from the Wardak tribe. They were quartered in the Chaman, under the walls of the fort, and on that day had furnished several of the guards in the Bala Hissar. Two of these three regiments broke out into violent mutiny at the Pay Office

on finding that they were not to be paid up in full; and suddenly turned upon the Residency. The mutineers appear to have been joined by men from other regiments and by some of the city populace; they besieged the Residency from all sides in great numbers, the building was set on fire, and its defenders perished after a desperate resistance. The Government of India must lastingly deplore the untimely and irreparable loss of Sir Louis Cavagnari; who, by his life and death, has bequeathed to the service he adorned a splendid example, and to the Empire for whose interests he lived and died the grateful guardianship of his honoured memory and spotless name.

7. The first intelligence of this catastrophe was received on the morning of the 5th of September last; and on the afternoon of the following day General Roberts left Simla under instructions to lose no time in advancing upon Kabul with a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 men. General Massy was instructed to re-occupy the Shutargardan, and General Stewart to re-occupy Kandahar; whilst a force of the same strength was detailed for the re-occupation of Jellalabad, with an efficient reserve of 5,000 men between Rawal Pindi and Peshawur. We need not here recapitulate the results of these measures, which have been reported to your Lordship, as they occurred, in our preceding Political letters. Their practical consequence has been the occupation of Kabul and the re-occupation of Kandahar and Jellalabad, the voluntary abdication of the Amir Yakub Khan and his deportation at his own request to India, and the complete dissolution of the Afghan Government. These events have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and materially altered the situation to which that Treaty had reference.

8. In our accompanying Letter, No. 3, we shall state, and explain, the general principles on which, subject to the approval of them by Her Majesty's Government, we now contemplate the resettlement of our relations with the Afghan people, whenever adequate guarantees for the stability of such a resettlement shall have been thoroughly secured by the successful completion of our present military operations.



We have, &c.,
 (Signed) LYTON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 „ A. CLARKE.
 „ J. STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ W. STOKES.
 „ A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 3.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

1. IN our letter, No. 2, of this day's date, we have reviewed the series of events which, terminating in the occupation of Kabul and the dissolution of Yakub Khan's Government, have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and totally altered the political situation to which that treaty was applied. It now devolves on us to indicate, so far as it is at present possible to do so, the general lines of the policy which, under these altered circumstances, we propose to adopt in pursuance of the object we have kept constantly before us, viz., the safety of the Indian Empire and the permanent tranquillity of our northern frontier.

2. Before proceeding, however, to the consideration of a future Afghan policy, we desire to express our strong conviction that no purely political action is desirable, or can be effective, until all military resistance has been effectually overcome, and the pacification of the country fully completed. We also feel that, owing to the unsettled

character of events now passing in Afghanistan, and our still imperfect knowledge of the changing influences by which, from day to day, they are forcibly affected, any present indication of future policy must necessarily be somewhat conditional and indefinite. In short, we can deal only with the general principles of arrangements, subject, in detail, to such modification as may hereafter be dictated by increased knowledge and experience.

3. The Treaty of Gandamak represented a final endeavour to bring into effect the policy of maintaining on our frontier a strong and independent kingdom with a foreign policy exclusively subordinate to British direction, a national unity relying upon the British Government for support against external aggression, and a commercial system connected with India by a natural community of interests. It had been in the hope of consolidating such an alliance that the British Government aided the Amir Sher Ali with money and arms, and enabled him, by his countenance and diplomatic support, to bring under his sovereignty a larger territory than had ever before been united under the rule of the Barakzais. But Shere Ali's estrangement from our Government increased in proportion to his power, until finally, at a critical moment, he leagued himself with a foreign Power which openly courted his friendship, in furtherance of projects and preparations directed against the Government of India.

4. After the discomfiture and death of Sher Ali, his son made overtures for the restoration of peace and friendship between the two Governments; and, believing, as we still do, that Sher Ali's estrangement arose partially from misunderstandings and other causes, to some extent at least preventible, we did not then abandon the hope that arrangements requisite for the permanent security of the Indian Empire might be reconciled with the maintenance of an independent and united Afghan kingdom under a friendly ruler. The result has disappointed this hope. The Amir Yakub Khan has failed altogether to maintain order even in his own capital, or to prevent the treacherous massacre of the British Embassy. The kingdom, laboriously recovered by Sher Ali, has fallen to pieces at the first blow; and it would now be a difficult if not impracticable task, even were it politically desirable, to reunite these fragments under any single ruler.

5. It must not be forgotten that the absorption of the Afghan principalities into one kingdom under Dost Muhammad, and again, after an interval, under Sher Ali, represented only a temporary, and to some degree an accidental, phase of their recent political history. In 1818, the Suddozai monarchy, after much internal dissension, was completely dismembered; and all its territories, except Herat, passed into the hands of different members of the Barakzai family. Dost Muhammad succeeded, after many vicissitudes, in obtaining possession of all the provinces which have since been recognized as belonging to Afghanistan. But he only established his permanent supremacy over Afghan Turkestan in 1850; Kandahar remained separate till 1856; and Herat did not surrender to him until just before he died in 1863. Immediately after Dost Muhammad's death, the ill-compacted and discordant kingdom was plunged into civil war, during the course of which Kabul and Herat became the head-quarters of rival Chiefs, until, after five years of anarchy, the Amir Sher Ali obtained the predominance which, partly through British countenance and support, he consolidated into a well defined kingdom. That kingdom, which it took Dost Muhammad a lifetime, and Sher Ali five years, to rebuild, has been again dissolved. Its provinces are left disconnected and masterless, and any attempt on our part to reconstitute them under one Government would commit us to a course of military and political interference which would certainly entangle us in great and protracted difficulties, and would end, as we believe, in failure.

6. We are of opinion, therefore, that the question of the resuscitation of the fallen kingdom of the Barakzais cannot now be entertained, and that we must accept the separation of its constituent provinces as our basis for the political reconstitution of Afghanistan. But, while the political conditions of the problem we have to deal with are thus altered, the military position, and the objects towards which our military and political action is directed, remain unchanged. It is our desire to avoid territorial annexation and the further extension of our administrative responsibilities. While maintaining a dominant influence over those provinces which form the outworks of our Indian Empire, we still desire to minimize our interference in their internal affairs; and it is still our wish to hold only such military positions as will enable us to maintain

that influence, by commanding the highways which cross our frontier. It has been to us a source of satisfaction to observe how fully the operations of the past autumn have justified the selection of the military positions secured under the Gandamak Treaty. When, in September last, a rapid march on Kabul became suddenly necessary, our forces already held open the two main lines of advance; our communications with India were established without difficulty, and our advanced position at Ali Khel gave us short and speedy access to the capital. Until all resistance has been overcome, and the situation has further developed, it is impossible to say precisely what military positions it may be necessary to hold permanently. But the unanimous opinion of the officers now holding high command in Afghanistan is that the military frontier should not be very materially extended beyond the line taken up under the treaty of last year, and to this line we propose to adhere as closely as circumstances permit.

7. In dealing with a disunited Afghanistan, the more difficult problems are presented by the remoter provinces. The value of Herat to India has been long recognized; and hitherto the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to keep it in the hands of an independent Afghan State whose interests on that frontier of Afghanistan were considered to be identical with our own. But the circumstances which dictated that policy have now entirely changed; the Afghan States which we maintained in possession of Herat have ceased to exist; and it has become necessary to make, without delay, upon a different basis, some fresh dispositions for the conservation of our interests in this important fortress and province. It is obvious, however, that the distance of Herat from India places it beyond the ordinary range of our military operations, and would, therefore, render difficult the exercise of direct political control. The annexation of Herat to Kabul or Kandahar would neither be popular at Herat, nor provide for the political security of a province peculiarly exposed to the intrigues and cupidity of powerful neighbours; while, as a separate State, Herat would be too weak to stand by itself, and might thus be compelled, in default of control from India (which, as we have already said, would be difficult), to look elsewhere for protection and support. For these reasons we concur in the decision which, as we understand, has already commended itself to Her Majesty's Government on grounds of Imperial policy, whereby Persia will be provisionally permitted to occupy Herat, under sufficient guarantees for her good administration of it, and for her adequate protection of British and Indian interests at that point, and with a special reservation of our right to occupy the place with British forces in certain eventualities.

8. While the terms of this understanding with Persia will, we feel certain, receive from Her Majesty's Government an attention proportionate to the magnitude of the question it raises, and the interests it involves, we are more immediately concerned with those conditions which directly affect our dealings with the rest of Afghanistan. Of these, one of the most important is the future boundary to be assigned to Herat; and this is a point so intimately connected with the territorial and political re-arrangement of the rest of Afghanistan that, if any room is left for misunderstanding or dispute as to the extent of the territory to be assigned to Persia, much confusion and embarrassment may ensue. We are not yet in a position to demarcate this boundary, but we conceive that the question is one that should be decided mainly and specially on considerations of Indian interests and policy; and we are of opinion that Furreh certainly, and possibly Lash Jowain also, should be excluded from the territories placed under Persian control. We are now actively engaged in pushing forward a railway towards Kandahar; and, believing, as we do, that the opening of such communication affords the surest guarantee not only for the peaceful development of the countries traversed, but for the permanent security of our frontier, we consider that Persia should be bound to contribute substantially towards the ultimate extension of this line to Herat. It will be apparent to Her Majesty's Government that such an extension of our Kandahar Railway will be a most effective means of ensuring the stability of any political arrangement with Persia regarding Herat, and will materially strengthen Persia in fulfilling her engagements.

9. The question of Seistan is nearly connected with that of Herat. The conditions which justified our intervention and arbitration in 1872 no longer apply; and if it is decided to make over Herat to Persia, we are prepared to recommend a revision of the Seistan boundary also in favour of Persia. This, however, is likewise a question on which we are not yet in a position to express a decided opinion; though we trust that the decision of it will be practically left to this Government when the general delimitation of the provinces of Afghanistan is considered.